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THE
PAULINE ΗΙΣΤΗ-ΤΗΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ

Λόγισμα το Ηρώ. ΝΟ. 1

AN HISTORICO-EXEGETICAL
INVESTIGATION

DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SACRED SCIENCES
AT THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DOCTORATE IN THEOLOGY

BY JOHN

REVIEWED BY MICHAEL AMBROSE MATHIS, S.T.L.
By the Commission of Holy Theology

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1920



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no.14



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school.
Studia theologica. no. 14.*

THE
PAULINE ΠΙΣΤΙΣ-ΤΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ

ACCORDING TO HEB. XI, 1

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REVEREND MICHAEL AMBROSE MATHIS, S.T.L.
OF THE CONGREGATION OF HOLY CROSS

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MY PROFESSOR AND FRIEND

THE REV. HEINRICH SCHUMACHER, S.T.D.

THIS WORK

IS GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY

DEDICATED



INTRODUCTION

Πίστις is undoubtedly one of the most important theological terms in the New Testament. Lightfoot goes so far as to say that "it assumes in the teaching of Our Lord, enforced and explained by St. Paul, the *foremost place* in the phraseology of Christian doctrine."¹ From the dawn of the Christian era to our own times, many volumes have been written about *πίστις* from various points of view. Among recent scientific works, that of Schlatter, *Der Glaube Im Neuen Testament*, might almost be called the classic on *Πίστις In the New Testament*. And in this work the author has, of course, treated the Pauline *πίστις* within the limits of his more general theme. A monograph, however, dealing specifically and scientifically with the Pauline *πίστις*, does not yet exist; hence, it is something to be desired. One needs but to read a few current definitions of this term, especially in non-Catholic writers, to agree with Lechler, "Was aber positiv der paulinische Begriff des Glaubens sei, darüber ist immer noch Streit."²

This misunderstanding and the status of the most recent opinion about the Pauline *πίστις* is frankly set forth by Johannes Weiss in these words: "Da ist vor allem und ganz besonders das Wort 'Glaube,' das bis heute zu so entsetzlichen Missverständnissen Anlass gibt, sei es dass man es im Gegensatz zu einem begründeten 'Wissen' als halbes, unsicheres, gemutmasstes Wissen oder Meinen versteht, oder

¹ St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, 157.

² *Das Apostol. und das Nachapostol. Zeitalter* (3 Aufl., 1885), s. 363, quoted from Bartmann's article in BS (1897), II, 41.

als ein trüges sich Verlassen oder ein unwürdiges sich Gefangengeben in eine fremde unverstandene Lehre."¹ The same author also points out the method by which this confusion can be cleared up, viz., by an historico-literary investigation of Heb. xi, 1: "Das Wort, dessen Geschichte man kennen muss, um es zu verstehen, ist von Paulus nicht geschaffen, es lag ihm vor als ein fertig abgestempelter Begriff";² and Heb. xi, 1 is suggested for this investigation, because for such a work "die beiden Umschreibungen, die der Hebräer-Brief in seiner berühmten Definition des Glaubens wählt, sind höchst bezeichnend."³ In a word, this verse is to be selected for the historico-literary investigation of the Pauline *πίστις*, because it has a literary history, and because, in the words of St. Augustine, "It is the standard definition of Faith."⁴

What gives an added exegetical interest to the problem, is the fact that there is as much confusion about the meaning of Heb. xi, 1 as there is about the Pauline *πίστις*. And the source of this confusion is not only the uncertainty about the meaning of *ὑποστασις*, the *pivotal term* of the whole verse, but also the dogmatic tendency always to define the Pauline *πίστις* as "conviction," or "confidence," or "foundation,"—no matter in what Pauline text or context the term happens to occur. Thus Delitzsch insists that here *ὑποστασις*, and hence *πίστις* means "Zuversicht";⁵ J. Weiss hails it as a striking example of "unbeugsamer Überzeugung";⁶ and Westcott is satisfied that "the general scope of the statement is to show that the future and the unseen can be made *real* by Faith."⁷ A whole litany of such variant and yet emphatic views about the meaning of *ὑποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 might be noted. But these are sufficient to

¹ *Das Urchristentum*, I, 322.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. *Enchiridion*, c. 8.

⁵ *Comm. on the Epist. to the Hebr.*, II, 210.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, I, 322.

⁷ The Epistle to the Hebrews, 351.

illustrate the existing confusion and contention regarding the sense of the Pauline *πιστις* of this verse. It is with the hope of aiding in clarifying this important theological term that I take up this historico-literary investigation of Heb. xi, 1: *Εστιν δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποστασις, πραγματων ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων.*

Without anticipating the investigation itself, we may preface it by saying what at a glance is evident to every one, viz., that the Pauline *πιστις* is here defined in two phrases: (a) *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*, and (b) *πραγματων ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*. The second phrase has been so generally interpreted as the "incontestable proof," or "the test," or "the conviction" of "things unseen," that there remains no longer any serious doubt about its meaning. Accordingly, we shall confine our investigation to the first element of the verse, or more precisely, to *υποστασις*, the term out of which most of the confusion regarding the passage has arisen.

After establishing the original text, we shall seek the light of Greek literary history for the interpretation of its decisive term, *υποστασις*. To that end, we shall not only review all the extant interpretations of the verse, among which those of the early Greek Fathers (the descendants of those very Greeks whose ears once rang with the Pauline *πιστις*) must be of great importance, but we shall also study the meaning of *υποστασις* in the ancient classic and *κοινη* literatures, where the term was prepared by its natural historical development for the Pauline author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is only by this method that we can force this ancient Greek past, the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1, to surrender its understanding of *πιστις*—*υποστασις*. And we have every reason to hope that by this light we shall dispel the darkness that now envelops this important verse; for, we believe with the ever-growing conviction of modern scholars that there is "contact" between the language of

the Greek Bible and the speech of the contemporary Hellenic world.

It is a most agreeable duty to express here sincere gratitude to the Rev. Dr. Heinrich Schumacher, my professor of New Testament Exegesis, under whose helpful and stimulating direction this monograph has been written. I am also happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to other professors at the Catholic University of America, and notably to Drs. Cöln, Butin, and Vaschalde, my masters in Old Testament Exegesis and Semitic Languages, to Dr. Shanahan, my preceptor in Dogma, to Dr. Aiken and the professors of Sacred Theology who have read the first draft of this work. Expressions of my sincere gratitude are also due the Very Rev. James Burns, C.S.C., Ph.D., and the Rev. Maurice Norckauer, C.S.C., for helpful suggestions in the presentation of the matter.

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PART I — HISTORICAL

PART I — HISTORICAL

CHAPTER I

THE TEXT

AT the very outset of this exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, it will be well to establish critically the original text. Because the original text will be "terra firma" for the whole investigation, and "lux in tenebris" for the history of the various interpretations of our verse. The commonly accepted critical evidence¹ is threefold: Greek uncial MSS., versions prior to the eighth century, and Patristic quotations.

I. *The critical evidence favoring the Textus Receptus*: Εστι δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποστασις, πραγματων ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων:

1. *Greek MSS.*: All Greek MSS. of critical value, except Codex Alexandrinus (A) and Codex Claromontanus (D^{Paul}).² The variance of the latter is so slight (the accusative case, υποστασιν, for the nominative), that it may be eliminated.

2. *Versions*:

A. For the Latin versions we note those given by Tischendorf:³ (a) Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium: The Latin translation⁴ of Augiensis Cantabrigiensis (F), Vulgate (vg^{Cle}), Demidovianus (demid).

(b) Sperandorum substantia, rerum argumentum non apparentum⁵: Amiatinus (am) Fuldensis (fu).

¹ Hammond, *Outlines of Textual Criticism Applied to the N. T.*, 1, 42.

² Tischendorf, *Novum Test. Graece*, etc., II, 820.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Hebrews* in *Cod. Augiensis* is preserved only in Latin.

⁵ "Apparentum" is obviously a careless spelling for "apparentium."

B. Bohairic: Faith is a firmness (ΟΥΤΑΧΡΟ)¹ of things hoped for and a proof of things not seen.

C. Arabic: Invenitur autem fides substantia eorum quae expectantur, evidentia rerum quae non cernuntur.²

D. Armenian: Quid est fides nisi certitudo rerum speratarum et argumentum rerum non apparentium.³

3. *Patristic Quotations:*

A. Greek Fathers: Clement of Alexandria,⁴ Origen (extant in the Latin translation of Rufinus),⁵ Cyril of Jerusalem,⁶ Gregory of Nyssa,⁷ John Chrysostom,⁸ Theodore of Mopsuestia,⁹ Cyril of Alexandria,¹⁰ Theodoret,¹¹ and John Damascene.¹²

B. Latin Fathers: Ambrose,¹³ and Jerome¹⁴ ("Non" of TR is changed to "necdum").

4. Papyrus P¹³ (saec. IV) in the British Museum with fragments of the Epistle to the Hebrews reads: *ελπιζομενων πραγματων υποστασις*.

II. *Critical evidence for OTHER TEXTS:*

A. *Εστι δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποστασις, πραγματων ελεγχος ου Βουλομενων*: only one Greek MS. Codex Alexandrinus (A).

B. *Est autem fides ispirantium* substantia rerum, accusator non *videntium*: Latin of the Graeco-Latin codices Claromontanus (d) and Sangermanensis (e), the latter not being of independent value, but a mere copy of Codex Claromontanus. It should be noted that the Epistle to the Hebrews

¹ *The Coptic Version of the N. T. etc.*, Ed. Horn, III, 528.

² Brianus Waltonus, *S. S. Biblia Polyglotta, etc.*, V, 873.

³ Translated by Dr. A. A. Vaschalde from the Armenian text of the American Biblical Society.

⁴ Berlin Ed. *Clemens Alexandrinus*, II, 117.

⁵ Migne, *P. G.*, 14, 979 C.

¹⁰ Migne, *P. G.*, 74, 989 C.

⁶ Migne, *P. G.*, 33, 506.

¹¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 82, 757 A.

⁷ Migne, *P. G.*, 45, 941 C.

¹² Migne, *P. G.*, 95, 980 B.

⁸ Migne, *P. G.*, 63, 151 B.

¹³ Migne, *P. L.*, 18, 521 B.

⁹ Migne, *P. G.*, 66, 965 B.

¹⁴ Migne, *P. L.*, 28, 448 C.

knew well the meaning of the Greek word *υποστασις* in this context, but apparently was unable to express it adequately in Syriac. Therefore, he translated with the next best word — *certitudo* (*cognitio*), and supported this weak expression by a paraphrase which would give the full meaning of *υποστασις*. Thus the Peshitto becomes not only valuable evidence for the originality of the TR, but also a precious and official interpreter in the early Syrian Church of *υποστασις* in the sense of a "presentation of future reality."

2. *St. Augustine's usual text* also varies with the TR: *Est autem fides sperantium substantia, convictio rerum quae non videntur*. At most this variant can only be the text of a LATIN VERSION of the time; and, of course, its value is derived from the Greek text of which it is a translation. As to this Greek text, there is no doubt that the second part of the verse — *convictio rerum quae non videntur* — translates *πραγματων ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*; and in the first part of the verse we find difficulty only with "sperantium." Does "sperantium" translate *ελπιζοντων*, or *ελπιζομενων*? In view of the fact that almost the whole threefold critical evidence favors *ελπιζομενων* as original, and since *ελπιζομενων*, as the Middle Voice, could be translated "sperantium," we may conclude that the Latin translator of Augustine's text rendered *ελπιζομενων* by "sperantium." Of course, we agree with Delitzsch¹ that this was not the best translation of *ελπιζομενων*. It probably came into being with Augustine's interpretation of *υποστασις*. It is certainly not testified to by the MSS., since only one Latin Version d (Claromontanus) has it.

3. *The text of the Cod. Claromontanus* runs: *Est autem fides ispirantium² substantia rerum, accusator non videntium*. The Cod. Sangermanensis with the same reading is only a copy of d. Since the Greek parallel is identical with the

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 207.

² "Ispirantium" is, no doubt, a corrupted spelling for "sperantium."

TR, we have here no different reading at all. The Latin translation, however, causes difficulties. Evidently, the first part is identical with Augustine's reading. The Greek parallel has *ελπιζομενων*. "Ispirantium" may, therefore, be explained in the same way as Augustine's "sperantium." But what about the second difference in the text: "Accusator non videntium" for *ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*? "Videntium" seems to be a harmonization with "ispirantium." And "accusator" — a term for juridical procedure — seems to betray this strange interpretation of the second part of the verse: *πιστις* is the accuser of those who do not see. This reading is, therefore, more interesting for the history of the interpretation than for the history of the text. Besides, let us note the words of Tischendorf on the general untrustworthiness of Cod. Claromontanus: "Graeca praebent formas 'Alexandr[in]as' quas dicunt, Latina inprimis in Epistola ad Hebraeos errores multos."¹

4. *Alexandrinus* (A) varies from TR by having the remarkable form *βουλομενων* for *βλεπομενων*. All other Greek MSS., all critical versions, and all Patristic quotations are against this reading. Besides, it is a curious reading, giving this unusual contrast of *πιστις*: *πιστις* is an *assurance of things hoped for* (e.g., heaven) and a *forced conviction of things not desired* (e.g., hell). Is this an intentional alteration of the original text, or only an error of the copyist? Indeed, if *βουλομενων* could not be explained as a transcriptional error, we should have a much more difficult problem in textual criticism before us. But we have good grounds for thinking that *βουλομενων* is a mistake in the transcription of *βλεπομενων*, since in the uncial MSS. ΒΛΕΠΟΜΕΝΩΝ might very easily be read ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΩΝ. For both words have the same number of characters, the same termination -ΟΜΕΝΩΝ, and the same initial letter Β. The transposition and inversion of ΑΕ of ΒΛΕΠΟΜΕΝΩΝ to ΟΥ of ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕ-

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 419.

NQN would not be extraordinary at all, since it is an ordinary mistake in the MSS. Hence, it is at least possible that in the uncial MSS. ΒΑΕΠΤΟΜΕΝQN was transcribed ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝQN.

The Patristic evidence, however, is decisive in this case. For, as Codex Alexandrinus was probably written at Alexandria,¹ the Alexandrian Patristic writers in their quotations of Heb. xi, 1 are of supreme interest. Clement and Cyril of Alexandria, and Origen witness, by their quotations of our verse, to *βλεπομενων*. Clement's testimony is weightiest and clearest, because his text antedates by two centuries the transcription recorded in Alexandrinus, and also because Clement has made it unmistakably clear that he read *πραγματων ου βλεπομενων* by giving for it in the context of his quotation the synonym *αφνους πραγματος*.² Accordingly, by the combined evidence of all other Greek MSS., all critical versions, and the decisive Patristic quotations, and in view of the fact that *βουλομενων* can possibly be explained as an error in transcription, we must eliminate the text of A as the original text of Heb. xi, 1.

Summarizing the investigation of the history of the text, we may say: In spite of some remarkable testimony in a few witnesses, which more or less betrays the difficulty translators had with *υποστασις*, we have in fact an overwhelming unanimity for the TR. In support of the TR we have the combined witness of practically all the critical evidence—the Greek MSS., all the critical versions, and strong Patristic quotations that go back to the first appearance of our verse in extant literature. Hence, we conclude that the text of Heb. xi, 1 in TR is the original text. For, in the words of Hammond, "the combined testimony of the earliest MSS. with the earliest versions, and quotations in the earliest writers, mark an undoubted reading."³

¹ F. G. Kenyon, in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, 917. — Art. Text.

² *Stromata*, II, 2. — Berlin Ed. *Clemens Alexandrinus*, II, 117.

³ *Op. cit.*, 106.

There still remains one more textual problem to consider, viz., the punctuation within the text itself. The history of the text has developed two problems of punctuation: (a) Should a comma be placed after *πιστις*, and (b) should a comma be placed before or after *πραγματων*?

The critical evidence for punctuation is unsatisfactory for both questions, and in the second it is divided (in the versions and Patristic quotations). For there is no, or only irregular, punctuation in the earliest uncial MSS. In such codices as record our verse, we have the following general confusion in the matter of punctuation: In Sinaiticus (Ⲱ) words are not separated, except where a new idea requires a new line¹; in Alexandrinus (A) "a very simple punctuation is introduced, consisting of a simple point at the end of a sentence followed by a break in the line"²; in Claremontanus (D^{Paul} and d) and Sangermanensis (E^{Paul} and e), we find the stichometric arrangement³; and Augiensis Cantabrigiensis (F^{Paul} and f) places a period after every word of the text.⁴ Hence, we conclude with Tischendorf⁵ that no sound argument can be taken from the punctuation in the earliest MSS.: "Luce clarius est ne argumentum quidem ad interpunctionem rectam decernendam hauriri posse ex priorum nuditate (as in Ⲱ),⁶ neque magis ex posteriorum copia signorum" (as in f).⁶

A. THE COMMA AFTER ΠΙΣΤΙΣ.

With Erasmus a comma was placed after *πιστις*. This comma put *υποστασις* and *ελεγχος* in apposition to *πιστις*. The construction would then yield the sense, "Faith really exists, etc.," — a remarkable and useless insistence on the obvious. But this comma is disappearing in the light of modern research. Olshausen undermined the principal ground upon which the comma was inserted after *πιστις*: "And

¹ Tischendorf, *Op. cit.*, III, 111.

⁴ Tischendorf, *Op. cit.*, III, 111.

² Hammond, *Op. cit.*, 142.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, III, 112.

³ Tischendorf, *Op. cit.*, III, 114 and 423.

⁶ My additions in parenthesis.

when in support of this construction, it is affirmed that *εστι* as copula cannot stand at the beginning of the sentence, such passages are forgotten as Luke viii, 11: *εστι δε αυτη η παραβολη*. In the preceding context of that passage it is said that the understanding of the parables is important, and then the transition is made to the explanation of the parables themselves. Just so here. In x, 38, it was said Faith is necessary; and in xi, 1, the question is answered, what is Faith."¹ A. T. Robertson, in the light of the most recent research, says of this objection: "*Εστιν* is also the accent at the beginning of the sentence, Heb. xi, 1."² And this emphasis "on the *εστι* denotes certainty of connection between the subject and the predicate, the assured truth of the affirmation made."³ Accordingly, in the absence of all certain critical evidence, and with the fall of the principal reason for placing a comma after *πιστις*, we conclude that no comma should be placed here.

B. THE COMMA BEFORE OR AFTER *πραγματων*.

From a mere glance at the text: *Εστι δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποσταςις πραγματων ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*, it will be observed that this definition or description of *πιστις* is two-fold: *ελπιζομενων υποσταςις* and *ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*. The difficulty arises with *πραγματων*. Does it belong to the first or to the second part of the verse? As we stated above, the punctuation in the earliest uncial MSS. is such as to preclude any sound argument being taken from them. Yet the inversion of the words *ελπιζομενων υποσταςις πραγματων* into *ελπιζομενων πραγματων υποσταςις* in the Papyrus P¹⁸ in the British Museum favors the view that *πραγματων* belongs to the first part.

We find more critical evidence on the point under discussion in the versions and the Patristic quotations. All the

¹ *Bibl. Comm. on the N. T.*, VI, 540.

² *A Grammar of the Greek N. T., in the Light of Historical Research*, 284.

³ *Delitzsch, Op. cit.*, II, 204.

Latin versions (except Amiatinus and Fuldensis), the Syriac, the Bohairic, and the Armenian place *πραγματων* in the first part of Heb. xi, 1, whereas the Arabic puts it in the second part of the verse. The Patristic writers are also divided in this matter. Those favoring *πραγματων* in the first part of the verse are: Origen,¹ Chrysostom,² Augustine,³ and Jerome⁴; and those favoring the other view are: Clement of Alexandria,⁵ Ambrose,⁶ Theodoret,⁷ and others. Thus, the critical evidence is divided so sharply as to make it almost impossible to decide the matter.

Since the Patristic period the place of this comma (either before or after *πραγματων*) has been discussed in every complete exegesis of Heb. xi, 1; and the opinion that *πραγματων* belongs to the second part of the verse has been constantly gaining ground. So much so that in the best recent texts Tischendorf does not even mention the variant for the comma after *πραγματων*, and Westcott and Hort call it a less probable punctuation. We agree with this modern opinion, because, in the words of Delitzsch, "*πραγμα* sometimes denotes an historical fact, sometimes a supersensuous reality: It is in the latter sense that *πραγματων* is used here; and so evidently belongs more properly to the *ου βλεπομενων*, in order to distinguish the unseen realities which are the objects of Faith from the shadowy dreams which are the creations of human fancy."⁸

Having established the original text of Heb. xi, 1 to be *Εστι δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποστασις, πραγματων ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*, we shall take up in the next chapter the HISTORY OF THE EXEGESIS of our verse, — what men have thought of Heb. xi, 1 from its first appearance in extant literature to the interpretations of our own day.

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 14, 979 C.

² Migne, *P. G.*, 63, 151 B.

³ *Op. cit.*, 121, 8.

⁴ Migne, *P. L.*, 26, 448 C.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, 117.

⁶ Migne, *P. L.*, 16, 521 B.

⁷ Berlin Ed. *Theodoret*, I, 91.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, II, 205.

CHAPTER II

INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT

1. IN THE GREEK FATHERS

Certainly the most important period in the exegetical history of Heb. xi, 1 is the Greek Patristic. For the Greek interpretation is not only the first exegesis of our verse, but it is also the interpretation of writers whose mother tongue was the *κοινή διαλεκτός* of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Hence, besides its importance for the history of the interpretation, the Greek Patristic understanding of *υποστασις*, the pivotal term of the verse, will be constantly noted because it has an historico-literary value of the greatest moment.

The first time we meet *υποστασις* in Patristic literature is in the EPISTLE TO DIOGNETUS, II, 1, where it is apparently used synonymously with *ειδος*. The author invites Diognetus to purify his mind from all prejudices and see of what *υποστασις* or *ειδος* the Pagan gods have been fashioned: *ιδε μη μονον τοις οφθαλμοις, αλλα και τη φρονησει, τινος υποστασεως η τινος ειδους τυγχανουσιν ους ερειτε και νομιζετε θεους.*¹ Although *υποστασις* seems to be synonymous with *ειδος*, it cannot be determined with certainty what it really means in this passage. If *υποστασις* is used synonymously with *ειδος*, then it means either form or an element of a composition, which were the meanings of *ειδος* at the time.² If it is not used synonymously with *ειδος*, then it is difficult to describe it more accurately than as something connected with essence.

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 2, 1169 A.

² Cf. R. Hirzel, *Ousia*, *Philologus*, Band 72 (1913), 43, where he says that *ειδος* is not confined to the limits of Platonic metaphysics, "mag man darunter die das Wesen eines Dinges scharf umschreibende Form oder das zur Komposition eines Ganzen dienende Element verstehen."

If we can trust Goodspeed's *Index Apologeticus*,¹ *υποστασις* is not in the vocabulary of Justin, but we are indebted to his disciple TATIAN for an extensive use of the word. *Υποστασις* occurs seven times in his *Προς Ελληνας*. In c. 5, God is called the Lord of all things, because He is the original *υποστασις* of all things: Ο γαρ Δεσποτης των ολων, αυτος υπαρχων του παντος η υποστασις, κατα μεν την μηδεπω γεγενημενην ποιησιν μονος ην.² Certainly Tatian did not mean to say here that God is the original essence from which everything flows (as the pantheists would say), because he explains the *υποστασις* by: He existed originally alone, when no creation had yet taken place. Not only because He existed before (temporally) the creation, but also in contrast to the creation (*κατα*), as author of the creation, He is called *υποστασις*: *The REALLY EXISTING BEING in contrast to the NON-EXISTING BEING*.

One of the most interesting usages of *υποστασις* in the whole Patristic literature is found in c. 7, 2, of the same work. The author is here establishing the Christian Belief in the resurrection of the body at the last day, which doctrine the Greeks ridiculed. But it is not so ridiculous, wrote Tatian. For just as one does not exist before he is born (and of course "*I did not know who I was, though I existed in the υποστασις of fleshly matter*"), and when actually born he is convinced that he really exists; so in the same way once having been born and by death existing and seen no longer he shall again exist. . . . For should his body be burned, or dispersed into rivers and seas, or even torn into pieces by wild beasts, yet he is laid up in the storehouse of a mighty Lord who, when He pleases, will restore to its pristine condition the *υποστασις* which is visible to Him alone: Ωσπερ γαρ ουκ αν πριν η γενεσθαι τις ημην ουκ εγινωσκον, μονον δε εν υποστασει της σαρκικης υλης

¹ Cf. p. 280.

² Migne, P. G., 6, 813 C.

υπηρχον, γεγονως δε ο μη παλαι δια της γενεσεως το ειναι πεπιστευκα· τον αυτον τροπον ο γενομενος και δια θανατου μηκετ' ων αυθις τε μηκεθ' ορωμενος εσομαι παλιν ωσπερ μη παλαι γεγονως ειτα γεννηθεις. . . . θεος δε ο βασιλευων, οτε βουλεται, την ορωτην αυτω μονω υποστασιν αποκαταστησει προς τον αρχαιον.¹

We have here three parallel expressions: Tatian compares the BIRTH of man with the RESURRECTION of the body; also the manner of EXISTENCE IN THE ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ OF FLESHLY MATTER before birth with the manner of EXISTENCE OF A CORPSE before the resurrection; the third and apologetic comparison makes use of the other two,—just as BIRTH can be predicated *as a future reality* of the manner of EXISTENCE IN THE ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ OF FLESHLY MATTER, so the RESURRECTION can be predicated *as a future reality* of the manner of EXISTENCE PROPER TO A CORPSE (which is also called an *υποστασις*). What is the meaning of *υποστασις* in these comparisons?

We must first of all establish the meaning of the various expressions used:

1. "Before my existence" (*γενεσθαι*) from the context means "before my visible existence on earth."

2. "I did not know (imperf. *εγινωσκον*) who I was,"—the imperfect *εγινωσκον* demands the sense, "I was in a condition where I did not know who I was."

3. "But I was already existing (*υπηρχον*) in the *υποστασις* of fleshly matter." *Υπηρχον* means *real existence*; and the only such existence before birth in fleshly matter is existence in the maternal womb.

4. "But after having come into existence by birth I believed in the reality of my existence."

With this fact Tatian compares the resurrection thus:

1. "After coming into existence, and by death existing and seen no longer,"

¹ Migne, P. G., 6, 817 C-820 A.

2. "I shall be again,"

3. "like the former, not existing and afterward receiving existence."

4. Reason: For God the King, when He wishes, will restore the *υποστασις* of the dead body which is visible to Him alone unto its former state.

By "*τις ημην*" ("Who I was") is expressed what Tatian understood by the term "before my existence," namely, the time when he was in the womb of his mother. Thus, (1) the existing being in the womb of the mother is the *υποστασις* for the existence on earth, (2) as the body existing in death is the *υποστασις* for the risen body. Hence, the resurrection is not so ridiculous as the Pagans thought. For just so surely as he who exists in the womb of his mother will have real life on earth, so he who exists somehow in death will rise again. The example of coming into existence by birth is the easier, and is used for the illustration of the more difficult idea of resurrection.

For the interpretation of the expression "existing in the *υποστασις* of fleshly matter" (existence in the maternal womb) in these comparisons, it seems quite certain that the author does not wish to say that such an existence is merely *temporally* before birth, or similar to the existence of a corpse (for surely there is little similarity), but rather that it is a GUARANTEE OF FUTURE EXISTENCE, A CERTAINTY OF FUTURE REALITY, or better still, the ANTICIPATION OF A FUTURE AND MORE COMPLETE REALITY. For the EXISTENCE in the womb of the mother is REAL though incomplete, as is evident from the expression qualifying EXISTENCE in the womb, "I did not know WHO I WAS" (*τις ημην*). In a word, something was lacking to this manner of existence. All this is expressed in *υποστασις*: It is a GUARANTEE and a CERTAINTY OF A FUTURE REALITY, a REALITY WHICH IS POSSESSED NOW TO A LIMITED EXTENT BUT WHICH WILL BE POSSESSED MORE COMPLETELY IN THE

FUTURE,—IT IS A REAL ANTICIPATION OF A FUTURE REALITY.

ATHANAGORAS also speaks of the *υποστασις* as a quality of possession, saying that the angels to whom was intrusted the *υποστασις* of power and the government of the world abused them, *οι δε ενυβρισαν και τη της ουσιας υποστασει και τη αρχη*.¹ What is the meaning of *υποστασις* in this citation?

There is no doubt that *ουσια* here means possession or power.² Happily Athanagoras then gives an example of such angels as have abused the *υποστασις της ουσιας* and the *αρχη*, namely, those angels who in Gen. vi, 1-4 took wives of the daughters of man and bore giants. These abused the *υποστασις* of their possession or power. The *υποστασις της ουσιας* or the *υποστασις* of their power is identified with *αρχη* (government), except that *αρχη* is a specification, i.e., to their power belongs the government. Since we have here a contrast between the authority which gives the power and the medium which uses, or better, abuses, the power, the *υποστασις* must express the connection between the power of the authority and that of the medium, the *conditio sine qua non* under which the medium can use the *ουσια*, i.e., the TITLE-DEED, the AUTHORIZATION to the power and government, which can be abused. Accordingly, *υποστασις* means TITLE-DEED, or GUARANTEED RIGHT.

It will be interesting to note even now the various meanings of the term *υποστασις* thus far met with:

1. In the Letter to Diognetus *υποστασις* probably means ESSENCE or SOMETHING CONNECTED WITH ESSENCE.
2. In Tatian *υποστασις* is used as the emphasis of REALITY in contrast to NON-REALITY, as a GUARANTEE, CERTAINTY, and ANTICIPATION OF A FUTURE REALITY.
3. In Athanagoras *υποστασις* signifies GUARANTEE or TITLE-DEED.

¹ *Supplicat. pro Christ.*, XXIV, 4, — Migne, *P.G.*, 6, 948 B.

² Cf. Hürzel, *Op. cit.*, Band 72 (1913), 43 sq.

Is there any connection between the three meanings? Certainly. For the author of the Letter to Diognetus, *υποστασις* means *simply reality*; for Tatian, it is an anticipated possession of a *future reality*; and for Athanagoras, a guarantee of a *present reality*. The common element is *reality*.

We now pass on to IRENAEUS in a new field of literature, the Gnostic, that interesting literature, through which, as Bigg¹ says, "these scientific terms were introduced into theology. *Ουσια, υποστασις, υποκειμενον, ομοουσιος*, all occur in Irenaeus," as in the philosophy of the time, where *υποστασις* and *ουσια* "mean precisely the same thing."² Irenaeus uses them synonymously in Contr. Haer. I, 15. In this passage Irenaeus protests against the ravings of the Gnostic Marcus who, though admitting God to be incorporeal, yet conceives the generation of God out of a multitude of letters of the alphabet. Our author thus states the dilemma: *Και ον ασωματον και ανουσιον ονομαζεις, την τουτου ουσιαν και την υποστασιν εκ πολλων γραμματων, ετερων εξ ετερων γεννωμενων, κατασκευαζεις.*³ Here *υποστασις* and *ουσια* are clearly used synonymously. We have seen that the preceding authors employ *υποστασις* in the sense of GUARANTEE OF REALITY, as the ANTICIPATED REALITY. But Irenaeus, in identifying *υποστασις* with *ουσια*, the EXISTING REALITY, clearly marks a step in the development of the term, which becomes more evident by a note of the same author, especially interesting and important for the exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, Contr. Haer. IV, 21. Irenaeus here gives a definition of *πιστις*, which though not an explicit exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, yet is strikingly similar to the *Syriac text* of our verse, and even foreshadows the common Patristic exegesis of Heb. xi, 1. Speaking of Abraham as the prophet and example of *πιστις*, Irenaeus makes the interesting observa-

¹ Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, 164, f. n. 1.

² *Op. cit.*, 164.

³ Migne, *P. G.*, 7, 625 B.

tion that Abraham believed in things future (which are also "things hoped for"), *as if they were already accomplished*: Illo quidem credente futuris *quasi iam factis* propter promissionem Dei.¹ Here we have *πιστις* as the REPRESENTATION OF A FUTURE REALITY, as if it were already an accomplished fact: Futuris quasi iam factis. This bears a striking resemblance to the Syriac rendering of *ἐλπίζομενων υποστασις* of Heb. xi, 1: Est autem fides persuasio super iis, quae sunt in spe, ac si essent ipsis (intellige credentibus) in actu sive effectu.² Then our author goes on to give what has a broad parallelism with the second part of Heb. xi, 1, *ἐλεγχος ου βλεπομενων*, when he says, "nobis quoque similiter per fidem speculantibus eam quae est in regno haereditatem."³ This is the first, though vague, indication of Heb. xi, 1, and means plainly per fidem videmus, quae non iam videtur, *i.e.*, "haereditatem in regno," or: *βλεπομεν δια πιστεως ου βλεπομενα*. The *anticipated possession* of a future reality (Tatian) is here a vivid *representation* of a future and *complete* reality ("as if they were already accomplished").

Up to this point we have been considering the common Patristic usage of the term *υποστασις* prior to Clement of Alexandria, because until his time our text itself is not found. Yet this earliest Christian usage is important, since it represents the closest link to the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1 in its principal difficulty, namely, the meaning of the term *υποστασις*. As the result of this investigation we may note the chief usages of the term found: *υποστασις* has been used in the sense of ESSENCE, SOMETHING CONNECTED WITH ESSENCE, REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY, GUARANTEE, CERTAINTY, OR ANTICIPATION OF A FUTURE REALITY, a REALITY NOT YET COMPLETE, and a REPRESENTATION OF A FUTURE AND COMPLETE REALITY.

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 7, 1044 A.

² Estius, *Comm.*, in Cap. XI, — Epist. ad Hebraeos, vers. 1, 275; cf. also p. 5 of this Dissertation.

³ Migne, *P. G.*, 7, 1044 A.

In CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA we find the first statement of our text, which he advances as scriptural confirmation, and, what is more important still, as an equation of his definition of *πιστις*. In passing, we may note that much of the *Stromata* is devoted to *πιστις*. In fact, Clement is the first to give us a well-rounded treatment of the doctrine of Faith. But what is of the highest interest to the student of the development of religion (especially from the linguistic point of view) is the fact that in Clement the Christian *πιστις* is viewed in the light of the classical, which has profoundly affected the terminology of *πιστις* as an intellectual assent (*συγκαταθεσις*).¹ In *Stromata*, II, 2, Clement argues that through *πιστις* alone can we come to the knowledge of God. Then he defines *πιστις* in the following terms: *προληψις εκουσιος εστι, θεοσεβειας συγκαταθεσις, ελπιζομενων υποστασις, πραγματος ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων, κατα τον θειον Αποστολον*.² Then follows in the next few chapters a further elucidation of *συγκαταθεσις*, *θεοσεβεια*, *εκουσιος*, and *προληψις* in the light of classical Greek antiquity. That Clement's definition of *πιστις* is equated by Heb. xi, 1 is unmistakable. What is the meaning of the individual terms of this equation?

1. *Συγκαταθεσις*: The sense of *συγκαταθεσις* is clear from the immediate context. Clement, after quoting the Apostle, continues: Other philosophers have defined *πιστις* as an ASSENT to an unseen object: *Αλλοι δ' αφρους πραγματος εννοητικην συγκαταθεσιν επεδωκαν ειναι την πιστιν*.³ And he adds the important words: *Ωσπερ αμελει την αποδειξιν αγνοουμενου πραγματος φανεραν συγκαταθεσιν*:⁴ As certainly

¹ Origen (*Contr. Cel.*, III, 38, 39), Cyril of Jerusalem (*Cat.*, V, X), John Damascene (*Expos. of the Orthodox Faith*, IV, XI), and others have defined *πιστις* as a *συγκαταθεσις*, and Theodoret (*Ouratio Graec.*, I) repeats Clement of Alexandria almost verbatim in his dissertation *Περί Πιστεως*.

² Berl. Ed. *Clemens Alexandrinus*, II, 117.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Migne, *P. G.*, 8, 940 A.

the proof of an unknown thing is an evident assent. In the first instance *πιστις* was called an ASSENT (*συγκαταθεσις*). Here PROOF (*αποδειξις*) is called ASSENT (*συγκαταθεσις*). Thus we have the identification of *πιστις* with *αποδειξις*. *Αποδειξις* (*απο-δεικνυμι* = present) originally means PRESENTATION of a reality, and includes the meaning that something which was not present (materially or mentally) is MADE PRESENT. Thus *αποδειξις* is a proof in so far as it PRESENTS A REALITY. If we consider in this light the identification *πιστις* = *συγκαταθεσις* = *αποδειξις*, then *πιστις* is to be understood as the POWER WHICH MAKES A NON-PRESENT REALITY TO BE A PRESENT REALITY. This REPRESENTATION is produced by *πιστις*, as Clement expressly states: *προαποδεικνυντος τινος αυτω δια της πιστεως την αποδειξιν*.¹

The manner in which *πιστις* thus makes things to be PRESENT is plastically set forth in *Stromata*, II, 4. Clement here distinguishes between the *απιστοι* and the *πιστοι*. The *απιστοι*, clinging to visible things, assert that those things alone exist which can be touched and handled, defining *σωμα* and *ουσια* to be the same thing. Not so with the *πιστοι*, those who love *πιστις*, "Lo, I make new things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath the heart of man conceived" (Is. lxiv, 4; 1 Cor. ii, 9). It is these things which the Christian sees through *πιστις*. *Πιστις* creates in man a real means of perception: *Καινω οφθαλμω, καινη ακοη, καινη καρδια, οσα ορατα και ακουστα, καταληπτα δια της πιστεως και συνεσεως, πνευματικως λεγοντων, ακουοντων, πραττοντων των του Κυριου μαθητων*.² Here we have as an illustration a wonderful contrast between both a MATERIAL REALITY and a SPIRITUAL REALITY, and the means of perceiving the two; what we see with our material eyes, hear with our material ears, love with our material heart, is MATERIAL REALITY; besides these material senses which

¹ Migne, P. G., 8, 940 A.

² *Ibid.*, 945 B.

guarantee a material reality, there are spiritual senses, replacing the material faculty in another realm of thought but *guaranteeing the REALITY of the perceived object* — it is *πιστις*. By *πιστις* we possess a new eye, a new ear, and a new heart — new things become visible, hearable, perceptible. Hence, the conclusion must be: *Πιστις* makes its objects as PRESENT to us as the material senses do their objects. *Πιστις* presents realities as truly as our material senses do, or *πιστις* gives the same *GUARANTEE for the REALITY* of its objects as do the material senses.

2. *Προληψις*. Clement not only borrows *προληψις* from Epicurus (who also defined *πιστις* as a *προληψις*) but also quotes his definition of the term: *επιβολην επι τι εναγες, και επι την εναγη του πραγματος επινοιαν*.¹ This is the classical passage. It means "the throwing oneself toward the VERY REAL and toward the clearer understanding of a thing which is in REALITY." This is a kind of anticipation or pre-conception of reality. Thus nobody can, as Clement then proceeds to show, "make a judicial inquiry, nobody can raise a question, nor even argue without this *προληψις*." For something must be taken for granted. It is of secondary importance for us to know that without being prepared for the acceptance of the reality we are unable to do anything. But it is of primary importance for us to note that *πιστις* as a *προληψις* is the *preparedness a priori to accept the REALITY*, and that this *preparedness to accept* is already the PERCEPTION OF THE REALITY. Thus *πιστις* becomes the REPRESENTATION OF THE REALITY IN ADVANCE, the ANTICIPATION OF REALITY.

Whence we conclude that for Clement *πιστις*, as a *συγκαταθεσις*, is the REPRESENTATION OF A REALITY, and, as a *προληψις*, it is the REPRESENTATION OF THE REALITY BY ANTICIPATION. We have here a combination of Tatian's *υποστασις* = "anticipated possession" and Irenaeus' *πιστις* = "vivid representation of a reality."

¹ Migne, P. G., 8, 948 B.

After having obtained a clear idea of Clement's *πιστις*, it is of interest to us to know how he explains *υποστασις* which is identified with *πιστις* in Heb. xi, 1. I have found two usages of *υποστασις* in the writings of Clement: (a) in the participial form (*υποσταντος*), as the EMPHASIS OF REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY; (b) *υποστασις*, as the TITLE-DEED TO PROPERTY.

In Stromata V, 4, Clement maintains that the Greeks plagiarized from the Hebrews in their doctrines. Thus Plato is accused of having taught that the world was created. Whereupon Clement remarks that Plato here not only shows that the earth was created, but also points out that it was generated as a son by God, — when in a state of non-existence it derived its being from Him alone, — *Ὡς ἀν ἐκ μόνου γενομένου καὶ ἐκ μὴ οντος υποσταντος*.¹ We have *υποσταντος* clearly as a contrast to NON-REALITY (*μὴ οντος*). Hence, *υποσταντος* must be an emphasis of REALITY.

The use of *υποστασις* in Stromata II, 18, is most interesting. Some have thought that here we have the first instance of *υποστασις* as a term of distinction in the Trinity. In the words of Wilson,² "here Clement seems to designate the Human Nature of Christ — as being the quantum quid in addition to the Three Persons of the Godhead." But that this interpretation is wholly a priori and a complete misunderstanding of Clement's terminology will be evident from the sequel. For in the text there is no indication whatsoever of either the Human Nature of Christ, or of a distinction in the Godhead. Such a curious interpretation of the text very probably is merely the projection of the idea that *υποστασις* means person into the passage, and then the invention of the Human Nature of Christ to answer to the "fourth *υποστασις*," which the *τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου τεταρτὴν υποστασιν* of the text calls for. It is true that this passage

¹ Migne, P. G., 9, 136 B.

² *The Writings of Clement of Alexandria*, II, 56.

might have remained shrouded in darkness, had not the recent papyri studies brought to light an old but forgotten meaning of *υποστασις* = TITLE-DEEDS.¹

In Stromata, II, 18, Clement speaks of Christian ethics, especially of the Christian virtues. He enumerates expressly four virtues, — piety, liberality, justice, and humanity. Several times in the chapter he speaks of the law that gave certain prescriptions for the exercise of virtues, *e.g.*, from the "first fruits" the priests of the Old Law were to be maintained. Then passing to the Christian law he emphasizes the idea that the Christian law is also *humane*, — that HUMANITY IS COMBINED WITH THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUES. The famous text where *υποστασις* is used occurs in an illustration of this doctrine. Clement takes his analogy from horticulture. By the civil law, newly planted trees were to be nourished three years in succession, and no fruit was to be plucked till the fourth year; this fruit was to be reserved to God as the fourth year's lawful tribute. Clement then applies these facts to Christian life. In the fourth year the virtues which are the fruit of *πιστις* (piety, liberality, justice, and humanity) are consecrated to God (justice and humanity are connected), the fourth *υποστασις* of the Lord: *Η τετρας των αρετων καθιερουνται τω θεω, της τριτης ηδη μορης συναππουσης, επι την του Κυριου τεταρτην υποστασιν.*² The parallel expresses this idea: since the fruit of the fourth year is by law dedicated to God as *first-fruit*, so the four virtues are dedicated to God as (*επι* with the Acc. can here only express finality)³ the FOURTH *Υποστασις* of the Lord, or as the fourth year's lawful *υποστασις*. According to the meaning of *υποστασις* in earlier documents and in Clement

¹ Cf. Moulton, *Egyptian Rubbish Heaps*, 27 sq., after showing that Grenfel and Hunt in their Papyri-studies have given us a new meaning for *υποστασις*, says: "In other words this word may be translated title-deeds."

² Migne, *P. G.*, 8, 1087 B.

³ Cf. Pape.

himself, the term could express the **REAL POSSESSION**, the **REALITY BELONGING TO THE LORD**. But the addition of the idea of the law in this instance suggests the only possible meaning to be that which we find also in the papyri, namely, the **LAWFUL PROPERTY**, or the **TITLE-DEED** of the Lord. This **TITLE-DEED**, however, includes absolutely the **REALITY** of the possession; it emphasizes rather the legality, the lawfulness of the fact that this **REALITY** belongs to God.

Finally, in the light of these two usages of the term *υποστασις* can we reconstruct Clement's interpretation of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* of Heb. xi, 1? As already noted, Clement equated his definition of *πιστις* (the **REPRESENTATION** or **PRESENTATION OF A SPIRITUAL REALITY**) with Heb. xi, 1. Furthermore, the choice of Clement's interpretation of *υποστασις ελπιζομενων* lies between the two meanings of the term *υποστασις* (as used by him), which senses, when taken in connection with our text, would yield: 1. *πιστις* is the representation of the **REALITY** of things hoped for; 2. *πιστις* is the (lawful) **TITLE-DEED** for the **REALITY** of things hoped for.

Whichever of the two meanings we accept, the sense of the two formulae is essentially the same. For whoever has *πιστις*, has the **REALITY** of things hoped for, except that the second formula adds the interesting observation that the possessor of *πιστις* is not only in possession of the **REALITY** of things hoped for, but that he is in possession **LAWFULLY**, — that he has a **RIGHT** to this possession. We may here quote the words of Moulton:¹ "This word (*υποστασις*) may be translated title-deeds. Can we not see what depth of meaning that puts into the word? 'Faith is the title-deeds of things hoped for' — men and women who received a promise from God counted that promise as being the title-deed to something they could not see yet, but which they were going to see some day."

¹ *Op. cit.*, 23.

Lastly, Clement's interpretation of *ἐπιζόμενων υποστάσις* of Heb. xi, 1, either as (a) the REPRESENTATION OF THE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR, or (b) the TITLE-DEEDS TO THE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR, completes and illustrates what we found to be the most common meaning of *υποστάσις* in the preceding writers, viz., the EMPHASIS OF REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY.

With ORIGEN we enter the epochal field of Patristic literature in which *υποστάσις* became the technical term for "Person" in the Christological and Trinitarian controversies. It is not less important to the exegete than to the dogmatist to realize that in the process by which *υποστάσις* took on this technical meaning, the previous sense of the term (*reality* in contrast to *non-reality*) controlled the development. To the dogmatist it is important in so far as it gives the historical reason for the employment of *υποστάσις* as a term of distinction in the Trinity, and to the exegete it is interesting to see how the basic meaning of *υποστάσις*, elsewhere maintained, in these controversies controls the development of the term as "Person." Accordingly, within the limits of this interest to the exegete the meaning of *υποστάσις* in the Christological and Trinitarian controversies is pertinent to the exegesis of Heb. xi, 1.

As far as I can ascertain, Origen is the first writer to use *υποστάσις* as a term of distinction in the Godhead. In the words of Bigg,¹ "the word for Person in Origen is commonly Hypostasis." The constant use of *υποστάσις* to express the Personal distinction of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost occurs in the first three chapters of Origen's *De Principiis*. In *De Princip.*, I, 2, the Son is called the Wisdom of God. But lest some think that this Wisdom is a mere quality of the Father, he remarks, *De Princip.*, I, 2, "Let no one imagine that we mean anything *insubstantivum*,² when we call Him the Wisdom of God." We could

¹ *Op. cit.*, 168 sq.

² Migne, *P. G.*, 11, 180 B.

translate simply: "Let no one imagine that we mean anything *unreal*." But he continues, "If then it is rightly understood, the Only-Begotten Son of God is the Wisdom hypostatically existing (substantialiter)." ¹ What we must conclude from these two instances, although they are preserved only in a Latin translation, is that Origen considers *υποστασις* (= substantia) as the emphasis of the REAL, INDIVIDUAL, or PERSONAL EXISTENCE. Where he uses it as an expression for the Personality he indirectly includes the emphasis of the REALITY, since the REALITY is the *conditio sine qua non* for the Personality.

Origen also uses *υποστασις* in the sense of GUARANTEE, which shows that although the term was used by him so largely in the sense of Person, still it retained its previous meaning. In *Contr. Cel.*, VI, 56, he says that God may send external evils for pedagogical reasons, as fathers chastise their children to bring about conversion. Thus, in the evils sent against Jerusalem the Jews had the *υποστασις* in these sufferings from the enemy for their being brought to repentance: *Την υποστασιν εχοντα εν τοις απο των πολεμων πονοις, προσαγομενοις αυτοις εις επιστροφην*.² Here *υποστασις* clearly means the GUARANTEE OF A FUTURE REALITY, which in our case is REPENTANCE.

Whence we may conclude that in the general use of the term *υποστασις*, Origen understands by it REALITY or GUARANTEE OF A FUTURE REALITY, and even as the technical term for PERSON, the old meaning of the word, the EMPHASIS OF REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY, is apparent.

Origen also quotes Heb. xi, 1 in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*. Unfortunately, this is preserved to us only in a Latin translation by Rufinus. It is not a strict exegesis of our text, and under ordinary circumstances it should be passed over with the aforesaid observation, were

¹ Migne, P. G., 11, 130 C.

² Berl. Ed. Origen, II, 127.

it not for the fact that from the context it seems to favor an interpretation of *ἐλπίζομενων υποστασις* which is followed by later writers, namely, the FOUNDATION OF THINGS HOPED FOR. In discussing the plight of Abraham, when in his old age he was promised a son, Origen remarks that from the natural point of view the patriarch could only despair. But on considering the promises of God, HOPE sprang up in him and he BELIEVED. It is in connection with this statement, viz., that as in Abraham's case so in all others HOPE is inseparably connected with Faith, Heb. xi, 1 is quoted: *Apostolus coniungit et spem, sciens fidei spem inseparabiliter cohaerere, sciens et in Epistola ad Hebraeos idem docet dicens: EST AUTEM FIDES SPERANDARUM RERUM SUBSTANTIA, INDICIUM NON APPARENTIUM.*¹ Further on our author shows how FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY are connected: *Et puto quod prima salutis initia, et ipsa FUNDAMENTA FIDES est; profectus vero et augmenta aedificii SPES est; perfectio autem et culmen totius operis CHARITAS.*² From this evidence it would not be legitimate to conclude that Origen understood *ἐλπίζομενων υποστασις* of Heb. xi, 1 to be the FOUNDATION OF THINGS HOPED FOR, which is the interpretation of our text found in later writers and championed (as the chief meaning of the term *υποστασις*) by no less a theologian than Stentrup.³ I cannot accept this explanation of Origen's interpretation for the following reasons:

1. Origen is comparing FAITH, HOPE, and CHARITY by an analogy. The analogy is between the general doctrine of *salvation* and an *edifice* in which FAITH is compared to the FOUNDATION (*Et puto quod firma salutis initia, et ipsa*

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 14, 980 C.

² Migne, *P. G.*, 14, 981 A.

³ F. Stentrup, *Zum Begriff der Hypostase* (Zk. Th. I (1877)), p. 73, "Wir dürfen für ausgemacht annehmen . . . dass sie (*υποστασις* = Fundament) die ursprüngliche ist, und die gewöhnliche war."

FUNDAMENTA FIDES est); HOPE to the added parts of the structure (profectus vero et augmenta *aedificii* SPES est); and CHARITY to the finished product (perfectio autem et *culmen totius operis* CHARITAS). So in applying this connection between FIDES and SPES to Heb. xi, 1 (for Origen used our text to show that FAITH and HOPE are inseparably connected) one could say only at most that FAITH is *like* a FOUNDATION for things HOPED FOR, because the statement of the connection between FAITH and HOPE is only an *analogy*.

2. FOUNDATION is not the ordinary meaning of SUBSTANTIA (*υποστασις*) in the writings of Origen. We have found that our author employs *υποστασις* to express the EMPHASIS OF REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY, and also in the technical sense of PERSON.

3. The notion that *υποστασις* means "foundation" is based on the false popular philology that derives the term quite correctly from verb *υφισταται*, but then assigns to it an incorrect meaning. Hatch¹ has shown that the term is derived from *υφισταται* and expresses *emphatic existence* or *reality*.

Hence, we conclude that Origen did not give a strict interpretation of Heb. xi, 1 in this passage. He used our text merely to show from Scripture that FAITH and HOPE are inseparably connected.

As a disciple of Origen, and later as head of the Catechetical School and Bishop of Alexandria, DIONYSIUS is interesting for the current notion of *υποστασις*, not because he has left us an exegesis of our text, but rather in this that he introduced into the Trinitarian and Christological controversies the preceding meaning of the term (an EMPHASIS OF REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY) by verbally

¹ Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, p. 275: "The term Hypostasis is the conjugate of the verb *υφισταται*, which had come into use as a more emphatic form than *ειναι*."

contrasting *υποστασις* with *ανυποστατον*. In his *Epist. ad Paul. Samosat.*, our author says that the Word, Wisdom, and Form of God are not the word, wisdom, and form of man. The former have an INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE: *Dei autem forma, Verbum ipsius et sapientia Filius Dei et Deus idem ipse confidendus est.*¹ Whereas this is not true of man — his word, wisdom, power, and form are *insubstantial* *partes* of his make-up: *verbum enim hominis et sapientia et virtus et forma insubstantiales partes unius hominis aspiuntur.*² Here “insubstantial” (*ανυποστατα*)³ means a quality not having INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE. Whence we see that for Dionysius *υποστασις* is characterized by an EMPHASIS OF INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE in contrast to NON-INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE, or by a REALITY IN ITS COMPLETENESS.

Although ALEXANDER, the Bishop of Alexandria, did not leave us an exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, still his characterization of the essence of the term *υποστασις* must be noted. In his *Letter to the Bishops of the Arian Blasphemy* (preserved by Theodoret), Alexander first notes that the Father and the Son are two inseparably existing REALITIES, *αχωριστα πραγματα δυο*.⁴ Then he goes on to say that the Word cannot be included in the things which were made out of nothing, as John proved when he said, “All things were made by Him” (John i, 3). For John showed the proper mode of His *υποστασις* when he said, “In the beginning was the Word, etc.”: *Την γαρ ιδιοτροπον αυτου υποστασιν εδηλωσεν ειπων · Εν αρχη ην ο Λογος, και ο Λογος ην προς τον Θεον.*⁵

What is the meaning of *υποστασις* here? The sense may be given in three propositions:

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 28, 1562 D.

² *Ibid.*

³ Petavius has preserved or reconstructed the Greek text: *Λογος γαρ ανθρωπου, και σοφια και δυναμις, και μορφη ανυποστατα μερη του ενος ανθρωπου θεωρεται*. Cf. *De Trinit.*, Lib. IV, c. 8, p. 195.

⁴ Migne, *P. G.*, 82, 893 B.

⁵ *Ibid.*

1. *Υποστασις* is something which can be predicated of a *πραγμα*, i.e., of a REALLY EXISTING THING.

2. The *υποστασις* of the Son demands that He be distinguished from all created things. Therefore, the Son's *υποστασις* is from one point of view characterized by ETERNAL PREEXISTENCE.

3. The MANNER OF THIS ETERNAL PREEXISTENCE is described as the PROPER MANNER of the Son's *υποστασις*, i.e., *εν αρχη ην* and *ην προς τον θεον*. These modes of EXISTING in His PREEXISTENCE explain HOW HE WAS, i.e., HIS INDIVIDUAL AND PREEXISTING REALITY, HIS DIVINE PERSONALITY. INDIVIDUALITY and PREEXISTENCE concern the *ιδιοτροπος*, whereas *υποστασις* must mean REALITY or PERSONALITY. Note how INDIVIDUALITY, i.e., completeness, is again connected with the notion of REALITY.

Like Dionysius and Alexander before him, ATHANASIUS has not left us an interpretation of Heb. xi, 1; still, as he was the center of the Christological and Trinitarian controversies which gave rise to the new meaning of *υποστασις*, his notion of the term must be noted, especially since he practically abandoned the technical sense of the term and often returned to the older sense of *υποστασις* as the EMPHASIS of *ειναι*. In his letter *Ad Afros.* 4, Athanasius decisively identifies *υποστασις* with *ουσια* and explains them both as the EMPHATIC REALITY: *Η δε υποστασις ουσια εστι, και δ' ουδεν αλλο σημαινομενον εχει η αυτο το ον.*¹ This shows clearly that *υποστασις* means nothing else than the *το ον* = the REALITY. Then, as if this were not clear enough, Athanasius identifies both *υποστασις* and *ουσια* with *υπαρξις* in a reference to Jeremias.² This makes it unmistakably clear that *υποστασις* is REALITY, since *υπαρξις*³ is the ORIGINALLY EXISTING REALITY, an EMPHASIS of the *το ον*.

¹ Migne, P. G., 26, 1036 B.

² *Ibid.*

³ Cf. Schumacher, *Christus in Seiner Präexistenz und Kenose, nach Phil.*, 2, 5-8.

As Defender of the Faith, Athanasius, in the words of Gregory Nazianzus, took the practical attitude, "getting at the meaning behind the terms used."¹ A practical instance of this attitude, and at the same time a most remarkable example of the meaning of *υποστασις* in the theological controversies, is the trial of the two parties (one held for *τρεις υποστασεις* in the Trinity and the other for *μια υποστασις*) just before the Council of Alexandria. Those who maintained that there were *τρεις υποστασεις* in the Trinity were asked whether they understood it like the Arians in the sense of three diverse substances, as gold, silver, and brass, or like the older heretics, as three gods. They answered that they never even imagined such queer things. And when asked, "In what sense, then, do you use such expressions?" they answered, "Because we believe in the Holy Trinity, not as a Trinity in name only, but *in truth and REALITY*, — the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost TRULY and REALLY EXISTING: *Δια το εις αγιαν Τριαδα πιστευειν, ουκ ονοματι Τριαδα μονον, αλλ' αληθως ουσαν και υφεστωσαν, Πατερα τε αληθως οντα και υφεστωτα, και Τιον αληθως ενουσιον οντα και υφεστωτα, και Πνευμα αγιον υφεστως και υπαρχον οιδαμεν.*"² Here the old notion of *υποστασις* as REALITY is put in striking relief. *Υποστασις* is used for a TRUE REALITY (*Υφεστωσαν*), since the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost each have a TRUE REALITY, which TRUE REALITY in its EXISTENCE is expressed by forms derived from *υφισταναι* (the stem for *υποστασις* = EMPHATIC EXISTENCE).³ Hence, we conclude that Athanasius is a strong witness for the old meaning of *υποστασις* as the EMPHASIS of the REAL.

Although EUSEBIUS has not written an interpretation of Heb. xi, 1, still we cannot leave entirely unnoticed his remarkable witness to the usage of *υποστασις* in the sense

¹ Cf. Gregory Nazianzus, *In Laudem Ath.*, 35; Migne, *P. G.*, 35, 1125 B.

² Migne, *P. G.*, 26, 801 B.

³ Cf. Hatch, *Op. cit.*, p. 275.

of REALITY in contrast to NON-REALITY (*ανυποστατον*). In *Constantine's Oration to the Saints*, 6, Eusebius says that in the face of the most harmonious order observable in nature *chance* has no meaning. For he asks, "Shall we dare to say that all things happen by chance (*αυτοματων*), though we be unable to show by what shape or form this chance is characterized: as it is a thing which has no *υποστασις* either in the intellect or in sense perception — a thing which rings in the ears as an empty sound: *υποστασιν ουδεμιαν εχον ουτε νοεως ουτ' αισθητως, μονον δ' οτι ηχος ονοματος ανυποστατου περι τα ωτα βομβει.*"¹ Chance has, therefore, neither a mental nor a visible *υποστασις*, which can here mean only "no mental nor visible REALITY," it is only an empty word, a word which in itself has no REALITY (*ανυποστατον*). We see here the word *υποστασις* clearly used to emphasize REALITY in striking contrast to its negation, NON-REALITY (*ανυποστατον*).

Besides giving an exegesis of our text, CYRIL OF JERUSALEM applies the old sense of *υποστασις* as the EMPHASIS OF REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY to the Trinitarian problem. In *Cat.* XI, 10, he says that the Father begot the Son, not as among men mind begets word. For mind is substantially existent in us; the word when spoken is dispersed into the air and *comes to an end*. But we know the Christ to have been begotten not as a word pronounced, but as a Word *existing* (*ενυποστατος*) and *living*; not spoken by the lips and dispersed into the air, but *εν υποστασει* begotten of the Father eternally and ineffably: *Ημεις δε οιδαμεν τον Χριστον γεννηθεντα λογον ου προφορικον, αλλα λογον ενυποστατον και ζωντα· ου χειλεσι λαληθεντα και διαχυθεντα, αλλ' εκ Πατρος αιδιως και ανεκφραστως, και εν υποστασει γεννηθεντα.*² Although *υποστασις* is used here in the sense of PERSON, the original meaning (REALITY in contrast to NON-REALITY) is still clearly evident. For in con-

¹ Berl. Ed., *Eusebius*, I, 161.

² Migne, P. G., 33, 701 B.

trast to the *ανυποστατος λογος* pronounced by human lips, which loses its *REALITY* by being dispersed into the air, the Eternal Word is called the *ευυποστατος Λογος*, the Word *REALLY EXISTING* and retaining *REALITY*.

As the text for his Lecture on *πιστις*, Cyril chooses Heb. xi, 1. Although this lecture is not a strict exegesis of our text, yet both *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* and *ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων* receive a general elucidation. In *Cat.* V, 3, Cyril enumerates what, it must be remarked, are the classical examples of *πιστις* throughout the Patristic literature.¹

1. By *πιστις* the laws of marriage yoke those who have lived as strangers; and by reason of *πιστις* in marriage contracts a stranger is made partner of a stranger's person and possessions.

2. By *πιστις*, also, husbandry is sustained, *πιστει και γεωργια συνισταται*.² For he who does not believe that he shall receive a harvest endures not the toil.

3. By *πιστις* seafaring men trusting to the thinnest plank exchange the *most solid* element, the land, for the restless motion of the waves, *committing themselves to unevident hopes* (*αδηλοις εαυτους επιιδοντες ελπισι*)³ and carrying with them a *πιστις more sure than any anchor*.

In the first instance, *πιστις* seems to have a meaning which we have already met with in Clement of Alexandria and in the papyri: *TITLE-DEEDS*. For this *πιστις* is the *GUARANTEE* for the *REALITY* of the person and the possessions. In the second example, we have clearly the meaning *ANTICIPATION OF REALITY*. This anticipation gives the farmer the

¹ The following authors use the same examples of *πιστις*, which are similar in cases to an identity of language: Origen, *Contra Cel.* I, 9; Rufinus, *Com. on the Apostles' Creed*, 3; Augustine, *De Util. Credendi*, chs. 1 and 2; Arnobius, *Contr. Gentes*, 2; Eusebius, *Praepar. Evangel.*, I, 5, and XII, chs. 1, 2, 3; Chrysostom, Hom. I, *In Tim.*; Theodoret, — transcribes Cyril of Jer. in *De Curandis Graec. Affectibus*, Orat. I, *De Fide*; Gregory the Great, *Dialog.*, IV, 2; John Damascene, *Orthodox. Fid.*, IV, 11.

² Migne, P. G., 83, 508 B.

³ *Ibid.*

courage to endure the hardships of his work. Yet in both of these cases "fiducia" would yield a sufficiently clear sense. But in the third example, REALITY is emphasized. For here we have in *αδηλοις* = "unevident" an element that we found before: "what is not seen," "what is not PRESENT" becomes visible and present. And we have in *ἐπιδιδόντες* a trust which includes CERTAINTY of the existence of the thing "not seen," which is still further explained as "surer than any anchor."

Hence, we see that in both the Trinitarian problem and in his lecture on *πίστις*, which has for its text Heb. xi, 1, Cyril understands by *ὑποστασις* an EMPHASIS OF REALITY in contrast to NON-REALITY. Accordingly, his exegesis of our text should very probably be rendered: FAITH is the reality of things hoped for (the anticipation of the reality of future things), or, FAITH is that which makes REAL "things hoped for."

The same EMPHASIS of REALITY in contrast to NON-REALITY, as the primary meaning of *ὑποστασις*, is set forth by BASIL in a special study of the term, (*a*) in its general usage, and (*b*) in its application to the Trinitarian problem. This is the theme of Epist. XXXVIII to his brother Gregory, a letter which the Council of Chalcedon read with reverence and instruction.¹ Herein Basil points out the fundamental difference between *ὑποστασις* and *οὐσία* to be this: What is common to numerically different subjects is *οὐσία*, and what is proper to each subject is *ὑποστασις*. Thus "man" is common to Paul, Timothy, and Sylvanus. Whatever indicates the *οὐσία* of Paul may also be applied to the *οὐσία* of Timothy and Sylvanus. What they have in common is the *οὐσία* — "man." When one turns to the differentiating properties whereby Paul, Timothy, and Sylvanus are distinguished one from another, we shall find that the definition by which each is known will no longer tally.

¹ *Counc. of Chalcedon*, Part III, c. 1.

That which is spoken of in a special or peculiar manner is indicated by the name Hypostasis: *Τουτο τοιουνν φαμεν· Το ιδιως λεγομενον τω της υποστασεως δηλουσθαι ρηματι*.¹ Then by way of illustration, Basil suggests that if one were to say, "Man," the indefinite meaning of the word would strike a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature is indicated, but the CONCRETE thing which REALLY EXISTS AND WHICH MANIFESTS REALITY under the name (man) is not pointed out. But this is the *υποστασις*, viz., *το δε υφεστως και δηλουμενον ιδιως υπο του ονοματος πραγμα*²; that which manifests the *πραγμα* is the reality under the mere name. Here the REALLY EXISTING THING (*το υφεστως*) and the MANIFESTED REALITY (*δηλουμενον ιδιως υπο του ονοματος πραγμα*) are the two principal elements of *υποστασις*. Then Basil continues, "Should one say 'Paul,' he would point out the REALLY EXISTING NATURE that goes by that name: *Ο δε Παυλον ειπων, εδειξεν εν τω δηλουμενω υπο του ονοματος πραγματι υφεστωσαν την φυσιν· Τουτο ουν εστιν η υποστασις*."³ Here the REALLY EXISTING nature (*υφεστωσαν την φυσιν*) in the CONCRETE REALITY, as it is manifested by the name Paul (*εν τω δηλουμενω υπο του ονοματος πραγματι*), is clearly pointed out. In both of these definitions of *υποστασις* these two elements seem to be paramount:

1. THAT WHICH REALLY EXISTS (*το δε υφεστως* of the first, and *υφεστωσαν την φυσιν* of the second definition).

2. THE CONCRETE REALITY (*δηλουμενον ιδιως υπο του ονοματος πραγμα* of the first, and *εν τω δηλουμενω υπο του ονοματος πραγματι* of the second definition).

The first is clearly the element of REALITY in *υποστασις*, because both *υφεστως* and *υφεστωσαν* are forms of the stem *υφισταναι* (EMPHATIC EXISTENCE = REALITY), which is also the stem from which *υποστασις* is derived.⁴ The second is the REALITY (*πραγμα*) manifested directly by the name.

¹ Benedictine Ed., *Basil*, III, I, 166 B.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. Hatch, *Op. cit.*, 275.

Basil then illustrates his definition of *υποστασις* by application to the Trinitarian problem. He points out what the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity have in common and what peculiar notes distinguish them hypostatically. The Infinite, the Uncreated, the Uncircumscribed are all qualities of their common *ουσια*. These they have in common, but only the Father has *πατροτης*; only the Son has *υιοτης*, and only the Holy Ghost has *εκπορευσις*. The *υποστασις* is seen in these *ιδιωματα* of the Persons: *Η δε υποστασις εν τω ιδιωματι της πατροτητας, η της υιοτητας, η της αγιαστικης δυναμεως θεωρεται.*¹ Now we come to the crucial point in the exposition of the meaning of *υποστασις*. "Merely to enumerate the different Persons is not sufficient," says Basil, "we must also confess each Person to have a natural EXISTENCE IN TRUE HYPOSTASIS: *Ου γαρ εξαρκει διαφορας προσωπων απαριθμησασθαι, αλλα χρη εκαστον προσωπον εν υποστασει αληθινη υπαρχον ομολογειν.*"² To deny that the *ιδιωμα* has REAL EXISTENCE was precisely the error of Sabellius, who admitted and indeed spoke of different Persons. But these *προσωπα* were *ανυποστατα*,—mere names to designate the various metamorphoses of God Who was indeed one in matter: *Επει τον γε ανυποστατον των προσωπων αναπλασμον ουδε ο Σαβελλιος παρητησατο, ειπων τον αυτον θεον, ενα τω υποκειμενω οντα, προς τας εκαστοτε παραπιπτουσας χρειας μεταμορφουμενον, νυν μεν ως Πατερα, νυν δε ως Τιον, νυν δε ως Πνευμα αγιον διαλεγεσθαι.*³ But to say that the Persons of the Blessed Trinity are *ανυποστατα* is absurd (*ει μεν ουν ανυποστατα λεγουσιν τα προσωπα, αυτοθεν εχει ο λογος την αποπιαν*),⁴ because *υποστασις* demands that the *ιδιωματα* of the Blessed Trinity REALLY EXIST. In fact, in *De Spiritu Sancto*, XVIII, 4, Basil simply defines the *υποστασις* of the Holy Ghost as a *τροπος της υπαρξεως*, a "mode of REAL EXISTENCE." This is the conclusion of his argument wherein

¹ Benedictine Ed., *Basil*, III, II, 467 E.

² *Ibid.*, 468 A.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 467 E.

he describes the *ιδίωμα* of the Holy Ghost to be the "One Proceeding" from God as "breath from the mouth." By so explaining the matter, says Basil, the close relation is made plain, while the MODE OF INEFFABLE EXISTENCE is safeguarded (*του δε τροπου της υπαρξεως αρρητου φυλασσομενου*). As the sequel will show, *τροπος της υπαρξεως* will become one of the classical equivalents for the term *υποστασις* in the Trinitarian controversy.

In conclusion, we may say that in Basil's classic study of *υποστασις*, both in its general usage and in its application to the Trinitarian problem, the term primarily means the REAL EXISTENCE IN CONTRAST TO NON-EXISTENCE.

In the writings of GREGORY OF NYSSA we meet the most striking exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*, as the GUARANTEE OF THE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR. This noteworthy interpretation occurs in *Contra Eunomium*, XII, where Gregory maintains that Christian *πιστις* is the *υποστασις* of "things hoped for" and not of things known: *Η δε των Χριστιανων πιστις, ουχ ουτως. Ου γαρ των γινωσκομενων, αλλα των ελπιζομενων εστιν υποστασις· το δε διακρατουμενον ουκ ελπιζεται. Ο γαρ εχει τις, φησι, τι και ελπιζει;*¹ For a thing altogether under one's control (*διακρατουμενον*) and which one has as his own (*εχει*), why hope for it? This suggests that *ελπιζομενα* are in the nature of *possessions*, though only in a *limited sense*. This is the function of *πιστις*, — to make these limited possessions real and absolute by means of *υποστασις*, which Gregory next explains in the clearest exposition of the matter we have yet seen in the exegesis of our text: "But that which escapes our comprehension, *πιστις* makes our own (*ημετερον*).” Then he adds the reason, — "By its own proper firmness GUARANTEEING (*εγγυωμενα*) that which is unseen": *Το δε διαφευγον την κατανοησιν ημων, ημετερον η πιστις ποιει, δια της ιδιας βεβαιωτητος εγγυωμενη το μη φαινομενον.*² Thus by *πιστις*

¹ Migne, P. G., 45, 941 C.

² *Ibid.*

"hoped-for things" become our POSSESSIONS (ημετερον) by guarantee. Πιστις by reason of its fixing things solidly in our mind (by some kind of *presentation*, since they are also called μη φαινόμενα) is the GUARANTEE OF THE UNSEEN REALITY. In a word, πιστις is the GUARANTEE OF THE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR.

This understanding of Gregory's interpretation of υποστασις as the GUARANTEE OF REALITY is confirmed by another instance of his use of the term in connection with πιστις and ελπις. The passage is found in *Contra Eunomium*, I, where he speaks of hopes lacking REALITY (ανυποσταται ελπιδες), because they depend for their υποστασις on a foolish faith (πιστις ματαια), which in turn is based on the empty heretical teaching (κενον κηρυγμα) that the Son is inferior to the Father: Οντων γαρ των τοιουτων, ματαια μεν η πιστις, κενον δε το κηρυγμα, ανυποσταται δε αι ελπιδες, αι δια της πιστεως την υποστασιν εχουσι.¹ If the Son is inferior to the Father, our hopes lack their true υποστασις, their true REALITY, since they are based on a foolish πιστις; whereas a true πιστις furnishes a true υποστασις and consequently the REALITY of the thing hoped for. Thus the contrast of a foolish πιστις, which makes the objects of hope *unreal*, with the effect of the true πιστις, which gives REALITY to them, is put in emphatic relief.

JOHN CHRYSOSTOM improves on the exegesis of Gregory of Nyssa and all the preceding authors who understand υποστασις to mean primarily REALITY by pointing out that πιστις through υποστασις, not only gives REALITY to "things hoped for," but is also their ουσια. It is of some interest to remark, in passing, that Chrysostom links the two parts of Heb. xi, 1, ελπιζομενων υποστασις and ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων, making the second explanatory and confirmatory of the first. In *Homil. XXI*, 2, on the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, Chrysostom interprets ελπιζομενων υποστασις,

¹ Migne, P. G., 45, 340 B.

showing that it is the office of *πιστις* to see things not seen visibly by the senses in such a way as to make things "not seen" as real as those that are seen. For just as it is impossible to disbelieve in things seen, so no one can be said to have *πιστις*, unless he is as fully assured with respect to things invisible as he is to things visible. And the reason for this is that *πιστις* gives *υποστασις* to objects of hope, which seem to be UNREAL (*ανυποστατα*), or rather does not give them *υποστασις*, but is their very BEING: *Επειδη γαρ τα εν ελπιδι ανυποστατα ειναι δοκει, η πιστις υποστασιν αυτοις χαριζεται· μαλλον δε, ου χαριζεται, αλλ' αυτο εστιν ουσια αυτων.*¹ This is a most striking explanation. Chrysostom even insists that we should give things of Faith, which are invisible, a greater assurance than we give to visible things. And this is the reason,—*πιστις* gives REALITY (*υποστασις*) to these objects of hope which seem UNREAL (*ανυποστατα ειναι δοκει*), or better, *πιστις* is their VERY BEING (*ουσια*).

Then Chrysostom illustrates his exegesis by the example of our resurrection at the last day, which has not yet come, nor does it EXIST IN REALITY (*εν υποστασει*), but hope makes it REALLY EXIST IN OUR SOULS: *Οιον, η αναστασις ου παραγεγονεν, ουδε εστιν εν υποστασει, αλλ' η ελπις υφιστησιν αυτην εν τη ημετερα ψυχη.*² The resurrection at the last day, of course, does not yet EXIST IN REALITY (*ουδε εστιν εν υποστασει*), but *ελπις* causes the resurrection to be REAL (*υφιστησιν*) in our souls. This clearly shows that *πιστις* through *υποστασις* does not make "things hoped for" REAL *objectively*, but rather REAL *subjectively*. Just as our resurrection at the last day has not yet occurred, nor EXISTS IN REALITY, so objects of hope are things of the future, and do not REALLY EXIST YET, as seen in the ordinary way, but nevertheless they do REALLY EXIST after the manner in which *πιστις* causes them to EXIST in the soul,

¹ Chrysostom, Vol. 22, 322.

² Ibid.

viz., by giving them *ousia* in the soul. In a word, *πιστις* is the REPRESENTATION of a FUTURE REALITY in the soul, which is as REAL to us as the visible universe.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA in his interpretation of our text insists upon one point, viz., whatever is the object of hope or of Faith *must be free from all questioning*. In his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Heb. xi, 1), he says: "Whatever has been received by *πιστις*, ought to be beyond curious meddlesomeness, and to overbold investigation it ought not to be even the subject of question. For *whatever is yet questioned* (το ζητουμενον) is not *πιστις*. For *anything which is subject to testing*, how can it still be believed? Το γε μην πιστει παραδεχθεν απολυπραγμονητον ειναι χρη, αλλ' ου θρασυτεραις ωσπερ εκβασανιζειν ερευναις. Πιστις γαρ ουκ ετι το ζητουμενον. Το γαρ τοι βασανιζομενον πως ετι πεπιστευται;"¹ In this passage the object of *πιστις* is described as that which is free from all QUESTIONING (ζητουμενον) and TESTING (βασανιζομενον).² These expressions sound natural, if they are used for visibly evident realities, which we can perceive through our senses. It is surprising that they are used for the invisible objects of *πιστις* and *ελπις*. The force of the expression is striking: By *πιστις* and *ελπις* their respective objects become as *evident* and *real* as visibly evident realities in ordinary life. They do not make and produce these realities, but they represent them as evident realities to those who have *πιστις* or *ελπις*. Hence, *πιστις* and *ελπις* are the means that present to us realities, otherwise unknown to us. Cyril confirms this interpretation by further comparing *πιστις* and *ελπις*, saying that if *ελπις* is "seeing things without question," then surely it ought to be true of *πιστις*, "which is altogether free from test": Ονπερ γαρ τροπον ελπις βλεπομενη αζητητον, πιστις ουκ αν ειη κατα τον ισον ελπιδι λογον; το γαρ πιστει τετιμημενον βασανου παντως ελευθερον.³

¹ Migne, P. G., 74, 989 C.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 989 D.

This understanding of Cyril's interpretation is confirmed by Cyril's notion of *υποστασις* as REALITY, expressed in his *Commentary on St. John*, Lib. V, c. 5. Here, speaking of the Son of God as the Word and Wisdom of the Father spoken in Him, Cyril says that the Word is not *ανυποστατος*, as the human word, but living and having its own EXISTENCE (*υπαρξιν*) in the Father and with the Father: *Και επειπερ εστιν ουκ ανυποστατος ωσπερ ο ανθρωπινος, αλλ' ενουσιος τε και ζων ως ιδιαν εχων εν Πατρι και μετα Πατρος την ΤΗΑΞΙΝ*.¹ In this context *υποστασις* means even more than reality. The human word is certainly real to some extent. But it has not the *ιδιαν υπαρξιν*. Thus *υποστασις* supposes a complete, individual, and perfect reality. So we conclude that *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*, for Cyril, meant the perfect REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR, OR THAT WHICH CAUSES THINGS OF HOPE TO BE PERFECTLY AND COMPLETELY REAL.

As an interpreter of our text, THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA is of no value, since he merely gives the author's reason for discussing *πιστις* in this Epistle. Yet this reason is of some interest to us, as it seems to foreshadow at least vaguely a later exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, viz., CONFIDENCE in Christ, which justifies in opposition to justification by works. The reason assigned for a special treatment of *πιστις* is that the Hebrews had a false idea of justification. Their doctrine was that men were justified by works, whereas *πιστις* was given as the cause of justification by the Christians who were wont to say: "Even if bound by a thousand evils, ONE BELIEVING his lot to be alone with Christ (*πιστευσας μονον Χριστω συντομον*) receives delivery from all sins, being made worthy of justification through Him: *Τουτο λεγοντες, οτι καν μυριοις τις ενεχεται κακοις, πιστευσας μονον Χριστω συντομον απαντων δεχεται την απολλαγην, της παρ' αυτου δικαιωσης αξιουμενος*." ² It is hard to say just what Theodore meant.

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 73, 844 B.

² *Ibid.*, 66, 965 B.

But the use of the term *πιστευσας* (trusting), for the explanation of *πιστις* (in the sense that those who have *πιστις* shall find delivery from all sins), seems to point to the meaning *fiducia* for *υποστασις*. We shall find this exceptional and remarkable notion very late again in the Middle Ages.

In his interpretation of our text THEODORET sums up the exegesis of Clement of Alexandria and John Chrysostom. Like Clement, Theodoret wrote a special treatise on FAITH, *Pro. Cur. Graec.* I, *Περί Πιστεως*, and from the same point of view, viz., that *πιστις* is approved by classical Greek antiquity. His dependence on Clement in the general treatment of the theme, in the quotations cited, and in definitions formulated, amounts, in cases, to an identity of language. And what is most important is that he accepts just that definition of *πιστις* which Clement gives as an equation of Heb. xi, 1.¹

Theodoret's words on Heb. xi, 1, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* are as follows: Those things which we do not see (by the senses), we see by means of *πιστις*; and for the viewing of things hoped for, *πιστις* becomes for us an EYE SHOWING AS REALLY EXISTING (*ως υφεστώτα*) things which have not as yet happened: *Τα γὰρ οὐχ ὁρωμένα δια ταύτης ὁρωμέν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐλπίζομένων θεωρίαν ὀφθαλμοῦς ἡμῖν γίνεταί, καὶ δεικνυσὶν ὡς τῶς ὄντα τὰ μὴδεπω γεγεννημένα.*² In "things hoped for," *πιστις* becomes for us an EYE seeing as REALITIES (*ως υφεστώτα*) things which have not yet happened. In other words, *υποστασις* is the factor that represents to us realities otherwise unknown. It is the representation of reality. Our author becomes even more expressive in *Diog.* I, where he thus answers the question: Is there a difference between *υποστασις* and *ουσια*? : *Ἡ τε γὰρ οὐσία το οὐ σημαίνει, καὶ το υφεστος ἡ υποστασις.*³

¹ In *Pro. Cur. Graec.* I, Theodoret thus defines *πιστις*: *Κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἡμετέρον λόγον πιστις ἐστὶν ἐκουσίος τῆς ψυχῆς συγκαταθέσις.* Migne, *P. G.*, 83, 815 A.

² Migne, *P. G.*, 82, 757 A.

³ *Ibid.*, 83, 33 B.

Τφειστος is emphatic REALITY. Hence, for Theodoret, υποστασις is the EMPHASIS of REALITY. Πιστις is that which causes "things hoped for" to be perfectly REAL. But as "things hoped for" are also invisible, they must be represented to us by something analogous to the eye, if we are to see them. Theodoret, like Clement of Alexandria, uses the picture of the "spiritual eye" which represents "things hoped for" to the mind as REALITIES. In a word, πιστις presents a REALITY in its proper sphere, as our senses present REALITIES in their sphere.

Then, like Chrysostom, Theodoret illustrates his exegesis of our text by the example of the resurrection of the body at the last day. Πιστις paints for us beforehand the resurrection of all those now lying in their graves, and makes VISIBLE the immortality of bodily dust: Των νεκρων απαντων εν τοις ταφοις επι κειμενων, η πιστις ημιν προζωγραφει την αναστασιν, και της κοινης των σωματος την αθανασιαν παρασκευαζει φανταζεσθαι.¹ The resurrection is brought into our mind by the anticipating REPRESENTATION-WORK of πιστις (προζωγραφει), as a FUTURE REALITY already seen (φανταζεσθαι). Πιστις causes this object of hope, the resurrection, which has not yet occurred, TO EXIST REALLY FOR US BY ANTICIPATION.

Thus, for Theodoret, πιστις (as ελπιζομενων υποστασις) means that faith is the (spiritually) visible REALITY of things which have not yet happened, the ANTICIPATION of a FUTURE REALITY.

The traditional meaning of υποστασις as the EMPHASIS OF REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY is very pithily set forth by LEONTIUS OF BYZANTIUM in *De Sectis*, actio VII. Here the author gives two definitions to both υποστασις and ανυποστατον. Τποστασις means either (a) simple EXISTENCE — το απλως ον,² or (b) EXISTENCE per se as an individual — το καθ' εαυτο ον.³ Here we see that a thing which is ενυπο-

¹ Migne, P. G., 82, 757 B.

² *Ibid.*, 86, 1240 D.

³ *Ibid.*

στατος (υποστασις), is fundamentally connected with the idea of EXISTING REALITY, either as that which SIMPLY EXISTS or that which EXISTS PER SE AS AN INDIVIDUAL.

Ανυποστατον also has a twofold meaning, *Αλλα και το ανυποστατον διττον*:¹ (a) *That which exists in no way*, as the fabulous goat-stag or the centaur, *λεγεται γαρ ανυποστατον, και το μηδαμως ον, ως τραγελαφος και ιπποκενταυρος*; ² (b) *That which has not its own υποστασις*, but has υποστασις in another thing, or that which per se does NOT EXIST: *Λεγεται παλιν ανυποστατον, ον το μη ον μεν, το εχον δε εν ετερω την υποστασιν, και μη καθ' εαυτο υφισταμενον*.³ It could hardly be shown with more clarity that ανυποστατον is predicated of something that lacks REAL EXISTENCE, either NO EXISTENCE AT ALL, or AN IMPERFECT EXISTENCE IN SOMETHING ELSE.

In this citation Leontius unmistakably witnesses to the interpretation of υποστασις as REAL EXISTENCE in verbal contrast to ανυποστατον, that which lacks PROPER EXISTENCE, OR IS ALTOGETHER FICTITIOUS.

With even more precision than Leontius of Byzantium, MAXIMUS MARTYR defines υποστασις in terms of EXISTENCE, as *το ειναι* and *υπαρξις* (the emphasis of *ειναι*). In *Dialog. I, 2*, Maximus distinguishes between υποστασις and ουσια in terms of EXISTENCE: *Η μεν γαρ υποστασις το ειναι σημαινει· η δε θεοτης το τι ειναι*.⁴ Here are the Trinitarian terms:

Το ειναι signifies "quis est."

Το τι ειναι signifies "quid est."

Υποστασις means the reality of perfect individual existence. We have here υποστασις completely in the atmosphere of the Trinitarian terminology. But the original meaning is still evident: the θεοτης signifies the essence, and υποστασις means the individually existing thing.

¹ Migne, P. G., 86, 1240 D.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Migne, P. G., 28, 1120 A.

As Theodoret summarized in his interpretation of our text both the exegesis of Clement of Alexandria and John Chrysostom, so JOHN DAMASCENE has summarized the common Patristic notion of *υποστασις*, and applied the same briefly in the explanation of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*. Chapter 42 of the Damascene's *Dialectica* is entitled *Περί Υποστασεως*. Here the author distinguishes two senses in which *υποστασις* has been used: (a) Simple EXISTENCE, *ποτε μεν την απλως υπαρξιν· καθ' ο σημαινομενον ταυτον εστιν ουσια και υποστασις*.¹ The fact that *υποστασις* and *ουσια* have *υπαρξεις* in common, no doubt explains why they have been so often identified; (b) INDIVIDUAL AND EMPHATIC EXISTENCE; *Ποτε δε την καθ' αυτο και ιδιοσυστατην υπαρξιν. Καθ' ο σημαινομενον το ατομον δηλοι, τω αριθμω διαφερον, ηγουν τον Πετρον και Παυλον*.² In these two definitions of *υποστασις* we see the common element REALITY (*υπαρξεις*); and it is clearly under the influence of the Trinitarian problem that John Damascene distinguishes *υποστασις* as SIMPLE REALITY and the Trinitarian *υποστασις* as the INDEPENDENT REALITY. But in both cases *υποστασις* is REALITY, and a REALITY in contrast to NON-REALITY. This is obvious from the Damascene's notion of *ανυποστατον*. Chapter 45 of the *Dialectica* is devoted to this term (*Περί ανυποστατου*). It also has two senses: (a) That which EXISTS in no way, *Ποτε μεν γαρ το μηδαμη μηδαμως ον σημαινει, ηγουν το ανυπαρκτον*.³ Just as *υποστασις* is fundamentally *υπαρξεις* so *ανυποστατος* is rightly called *ανυπαρκτος*; (b) That which does not EXIST IN ITSELF but in another, as an accident, *Ποτε δε το μη εν εαυτω εχον το ειναι, αλλ' εν ετερω εχον την υπαρξιν, ηγουν το συμβεβηκος*.⁴ But possibly the Damascene explains the second kind of *ανυποστατον* with even greater clarity in *Dialectica*, c. 29, where he says that it lacks its proper EXISTENCE, *Λεγεται παλιν ανυποστατον και το*

¹ Migne, P. G., 94, 612 B.

² *Ibid.*

³ Migne, P. G., 94, 617 A.

⁴ *Ibid.*

συμβεβηκος, διοτι το συμβεβηκος ουκ εχει ιδιαν υπαρξιν, αλλ' εν τη ουσια υφεστηκεν.¹ Again we find that *ανυποστατος* is defined in terms of NON-EXISTENCE, either no EXISTENCE at all, or an imperfect EXISTENCE. We conclude by saying that *υποστασις*, for John Damascene and for the Greek Fathers as a whole (since his theology is a "mosaic of citations"² from the best ecclesiastical literature in Greek), means an EMPHASIS of EXISTENCE (REALITY) in contrast to NON-EXISTENCE (UNREALITY).

The Damascene's commentary on Heb. xi, 1 is this short but comprehensive statement which unites the two parts of our text: *Πιστις* is impossible to one who is not more fully convinced about invisible things than he is regarding those that are visible: *Αν γαρ μη τις των ορωμενων σαφεστερον περι των αορατων πεπληροφορηται, πιστις ειναι ου δυναται.*³ This exegesis with its contrast of *ορωμενων* and *αορατων* seems to apply not only to *ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*, but it applies also to *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*. In fact, it unites the two parts of the verse. This we gather from the Damascene's idea of *υποστασις*, as derived above, and from the contrast which he draws between the certainty regarding visible and that regarding invisible things. The contrast is between the *certainty* about visible things and the *greater certainty* regarding invisible things. But we ask, what is the object of the certainty in both cases? Obviously, it is the EXISTENCE of things visible and invisible. And more strictly the contrast is between the certainty about the EXISTENCE of things visible and the certainty of the EXISTENCE of things invisible. On the one hand, the EXISTENCE of visible things is made certain by the organs of visual perception, and on the other hand, the EXISTENCE of invisible things is made certain by *πιστις*, which causes "things hoped for" (included in things

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 94, 589 C.

² Harnack, *Dogmengesch.* (English Translation, IV, 265, ft. n. 1).

³ Migne, *P. G.*, 95, 980 C.

unseen) REALLY to EXIST for the soul. In a word, *πιστις* is an incontestable proof of "unseen things," because through *υποστασις* they are made REAL (by spiritual PERCEPTION) to the soul.

Summary of the Greek Patristic Literature

The results of our investigation of the Greek Patristic interpretation of *επιζόμενων υποστασις* may now be summarily noted:

1. In the oldest Patristic literature, that preceding the technical use of *υποστασις* as PERSON, the term meant either EXISTENCE and REALITY in contrast to NON-EXISTENCE and UNREALITY, or something connected with POSSESSION: Letter to Diognetus, Tatian, Irenaeus, and Clement of Alexandria.

2. During the period when *υποστασις* became the technical word for PERSON, and *afterwards*, (a) the older meaning of *υποστασις* is observable in literature not dealing with the Trinitarian and Christological controversies: Eusebius, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil, and John Damascene; (b) and even in the process by which *υποστασις* was selected to designate "person," the older sense of the term controls the development to the extent of identifying *υποστασις* with *υπαρξις* and with *το ον*, and of contrasting *υποστασις* with *ανυποστατον*: Origen, Dionysius of Alexandria, Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus Martyr, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, and John Damascene.

3. In both periods *υποστασις* meant GUARANTEE, TITLE-DEEDS, ANTICIPATION and REPRESENTATION OF A FUTURE REALITY, when the term was used in connection with things of the future: Tatian, Athanagoras, Papyri, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, and John Damascene.

4. We were able to find only one doubtful exception to

this common Greek Patristic notion of *υποστασις*, viz., that of Theodore of Mopsuestia who probably used it in the sense of CONFIDENCE.

5. *Ελπιζομενων υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 expresses that fundamental characteristic of *πιστις* whereby "things hoped for" are made REAL by REPRESENTATION, or by ANTICIPATION OF A FUTURE REALITY. Hence, Faith is the SPIRITUALLY VISIBLE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR. This is substantially the Greek Patristic exegesis of our text: Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, and John Damascene.

With the possibility of one exception (Theodore of Mopsuestia), the practical unanimity among the Greeks in the exegesis of our text is striking, especially when we consider the hopeless confusion of the modern interpretation of Heb. xi, 1. In every exegesis of this verse the interpretation hinges on the term *υποστασις*. The Greeks, "who would have the most lively sense of the requirements of the language,"¹ employed this pivotal term, as we have abundantly shown, according to the current meaning, viz., as REALITY IN CONTRAST TO NON-REALITY, and in things of the future (which include "things hoped for"), as the GUARANTEE FOR THE FUTURE REALITY OF THINGS IN QUESTION, or ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE REALITY.

2. IN THE LATIN FATHERS

The Latin Patristic exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* while meager is, nevertheless, in agreement with the Greek Patristic interpretation.

TERTULLIAN in *De Cultu Feminarum*, II, 2, uses the expression "tota fidei substantia." We are not sure that the author had Heb. xi, 1 in mind here. Yet the fact that this is not only the first instance in the Latin Patristic literature where fides is qualified by *substantia*, but also the example

¹ Lightfoot, *Epist. to the Phil.*, 134.

on whose authority a later interpretation of "rerum sperandarum substantia" (FIRMA EXPECTATIO¹) is based, demands that we consider this passage.

In this chapter, Tertullian elucidates the general theme of book II, viz., that modesty is to be preserved not only in its essence, but also in its accessories. The reason for such conduct is then noted, viz., Christian women, though secure themselves, ought through motives of charity to abstain from such studied grace as leads others into sin. He says that they should walk so holily and with the entire *substantia fidei*, as to be secure in their conscience, hoping that modesty remain in them, yet not presuming: Debemus quidem ita sancte et tota fidei substantia incedere, ut confessae et securae simus de conscientia nostra optantes perseverare id in nobis, non tamen praesumentes.² It is difficult to say what Tertullian understood by *substantia* in this passage. But the following considerations may lead us to an approximate conclusion:

1. The more general meaning of *substantia* in the Latin world is POSSESSION. Thus Petavius says of *substantia* in Jeremias, IX, 10, "Ita LXX qui *ὑπαρξίς* hic habent, eaque vox substantiam, id est POSSESSIONEM significat. Hoc enim sensu saepe in Latinis Biblis substantia ponitur."³

2. As a jurist and as a theologian, it is probable that Tertullian used *substantia* in our passage in the sense of POSSESSION. For speaking of the introduction into theology of the legal terminology — *substantia* and *persona* — by Tertullian, Harnack has well said: "Substance . . . is in the language of the jurists not anything personal, but rather corresponds to 'property' in the sense of POSSESSION, or to essence as distinguished from the manifestation or status."⁴

¹ Hugo Grotius, *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1131.

² Migne, *P. L.*, I, 1432 A.

³ *De Trinitate*, IV, III, II, 171 (*De Theolog. Dogmat.*).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, IV, 144 sq.

3. That *POSSESSION* is a very common meaning of *substantia* in the writings of Tertullian is shown by the usage of the word in non-Trinitarian contexts. Thus in *Apolog.*, XXXIX, Tertullian contrasts the brotherly spirit of the Christians, who give freely of their wealth for religious purposes, with Pagan rivalry over money matters. He says, "We are considered to have no claim to the title of Brotherhood because the *family possessions* (*substantia familiaris*),¹ which generally destroy brotherhood among you, create fraternal bonds among us." Here *substantia* unmistakably means POSSESSIONS. Hence, we conclude that Tertullian used "tota fidei substantia" in the sense of ENTIRE POSSESSION OF FAITH. This interpretation harmonizes with the context. For Tertullian seems to explain the phrase, "tota fidei substantia" by its effects: (a) "ut confessae et securae simus de conscientia nostra"; (b) "optantes perseverare id in nobis, non tamen praesumentes." "Tota fidei substantia," as the cause that makes Christian women "confident and secure in their conscience," "desiring without presuming to persevere in the virtue," may well be explained as a POSSESSION OF FAITH.

AMBROSE quotes Heb. xi, 1, when speaking of *substantia* in the parable of the prodigal son, which he employs to refute the rigorist teaching of the Novatians. Heretics are likened to prodigals that have gone far away from their home to wander in strange lands. Then our author comments thus on "he wasted his *substantia*": "Rightly, for whose faith halts in bringing forth good works does consume it, since FAITH OF THINGS HOPED FOR is a SUBSTANTIA. SUBSTANTIA can here only mean "fortune," a "possession." Then he adds a further explanation: faith is the ARGUMENTUM OF THINGS NOT SEEN. Ambrose's text follows: Et consumpsit, inquit, SUBSTANTIAM suam. Merito consumpsit eam, cuius fides in operibus claudicabat: FIDES ENIM EORUM

¹ Oehler, I, 262.

QUAE SPERANTUR SUBSTANTIA EST, RERUM ARGUMENTUM NON APPARENTIUM.¹ This "argumentum" can have the ordinary meaning "contents, materia," or the secondary meaning "evidence of a fact." "Contents" seems to be preferred here, as harmonizing best with "possession." Then Ambrose goes on to explain our text: Et bona substantia FIDES, in qua spei est nostrae patrimonium.² Here "substantia" is evidently again synonymous with "possession," it being indifferent whether "patrimonium" has its general meaning "fortune," or its original meaning "inheritance — inherited fortune." In "*faith*" we have the "*fortune*," the "*possession*" of *that for which we hope*. Hence, "substantia," in so far as it is a qualification of Fides in Heb. xi, 1, is that which makes the contents of OUR HOPE a "possession," a "fortune" to us. This exegesis resembles the Greek, in which πίστις is the presentation or anticipation (here anticipated possession) of a future reality.

It is AUGUSTINE who says in his *Enchiridion*, c. 8, that Heb. xi, 1 is the *standard definition of FAITH* in the estimation of many Fathers: In epistola quippe ad Hebraeos, qua teste usi sunt illustres Catholicae Regulae defensores, fides esse dicta est Convictio rerum quae non videntur.³ The omission of ἐλπίζομενων υποστασις in his citation of the text is striking, and in this we see an example of Augustine's general tendency to omit the first part of the verse and to emphasize the second. And even when our author quotes the first part, he cites a strangely variant text: SPERANTIUM SUBSTANTIA. Thus in *De Pecat. Meritis et Remiss.* II, c. 31, 50,⁴ Augustine quotes SPERANTIUM SUBSTANTIA and understands it in the sense of FORTITUDO SPERANTIUM. What is the meaning of "fortitudo" here? In this chapter Augustine

¹ Migne, P. L., 16, 521 B.

² *Ibid.*

³ Migne, P. L., 40, 235.

⁴ *Urba et Zycha*, Vienna Ed., Vol. LX, 120, 20.

explains why it is that death itself along with sin is not abolished in baptism. The reason he gives is that the "fortitudo" of Faith would be diminished: Sed si hoc fecisset, carni quaedam felicitas adderetur, minueretur autem fidei fortitudo.¹ For men have such a fear of death, that they would believe in Christ for nothing else than to be immune from dying. This would make Faith only a source of sensual pleasure (delicatus crederetur in Christum).² In the light of the context it becomes clear how *fortitudo*, in contrast to sensual pleasure, is to be explained: it has its ordinary meaning — courage, courageous energy, bravery (not simple firmness). This again elucidates Augustine's idea of *substantia*. He evidently takes it as a derivative of *substo*, "to stand firm," "to hold out," and *substantia* is the *power* to "hold out." Hence, we see that in this passage Augustine understands by SPERANTIUM SUBSTANTIA the power to stand firm for those HOPING. This new exegesis of our text depends largely on the variant reading.

The Greek Patristic exegesis of Heb. xi, 1 is substantially found in JEROME's interpretation of our text. Jerome gives it in his *Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas*, Lib. III, c. 5, in connection with the list of the "fruits of the spirit" (Gal. v, 22, 23). In this list "spes" is omitted. But this omission need not be wondered at, says Jerome, since "spes" is contained in fides: Nec mirum si spes in hoc catalogo non referatur; cum in fide sit quod speratur; et ita eam Apostolus ad Hebraeos scribens definiat: Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum necdum apparentium.³ Then Jerome explains that Faith *by way of possession* appropriates these things of the future ("things hoped for"): Siquidem id quod speramus esse venturum, et necdum est in praesenti, fide possidemus, sperantes nos tenere quod credimus.⁴ Obviously, "substantia" is here used to

¹ *Urba et Zycha*, Vienna Ed., Vol. LX, 120, 20.

² *Ibid.*

³ Migne, P. L., 26, 448 C.

⁴ *Ibid.*

signify the MANNER IN WHICH THINGS HOPED FOR, THOUGH OF THE FUTURE, ARE POSSESSED NOW THROUGH FAITH. This manner of POSSESSING FUTURE THINGS IN THE PRESENT has been expressed in similar language by the Greeks, as the anticipation of a future reality. Here we have it expressed even more plastically, as the "anticipating *possession*" (fide possidemus) of a future reality.

At first sight, from the Latin Patristic use of *substantia*, it might appear that the Latins had lost the clear understanding of the original Greek notion of Hypostasis. But that later on they understood the Greek notion of the term is sufficiently clear from RUFINUS, *H. E.*, I, 29. Here our author in narrating the history of the Council of Alexandria (362) adds an interesting note about Hypostasis. He says that the Council insisted on distinguishing between *substantia* and *subsistentia*, as the Greeks distinguished between the *οὐσία* and *ὑποστάσις*. *Substantia* was to be understood synonymously with *natura*, and *subsistentia* with *persona*. Especially on account of the Sabellian heresy, they confessed "tres subsistentes personas," to forestall any suspicion that the Council intended to countenance that heresy which understood a Trinity *only in name* (in *nominibus tantum*), and not in REALITY (non in *rebus*): Ideoque propter Sabelli haeresim tres esse subsistentias confidendas, quod quasi tres subsistentes personas significare videretur ne suspicionem daremus, tanquam illius fidei sectatores, quae Trinitatem in *nominibus tantum*, et non in *rebus* ac subsistentiis confitetur.¹ Rufinus here witnesses to the Latin understanding of *ὑποστάσις* as meaning REALITY (in *rebus*) in contrast to the Sabellian notion of the Persons as *ἀνυποστώτα* (in *nominibus tantum*). That Ambrose and Augustine gave an exegesis of our text, in which Hypostasis was not understood in the Greek sense, may be accounted for by the fact that they did not go further than the Latin meaning

¹ Migne, *P. L.*, 21, 500 A.

of *substantia* (the Latin transliteration of the Greek *υποστασις*). Besides, for Augustine a strange Latin variant reading was misleading. It is remarkable, however, that in spite of the confusion concerning the literal meaning of *υποστασις*, they have essentially the same interpretation for the function of fides (*πιστις*),—possession or anticipated possession of a future reality.

BOETIUS, as the "founder of medieval scholasticism,"¹ just in this that he translated the Greek philosophical terminology into Latin, is of interest for his translation of the term *υποστασις*, and for the subsequent Middle Age exegesis of Heb. xi, 1. In *Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis*, c. 3, Boetius gives the following history of *υποστασις* and its translation into Latin:

1. Both the ancient Latin (by the term *persona*) and the Greek (by the term *προσωπα*) terminology for PERSON in the tragedies and comedies signified "mask,"² by means of which PERSONS were represented. Boetius thus derives "persona" from "personando," and *προσωπα* from *προς* and *ωπα*. In a word, "Personae" and *προσωπα* were "masks" put "over the eyes" to hide the face of the actor when he proposed to represent some other individual: Sed quoniam, personis inductis, histriones, individuos homines, quorum intererat, in tragoedia vel comoedia ut dictum est, representabant: id est, Hecubam, vel Medeam, vel Simonem, vel Chrementum, idcirco ceteros quoque homines, quorum

¹ Bardenhewer-Shahan, *Patrology*, 682.

² Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium Primum*, c. 14, protests against the application of "persona" to Christ in the sense of *fictitious existence* common to the ancient tragedy and comedy: Sed cum personam saepius nominamus, et dicimus quod Deus per personam homo factus sit, vehementer verendum est ne hoc dicere videamur quod Deus verbum *sola imitatione actionis*, quae sunt nostra, suscepit, et quidquid illud est conversationis humanae, quasi adumbratus, non quasi verus homo fecerit; sicut in theatris fieri solet, ubi unus plures effingit repente personas, quarum ipse nulla est. (Migne, P. L., 50, 657.)

certa pro sui forma esset agnitio, et Latini *personam*, et Graeci *προσωπον* nuncupaverunt.¹

2. To express the *individual subsistence* of a rational nature, the Greeks used a far more expressive term than *προσωπον*. They used *υποστασις*, whereas the Latins, to express the same idea, by reason of the poverty of their tongue, continued to use the term "persona": Longe vero illi signatius naturae rationalis *individuum subsistentiam υποστασεως* nomine vocaverunt; nos vero, per inopiam significantium vocum, translatitiam retinuimus nuncupationem, eamque quam illi *υποστασιν* dicunt, *personam* vocantes.² Then Boetius quotes a Greek passage to confirm his view: *Αι ουσαι εν μεν τοις καθ' ολου ειναι δυναται, εν δε τοις κατα μερος μονοις υφιστανται*.³ That is, essences can be in universals, but they can exist in reality only in the particular. Hence, the Greeks designate by the term *υποστασις* only those subsistences that existed particularly: Quodcirco cum ipsae subsistentiae in universalibus quidem sint, in particularibus vero capiant substantiam, iure subsistentias particulariter substantes *υποστασις* appelaverunt.⁴ Here we see that the basic idea of *υποστασις* is the REALLY EXISTING THING. For the contrast is precisely between the *particular* and the *universal*, i.e., the REALLY EXISTING THING and the idea of the thing which is gathered from the particular, as Boetius says, *Intellectus enim universalium rerum ex particularibus sumptus est*.⁵

3. Boetius notes further: There is a difference between "subsistentia" and "substantia." "Subsistentia" (*ουσιωσις* or *ουσιωσθαι*) does not need accidents to be capable of existence, whereas, the "substantia" (*υποστασις* or *υφιστασθαι*) serves as a *subject for accidents*, so that it can come into existence: *Subsistit enim, quod ipsum accidentibus, ut possit esse, non*

¹ Migne, P. L., 64, 1343.

⁴ Migne, P. L., 64, 1344 B.

² Migne, P. L., 64, 1344 A.

⁵ *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

indiget; *substat* autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut esse valeant, subministrat; sub illis enim *stat*, dum subiectum accidentibus.¹ Substantia or *υποστασις* is the *REALITY* underlying the accidents. Then follow examples of both "subsistentia" and "substantia": Itaque *genera* vel *species* subsistunt *tantum*, neque enim accidentia generibus speciebusve contingunt. *Individua* vero, non modo subsistunt, verum etiam *substant*.² In a word, "subsistentia" is a manner of existence, as the genus or species "man," which can be predicated of the universality of mankind, whereas "substantia" or *υποστασις* is the *REALITY* which can be predicated only of some particular man determined by the accidents of specific difference. Here again we see that *υποστασις* means fundamentally *REALITY*.

4. Boetius then sums up the terminology in the Greek and Latin equivalents, in the words of Marcus Tullius: *Essentiam* quidem *ουσιαν*; *subsistentiam* vero *ουσιωσιν*; *substantiam* *υποστασιν*; *personam* *προσωπον*, appellans.³ Boetius then applies these terms to man and to God: (a) *To man*: *Est oucia* quidem atque *essentia*, *quoniam est*; *ουσιωσις* vero atque *subsistentia*, *quoniam in nullo subiecto est*; *υποστασις* vero atque *substantia*, *quoniam subest ceteris, quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est ουσιωσεις*.⁴ In a word, Hypostasis can be applied to *man* only in so far as he exists in fact under accidents which of themselves *do not exist* independently, but in a man as a subject. That is, man is an *υποστασις* in this that he is a *particular man*, as, e.g., St. Paul. (b) *To God*: *Deus* quoque et *oucia* est et *essentia*; *est enim, et maxime ipse est, a quo omnium esse proficiscitur*. *Est ουσιωσις*, id est *subsistentia*; *subsistit enim nullo indigens, et υψιστασθαι, substat enim*.⁵ That is, *υποστασις* may be predicated of God in so far as He exists independently and supports in *real existence* all existing things. He is the *REALITY PAR EXCELLENCE*.

¹ Migne, P. L., 64, 1344 B.

³ *Ibid.*

² Migne, P. L., 64, 1344 C.

⁴ Migne, P. L., 64, 1345 A.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Hence, we conclude that the meaning of *υποστασις* for Boetius was fundamentally EXISTING REALITY. This is clear:

(1) From his historical note about the ancient understanding of "personae" and "*προσωπα*," as "masks" representing REALITIES;

(2) From the Greek terminology — *υποστασις*, to express *individual subsistence*, which the Latins by poverty of vocabulary signified by "persona";

(3) From the difference between "subsistentia" and "substantia"—the former existing in universals without accidents, as "genus" or "species," and the latter supporting the accidents in some *particular and really extant being*, as St. Paul.

(4) From the fact that *υποστασις* can be predicated: (a) of *man*, in so far as some *particular and really existing man* is extant; and (b) of *God*, in so far as He exists independently, and supports in *real existence* all extant things.

Summary of the Latin Patristic Literature

The Latin Patristic literature dealing with *υποστασις* presents, at first sight, a rather remarkable picture, if compared with the Greek.

1. In Tertullian we have substantia = possession with the moral assurance or guarantee of something.

2. In Ambrose, substantia = simply possession.

3. Augustine has an entirely different text for Heb. xi, 1, and his substantia = fortitudo = power to hold out, or to stand firm.

4. For Jerome, the substantia of fides expresses anticipated possession.

5. For Rufinus, substantia means the reality in contrast to non-reality.

6. For Boetius, it is the emphasis of the existing reality.

These various meanings for *ὑποστασις* seem to be confused; and yet there is unity. With the exception of the exegesis of Augustine, the entire exegesis is grouped around the two terms, possession and reality. But these are essentially identical, since the possession is only a qualified reality, a reality of which it is predicated that it is possessed, yet it is a reality.

On the other hand, *ὑποστασις* as reality is the unanimous exegesis of the Greek Patristic writers. Hence, as far as the interpretation of Heb. xi, 1 is concerned, the Greek and the Latin Patristic literatures are in complete harmony. However, in early Latin writings there seems to be confusion regarding the original meaning of *ὑποστασις*. The "substantia" of the Latins could never fully express what *ὑποστασις* signified to the Greeks; and, furthermore, the Latin idea of "substantia" (possession) is only an amplification of the original sense of *ὑποστασις*, but not the original notion itself.

Recapitulation

Having completed and summarized the RESULTS of the Patristic exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, we are now prepared to estimate their value. The principal difficulties of the verse have always centered on the meaning of *ὑποστασις*. Accordingly, we have studied the Patristic exegesis of Heb. xi, 1 in the light of the current Greek notion of this pivotal term. The RESULTS obtained justify the minute and painstaking investigation. For we have found a unanimity and clarity in the Greek and Latin exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, based on the current meaning of *ὑποστασις*, which is in striking contrast to the variety and vagueness of the modern exegesis, based on the lexical notion of *ὑποστασις*. It is another proof of the value of historical and literary investigation of Scriptural texts. With the possible exception of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Augustine (who used a strangely variant Latin text), the Greeks and the Latins in the light of the most

ancient Christian notion of *υποστασις* (as fundamentally REALITY) unanimously interpreted *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* either as the REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR, or (by reason of the fact that "hoped-for things" refer to the future) as the GUARANTEE FOR THE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR, the ANTICIPATION OF A FUTURE REALITY, or the ANTICIPATED POSSESSION OF THINGS HOPED FOR.

Ελπιζομενων υποστασις, then, is an expression used in Heb. xi, 1, to describe the manner in which "things hoped for" become REAL to the believer through FAITH. It is best expressed in these words: FAITH MAKES REAL, BY SPIRITUAL REPRESENTATION, THINGS HOPED FOR, or in view of the fact that "hoped-for things" are matters of the future, this more plastic expression has been used: FAITH IS THE ANTICIPATION OF THE REALITY OF FUTURE THINGS.

The second part of our text, *ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*, has never presented much difficulty. It means THE PROOF WHICH CANNOT BE QUESTIONED OF THINGS UNSEEN. It is explained by the Patristic interpretation of the first part of the verse, *i.e.*, the reason why FAITH IS AN INCONTESTABLE PROOF OF THINGS UNSEEN is the fact that by *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* faith MAKES THINGS HOPED FOR SO REAL TO THE BELIEVER, BY SPIRITUAL REPRESENTATION, that it constitutes the INCONTESTABLE PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THINGS UNSEEN.

The investigation into the Patristic interpretation of Heb. xi, 1, in the light of the most ancient Christian notion of *υποστασις*, is valuable not only as the most important stage in the exegesis of our text, but also as the closest link to the literary milieu in which Heb. xi, 1 was written; and, as such, it establishes a PROBABILITY that THIS WAS ALSO THE MEANING OF THE AUTHOR.

It will be interesting to see if in the next period, the Middle Ages, the Patristic exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* is maintained, or whether it gives way to new interpretations.

3. IN THE EXEGESIS OF THE MIDDLE AGES

In view of the practically unanimous Patristic understanding of *υποστασις* as REALITY, it should not surprise us to find it repeated in the exegesis of our text during the Middle Ages. At any rate, if new interpretations arise, it will be interesting to notice how they explain themselves historically. The Patristic exegesis, with its roots in the *κοινή διαλεκτος*, is historically in touch with the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1. Can new interpretations stand under this historico-literary test?

WALAFRIED STRABO (849) in his *Glossa Ordinaria* on the Epistle to the Hebrews, considers Heb. xi, 1 to be a *description* of Faith: *Hic est laus et commendatio fidei, cuius descriptionem ponit.*¹ For Strabo, three things are here predicated of fides, viz., (a) *Quid efficiat in nobis*; (b) *Quod fundamentum est omnium bonorum*, and (c) *Et quod et de non apparentibus est.*²

What is of immediate interest to us is the first and the second, because they are the exegesis of "substantia sperandarum rerum." Strabo makes the interesting remark that even in the Epistle to the Romans, fides is called "substantia sperandarum rerum."³ Then he continues: *Id est, causa quae res sperandas faciet quandoque subsistere in nobis; quod est dicere: faciet nos consequi futura bona. Et proprie dicitur fides substantia, quia sperandis substat, et faciet ea esse in credentibus in alia vita.*⁴ In a word, Fides is "substantia sperandarum rerum," because it makes "things hoped for" REAL to the believers; it gives "things hoped for" REALITY of existence. In this exegesis of "substantia sperandarum rerum" we can recognize the current Greek exegesis of our text, viz., the *anticipated reality* of "things hoped for," although the derivation of substantia from substare shows a lack of understanding of the literal meaning of *υποστασις*.

¹ Migne, P. L., 114, 663 B.² *Ibid.*³ *Ibid.*⁴ *Ibid.*

Secondly, faith is the *foundation* of all good things, which no one can change, and without which there can be no building; or, faith makes "things hoped for" to *exist* in the heart of the believer: *Et est fundamentum omnium bonorum quod nemo mutare potest, et sine quo non est bona aedificatio: vel, speranda iam facit esse in corde credentis.*¹ That is, Faith as the *foundation* of all good things is equated by Faith as the *cause* which makes "things hoped for" to *exist* in the heart of the believer. This is a noteworthy equation, because it may explain the exegesis of those who like Origen spoke of "substantia sperandarum" as the "fundamentum iustitiae." *Substantia*, as a *fundamentum*, must be considered a derived sense of *substantia* (*υποστασις*) which means primarily REALITY. For it is a very significant fact that those who interpret *substantia* (*υποστασις*) in our text as *fundamentum* usually do so in the light of the doctrine of justification. So Origen² probably explained it, and so Strabo in what follows: *Fides est causa sperandarum, quia causa iustitiae per quam sunt speranda.*³ Hence, "*substantia*" means "*fundamentum*" only by adaptation, in the light of the doctrine of justification, or, at most, it was in view of the fact that "*substantia*" (*υποστασις*) caused "things hoped for" to exist in the soul that the derived sense of *Fides* as the *fundamentum iustitiae* arose.

We conclude that STRABO understood *Fides* to be "*substantia sperandarum rerum*" in the sense that *Fides* causes "THINGS HOPED FOR" to EXIST IN REALITY in the soul of the believer. In the Greek Patristic literature we find *πιστις* as the *factor presenting* future realities, whereas, we have here Faith, as the *factor directly producing* (*faciet*) these realities.

HRABANUS (856), in his treatise, *In Epist. ad Hebr.*, interprets our text in the very words of John Chrysostom with

¹ Migne, P. L., 114, 663 C.

² Migne, P. L., 114, 663 C.

³ Migne, P. G., 14, 980 B.

the exception that he uses "*scientia*" where the other has *ουσια*. The following reason is given for the use of *substantia* in Heb. xi, 1: as "things hoped for" are considered devoid of *substantia* (*sine substantia*), Faith gives them *substantia*; nay more, it does not merely give it to them — it is the *scientia* of them: Quoniam ea quae sunt in spe, sine substantia esse putantur, fides eis tribuit substantiam; magis autem non eis tribuit, sed ipsa est scientia eorum.¹ Then, in the words of Chrysostom, follows the example of the resurrection of the body at the last day, which Faith makes to *subsist* in the soul.² It is evident from the contrast, "*sine substantia*" and "*scientia*," that "*scientia*" here means the PERCEPTION OF THE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR. The old Patristic idea of Faith, as a supernatural eye by which we see things in their REALITY, is easily recognized here. For "*sine substantia*," as a characteristic of the object of hope, points to a contrast between the *natural eye*, that cannot see the REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR, and *Faith*, that gives the "*scientia*" of the object of *Faith* in the same way as our *natural eye* gives the "*scientia*" (the perception) of the REALITY OF THINGS SEEN. Faith REPRESENTS things as REALLY EXISTING, although they may *seem* to be "*sine substantia*" (without reality).

The Greek Patristic exegesis of our text is strikingly given by OECUMENIUS (X century) in *Comm. in Epist. ad Hebr.* This author not only insists that *υποστασις* means REALITY IN CONTRAST TO UNREALITY, but he also points out how "things hoped for" are made REAL, viz., BY MAKING THEM TO BE PRESENT. First of all, Oecumenius says that *πιστις* is called the *ουσια* and *υποστασις* of "things hoped for": Πιστις εστιν αυτη η υποστασις και ουσια των ελπιζομενων³ πραγματων.⁴ Then he goes on to explain that

¹ Migne, P. L., 112, 788 B.

² *Ibid.*

³ Migne, P. G., 119, 401 D.

⁴ It is of interest to notice that *πραγματων* is here connected with *ελπιζομενων*, not (as in the more common text) with *βλεπομενων*.

“things of hope” are without REALITY (*ανυποστατα*), so long as they are NOT PRESENT (*μη παροντα*); but *πιστις* becomes both the *ουσια* and the *υποστασις* of such things BY MAKING THEM TO EXIST (*ειναι*) AND TO BE PRESENT: *Επειδη γαρ τα εν ελπισιν ανυποστατα εστιν, ως τεως μη παροντα, η πιστις ουσια τις αυτων και η υποστασις γινεται, ειναι αυτα και παρειναι τροπον τινα παρασκευαζουσα, δια του πιστευειν ειναι.*¹ *Πιστις* is not only the *reality of things hoped for*, but by *υποστασις* it also makes them REAL BY MAKING THEM PRESENT. In a word, we find here again the remarkable exegetical formula of the Greek Patristic literature: *Πιστις* = REALITY, or the ANTICIPATED REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR THROUGH THE PRESENTATION OF THESE THINGS TO THE SOUL.

In the briefest formula THEOPHYLACT (c. 1100) sums up the Greek Patristic exegesis of our text in *Expositio in Epist. ad Hebr.* c. XI: *Λοιπον υπογραφεται υμιν την πιστιν, και φησιν οτι ουσιωσις εστι των μηπω οντων και υποστασις των μη υφεστωτων.*² Faith is the factor that makes those things REAL (*ουσιωσις*³) that do not yet exist (*των μηπω οντων*). But *πιστις* not only takes “things hoped for” out of the class of mere imaginary figments of the mind (*των μηπω οντων*) by giving them REALITY (*ουσιωσις*), but in what follows Theophylact shows EMPHATICALLY that the ANTICIPATED REALITY of things unseen EXISTS (*υποστασις των μη υφεστωτων*). For *υποστασις* and *υφεστωτων* are both derived from *υφισταναι* = EMPHATIC FORM OF *ειναι*, and in our text *πιστις* gives EMPHATIC EXISTENCE (*υποστασις*) to those things of hope which do NOT yet so EXIST (*μη υφεστωτων*). With this understanding of Theophylact’s interpreta-

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 119, 401 D.

² Migne, *P. G.*, 125, 340 D.

³ Coming from *ουσιωω*, “to give REALITY,” the term *ουσιωσις* is the power that gives REALITY to things of hope which are both future and unseen by natural eyes. Cf. Pape.

tion of *ἐλπίζομενων υποστασις* in mind, we can see more clearly the aptness and force of what, since John Chrysostom, has become the classical example of the Greek exegesis of our text, viz., the resurrection of the body at the last day: *Οιον η αναστασις ουτω υφεστηκεν, αλλ' η πιστις υφιστα αυτην, και προ οφθαλμων ημιν τιθησι.*¹ The resurrection does not yet REALLY EXIST CONCRETELY (*ουτω υφεστηκεν*), but *πιστις* makes it to SUBSIST (*υφιστα*) and PLACES IT BEFORE OUR EYES (*προ οφθαλμων ημιν τιθησι*) in such a manner that we are more fully convinced about its REALITY than we are about the things we see with the eyes of the body. For things placed before our physical eyes and perceived by them are undisputed REALITIES, yet even more so are things seen by the eyes of Faith.

This classical example of the Greek exegesis of *ἐλπίζομενων υποστασις* proves to what extremes the Greeks went to show that *υποστασις* meant fundamentally REALITY.

HUGO OF ST. VICTOR (1141) is interesting in this, that he shows how Fides can be "substantia rerum sperandarum" for future, present, and past objects, respectively:

1. Fides is properly the "substantia" of future things, because *through it we know that they are*: Et ideo proprie Fides substantia futurorum dicitur, quia *per eam scimus quod sunt.*² It is the same idea that Hrabanus before him expressed in the words: Fides is the "scientia" of "things hoped for" — THE PERCEPTION OF THE REALITY OF THINGS HOPED FOR.

2. Fides can be called "substantia rerum sperandarum" for present or past objects, because *it makes the "things hoped for" to subsist in us*: Fides etiam de praesentibus, vel praeteritis potest dici substantia rerum sperandarum . . . *id est causa, quae res sperandas facit subsistere in nobis.*³ This is a step further: Fides not only makes things REAL, but also PRESENT (immediately existing in us). Thus we find

¹ Migne, P. G., 125, 340 D. ² Migne, P. L., 175, 629 D. ³ *Ibid.*

that Hugo of St. Victor emphasizes the traditional Greek interpretation of *ἐλπιζομένων υποστάσις*, viz., FAITH IS THAT WHICH MAKES "THINGS HOPED FOR" REAL AND PRESENT.

As a student¹ of Aristotle, Plato, and Boetius, GILBERT DE LA PORRÉE († 1154) is interesting in his interpretation of *ἐλπιζομένων υποστάσις*. In his commentary on Rom. i, 17, he quotes Heb. xi, 1, and interprets it in the light of the traditional Patristic exegesis. He says that it is a *causative* usage of Fides, when we say that by it we embrace with such great certitude things that we do not yet *have*, that they *subsist in us as "had"*: Huius vero fidei tam est efficax usus, ut ea quae nondum habemus, sed a nobis sperantur *habenda*, tanta certitudine amplectamur, ut *per ipsam tanquam habita in nobis subsistant*.² Notice here in strong terms the Greek Patristic explanation of *υποστάσις*, as THAT WHICH CAUSES "THINGS HOPED FOR" TO BE REAL BY MEANS OF POSSESSION, PRESENTED OR ANTICIPATED. Here the ANTICIPATED POSSESSION, as the means by which these things of hope are made REAL to us, is emphasized (*tanquam habita in nobis subsistant*).

The interpretation of "substantia rerum sperandarum" in the Middle Ages is pointedly summarized in the splendid exegesis of THOMAS OF ACQUIN, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, c. XI, Lectio I. In this commentary, Thomas gives the "setting" of our text; he insists that it is a definition (though obscure) of Faith, and answers the question, why Faith can be defined in terms of spes which contains Fides. These points will receive due attention in the interpretation of our text. But here, where our immediate aim is the exegesis of "substantia rerum sperandarum," it suffices merely to mention them.

¹ Schaff, *A Religious Encyclopaedia*, etc., art. on Gilbert de la Porrée, II, 878.

² Text taken from Denifle's *Luther und Luthertum, Die Schriftausleger bis Luther über Iustitia Dei*, 42.

By way of introduction, Thomas notes that there are many explanations of our text,—*substantia potest multipliciter exponi*.¹ He summarizes them, however, under two heads:

1. *Substantia* can be used in a *causal* sense, by which "things hoped for" are *made present to us* through Fides—either (a) *by way of merit*, when one comes to see what he hopes for (since vision is the reward of Fides); or (b) by way of ownership, when one *already has in a sense* what is believed will happen at some future time: *Uno modo causaliter, et tunc habet duplicem sensum. Unum quod est substantia, id est faciens in nobis substare res sperandas, quod facit duobus modis. Uno modo quasi merendo; ex hoc enim quod captivat et submittit intellectum suum his quae sunt fidei, meretur quod aliquando perveniat ad videndum hoc quod sperat; visio enim est merces fidei. Alio modo quasi per suam proprietatem praesentialiter facit quod id quod creditur futurum in re, aliquo modo iam habeatur, dummodo credat in Deum*.² In a word, Fides as "substantia rerum sperandarum" makes "things hoped for" ACTUALLY AND REALLY TO EXIST and be present in the soul by a kind of "seeing" or by a kind of "having,"—the former being the result of a "kind of merit" and the latter being the result of a "kind of possession." This explanation of our text is the current Greek exegesis of the same with the exception that some of the Greeks specified the manner of seeing the REALITY as PRESENTATION,³ and the manner of possessing the REALITY as ANTICIPATION, TITLE-DEEDS,⁴ or GUARANTEE. It is also to be noted that the transformation of Fides into vision is strongly emphasized in both the Greek and the Latin Patristic⁵ writings.

¹ *Opera Omnia*, XXI, 687.

² *Ibid.*

³ Cf. Theodoret and John Chrysostom, pp. 42, 38, of this book.

⁴ Cf. Greek Papyri and Clement of Alexandria, p. 25, of this book.

⁵ We note only one representative of the Greek and one of the Latin Patristic literature. In *Stromata*, II, 2, Clement of Alexandria describes the

2. The other sense, in which "substantia rerum sperandarum" can be explained in our text is the *ESSENCE* of "things hoped for": alio modo exponi potest substantia essentialiter, quasi Fides est substantia, id est *essentia rerum sperandarum*. Unde in Graeco habetur: Hypostasis rerum sperandarum.¹ Then Thomas goes on to explain his use of "essentia." Substantia is "essentia" just as First Principles are "essentia," in the sense that they in a way contain everything in any thing. Fides is "essentia" in the same sense that First Principles, which must be accepted by Faith, contain the whole *substantially*. This is true in all sciences; and, hence, if geometry were the "essence" of beatitude, then he who had the principles of geometry would in a certain sense have the "essence" of beatitude, — *Et in illis principiis quoddammodo continetur tota scientia sicut conclusiones in praemissis, et effectus in causa*. Qui ergo habet principia illius scientiae, habet substantiam eius, puta geometriae. Et si geometria

precise way by which *πίστις* develops into knowledge, *αυτिका η μελετη της πιστεως επιστημη γιγνεται θεμελιω βεβαιω επερηρυσμω* (Berl. Ed. *Clem. Al.*, II, 117). That is, the exercise of Faith directly becomes Knowledge. Again, in *Stromata*, VII, 10, Clement considers the steps to perfection, and says of *πίστις*, that starting with it and being developed by it, through the grace of God, the knowledge respecting Him is to be acquired as far as possible — "till it restores the pure in heart to the crowning place of rest, teaching to gaze upon God face to face, with knowledge and comprehension," — *αχρὶς αὖ εἰς τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀποκατάσθησθαι τῆς ἀναπαύσεως τόπον τὸν καθάρων τῇ καρδίᾳ προσώπων πρὸς προσώπων ἐπιστημονικῶς καὶ καταληπτικῶς τὸν θεὸν ἐποπτεύειν διδάσασθαι* (Berl. Ed. *Clem. Al.*, III, 41). This idea that the pure in heart shall begin to know what they believe is throughout the whole Patristic literature the common expression for the way Fides passes into knowledge and vision.

Augustine, too, in *Enchiridion*, c. 5, writes that when the mind has been imbued with the first elements of that Faith which worketh by love, it endeavors by purity of life to attain unto sight, where the pure and perfect of heart know that unspeakable beauty, the full vision of which is supreme happiness, — Cum autem initio fidei, quae per dilectionem operatur, imbuta mens fuerit, tendit bene vivendo etiam ad speciem pervenire, ubi est sanctis et perfectis cordibus nota ineffabilis pulchritudo, cuius plena visio felicitas. (Migne, P. L., 40, 233.)

¹ *Op. cit.*, XXI, 687.

esset essentia beatitudinis, qui haberent principia geometriae, haberent quoddammodo *substantiam* beatitudinis.¹

Yet another example is given by Thomas: just as the tree is contained in the seed, so "things hoped for" are contained in Faith as a *substantia*. Undoubtedly, "*substantia*" is here used in the sense of CONTENTS, a meaning which is in this form entirely new in the history of the exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, although in fact it is nothing else than an amplification of *υποστασις* = REALITY.

BONAVENTURE († 1274), in *Sent.*, Lib. III, Art. I, Quaes. V, somewhat under the influence of Augustine, prepares the way for a new exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*, although he also repeats substantially the traditional Patristic interpretation of our text. In general he says that Faith is essentially a matter of the intellect and the will, in that it *makes firm* the latter and *illuminates* the former. In so far as Faith makes the WILL FIRM, it is called "*substantia*," or "*fundamentum*," and in so far as it ILLUMINES the INTELLECT, it is called "*argumentum*": Nam ipsa Fides secundum essentiam suam aliquid respicit ex parte intellectus, et aliquid ex parte affectus. Habet enim *affectum stabilire*, et *intellectum illuminare*. Et in quantum *affectum stabilis*, dicitur "*substantia*," sive "*fundamentum*"; in quantum autem *intellectum illuminat*, dicitur "*argumentum*."² The original idea of *υποστασις* has been forgotten here. Only the "*substantia*" = fortitudo of Augustine has some similarities to it. But Bonaventure allows us to infer that some notion of REALITY is still in the term, in another reference to Heb. xi, 1,³ where he says that Fides can be called "*substantia*," in so far as it is the *foundation* of our spiritual edifice: In hac definitione Fides dicitur *substantia*, id est *fundamentum* substans aedificio spirituali, quod est gratia et gloria.⁴ But Faith is a FOUNDATION in the sense that it MAKES THINGS HOPED

¹ *Op. cit.*, XXI, 687.

² *Opera Omnia*, IV, 496.

³ *Op. cit.*, VIII, 179.

⁴ *Ibid.*

FOR TO SUBSIST through grace with as much REALITY as they will EXIST through glory: *Ipsa namquam Fides facit aliquid res sperandas in nobis subsistere per gratiam, et faciet tandem per gloriam. . . . Rerum sperandarum dicitur, quia fides per assensum facit in nobis subsistere res sperandas.*¹ This shows that Bonaventure understood "substantia" in our text at least once as REALITY or PRESENTATION OF REALITY. And his analysis of Fides into intellectual and volitional elements is rather a rhetorical application than a strict notion of *πιστις-υποστασις*.

In the interpretation of our text by ERASMUS († 1536), we meet *for the first time* the new meaning of "substantia," FIDUCIA. So he unmistakably interprets "substantia" in Heb. xi, 1: *Illud adiiciam, hoc loco fidem non usurpari proprie pro ea qua credimus credenda, sed qua speramus, h.e., IPSA FIDUCIA.*² Understanding "rerum sperandarum" as things of the future, and at the same time realizing that Faith embraces also things of the past and of the present, Erasmus reconciles the difficulty by saying that here Fides is described synecdochically: *Glossema quoddam vetustum indicat hoc dictum synecdochen, cum fides sit et praeteritorum et praesentium et futurorum.*³ It is also to be noted that Erasmus' interpretation of "substantia" as FIDUCIA is determined, not by the meaning of *υποστασις* or "substantia," but by the grammatical connection of the same with "rerum sperandarum," of which it is a qualification (*hoc loco fidem non usurpari proprie pro ea qua credimus credenda, sed qua speramus, h.e., IPSA FIDUCIA*).

Following Erasmus, LUTHER († 1546) gave still further impetus to the interpretation of "substantia" as FIDUCIA. Fortunately, we can summarize Luther's exegesis of our text in a Thesis of *Alia Eiusdem Argumenti cum Priore, Contra Satanam et Synagogam Ipsius*: De Fide — Thesis 22: FIDES VERA EST SUBSTANTIA CORDIS, id est, FIRMA

¹ *Ibid.*² *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1101.³ *Ibid.*

ET CERTA FIDUCIA IN DEUM PROMISSOREM MISERICORDIAE ET AUXILII.¹ Luther tells us in his *Comment. in Epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas*, c. 5, how it was that he abandoned his first interpretation of *ὑποστασις*, as POSSESSION or POWER, for the sense, TRUST IN PROMISES, which is equivalent to *firma et certa fiducia in Deum promissorem misericordiae et auxilii*. Here he states that for a long time he had followed Jerome's interpretation of *ὑποστασις*, as POSSESSION or POWER, especially since this was also the more general usage of the term in Scripture: In qua sententia et ego diu fui, quod observassem substantiam in sacris literis fere ubique pro facultatibus et possessione usurpari, maxime, cum ad hoc Hieronymi huius loci tenerem auctoritatem.² This interpretation Luther was led to abandon by Melancthon, who showed him that when "substantia" meant POSSESSION or POWER, *ὑποστασις* was not the term used, but rather *ουσια*, *βροτος*, or *ὑπαρξις*: Postquam Melancthon . . . ostendit substantiam, quando facultatem significat, non *ὑποστασιν* (quo verbo Apostolus Heb. xi utitur), sed vel *ουσιαν* vel *βροτον* vel *ὑπαρξιν* graece dici, mutavi sententiam.³ Our author then confirms his view by the interpretation of Chrysostom, who understood *ὑποστασις* as SUBSISTENTIA, from which Luther judged that PROMISSIO, PACTUM, and especially EXPECTATIO could be used with equal reason: Cedoque sensu meo, *ὑποστασιν* seu substantiam significare proprie SUBSISTENTIAM et substantiam, qua quodlibet in se subsistit, ut Chrysostomus sapit, vel etiam PROMISSIONEM, PACTUM, de quo non est nunc tempus latius disputandi, EXPECTATIONEM, quae verbi, unde descendit *ὑποστασις*, vis et proprietas admittit.⁴ It is difficult to see how Luther can consider PROMISSIONEM, PACTUM, and

¹ Ed. Jena, *Tomus Primus Omnium Operum Lutheri*, 528.

² Ed. Irmischer, *Lutheri Opera Omnia*, 29-31, III, 437.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 29-31, III, 438.

especially EXPECTATIONEM, as having about the same meaning as Chrysostom's SUBSISTENTIAM (the emphasis of REALITY), or that the *vis et proprietas verbi, unde descendit υποστασις*, admits the sense of EXPECTATIO. But this is an important matter — how can *υποστασις* mean EXPECTATION most aptly from its derivation? And Luther's "de quo non est nunc tempus latius disputandi" is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of scientific exegesis.

In marked contrast to Erasmus and Luther, VATABLUS (†1547) follows the traditional Patristic exegesis: Fides is ESSENTIA in the sense that it makes things to be PRESENT: Rerum sperandarum ESSENTIA, demonstratio rerum quae conspici non possunt: *i.e.*, quae credit res promissas a Deo, nondum tamen praestitas, *tam veras esse quam si iam praestitae essent*, PRAESENTES et DEMONSTRATAE.¹ In a word, "substantia" makes PRESENT "things hoped for," and "argumentum" makes DEMONSTRATED "things unseen." We have again for the meaning of *υποστασις* the ANTICIPATION and the PRESENTATION of a FUTURE REALITY.

CLARIUS (†1555) understands *υποστασις* to mean FOUNDATION or BASIS: Fidem esse rerum quae sperantur *υποστασις*, et tanquam BASIM et FUNDAMENTUM quo subsistant ea quae nondum adsunt, et tanquam PRAESENTIAM esse videantur.² FOUNDATION is not the primary meaning of *υποστασις*. And the further explanation of Clarius' usage (*υποστασις* means FOUNDATION in this that it gives "things hoped for" SUBSISTENCE and PRESENCE) resembles the manner in which *υποστασις* was employed by the Greeks in the sense of REALITY, — ANTICIPATION, REPRESENTATION, and GUARANTEE OF A FUTURE REALITY.

SEBASTIAN CASTALIO (†1563) enumerates three interpretations of our text:

1. "The substance of things hoped for" = the MATTER OF THINGS HOPED FOR (also Thomas of Acquin): *υποστασις*

¹ *Ortici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1104.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 1116.

est substantia, et ipsa res atque materia, ut in huius epistolae c. I, 3¹;

2. "The substance of things hoped for" = the PROOF OF THINGS HOPE FOR: Transferatur *υποστασις* ad alia, ut 2 Cor. xi, 17, *εν ταυτη τη υποστασει της καυχησης*, in hac gloriandi materia, sive ARGUMENTUM²;

3. "The substance of things hoped for" = the SUBJECTION OF THINGS HOPE FOR BY WHICH ABSENT THINGS ARE MADE PRESENT: Ut sit *υποστασις*, cum res *υφισταται*, *proponitur*, *subiicitur*, et PRAESENS *statuitur*. Itaque, hic dicitur eorum quae sperantur *subiicitio*, quod absentia nobis *subiiciat* ac *proponat*, *efficiatque ut praesentia* esse videantur, nec secus eis assentimur quam si cerneremus.³ In this third interpretation of our text, we notice (a) that Castalio follows the traditional Greek interpretation (Faith is that which makes PRESENT THINGS WHICH ARE ABSENT); (b) that Castalio derives the term *υποστασις* from *υφισταναι* (EMPHASIS of *ειναι*) in contradistinction to the combination of *υπο* and *ιστημι* in the mistaken sense of a kind of underlying.

The manner in which "things hoped for" become REAL is repeatedly expressed by CALVIN († 1564) in his interpretation of our text. In his *Commentary on Habacuc*, c. II, 5, he calls Fides a *vision* of hidden things and the *subsistentia* of absent things: Visio rerum abscondarum, ut etiam vocatur XI ad Hebr. et subsistentia rerum absentium.⁴ If, as it seems, "subsistentia" is the equivalent of *υποστασις*, then, for Calvin, the meaning of the term is similar to that of the Greek Patristic literature, — *υποστασις* is the factor that makes absent things PRESENT. Even more pointedly Calvin explains what he means by "subsistentia" in his exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, in Hom. LVII, *In Lib. Samuel*, c. XVI: At Fides illud quo extant quae sperantur et quae demonstrat

¹ *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1106.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Calvini Opera*, XLIII, 540.

quae non cernuntur.¹ Here *υποστασις* evidently is the factor whereby "things hoped for" become REAL and EXISTING (extant). *Υποστασις* is the PRESENTATION OF A REALITY.

In equating *υφιστάται* by *εχει το ειναι* CASAUBON (†1614) shows a remarkably accurate understanding of the Greek notion of *υποστασις* as true REALITY. He also identifies it with the "esse revera"—the very REALITY—in contrast to the figments of the imagination (*διανοιας αναπλασματα*): *Υποστασις* dubio procul hic accipitur ut cum apud philosophos dicuntur *τα προς τι* habere *υποστασιν*, h.e., ESSE REVERA, non autem *της ημετερας διανοιας αναπλασματα*. *Υφιστάται* pro *εχει το ειναι* usurpant philosophi.² What is valuable about this interpretation is the fact that the author recognizes the derivation of *υποστασις* from *υφισταναι*, and also that he confirms the Greek Patristic exegesis of the term by the classical, *υφιστάται=εχει το ειναι* (*υφιστάται* pro *εχει το ειναι* usurpant philosophi), a strong phrase for EMPHATIC EXISTENCE OR VERY REALITY.

ESTIUS³ (†1613) notes three interpretations of "substantia rerum sperandarum," according as "substantia" means FOUNDATION or PRINCIPLE, REALITY or EXISTENCE, and CERTITUDE, respectively:

1. Faith can be said to be the FOUNDATION of "things hoped for," in the sense that it is a BASIS and FOUNDATION upon which hoped-for salvation so rests, that without it salvation could not exist; no more than a column could (exist) without its BASE, or a house without its FOUNDATION,—as accidents are upheld by their substance: Quod sit veluti basis ac fundamentum, cui sperata salus ita innitatur,

¹ *Op. cit.*, XXX, 157.

² *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1113.

³ Estius also observes that although many, such as Jerome, Theodoret, and Theophylact, consider Heb. xi, 1, a definition of Faith, yet for him it is rather a description of the same: Breviter respondeo, non tam definitionem quam descriptionem seu notationem quamdam fidei his Apostoli verbis contineri. (Estius, *Comm. in Cap. XI, Epist. ad Hebr.*, 274.)

ut absque ea haberi nequeat; quomodo columna basi, et domus innititur fundamento; vel etiam quomodo accidentia a substantia sustentantur.¹ We know that *υποστασις* in the sense of FOUNDATION is unusual in the Greek Patristic exegesis.

2. "Substantia" is REALITY and EXISTENCE. Faith in this sense is said to be the *υποστασις* of "things hoped for" by metonymy, because it PRODUCES, GENERATES, and EXHIBITS to us "things hoped for," which of themselves do not yet exist: Ut Fides hoc sensu dicitur eorum, quae sperantur, hypostasis ac substantia (nimirum per metonymiam ab effectu), quia, quamvis, spe pendente, *nondum illa existant, tamen eorum existentiam in nobis quodammodo fides efficit ac gignit, atque ipsa praesentia nobis exhibet.*² This is nothing other than the current Greek exegesis of our text: THINGS HOPED FOR ARE MADE REAL EITHER BY ANTICIPATION OR BY REPRESENTATION.

3. Because Faith makes us as certain about "things hoped for," as if they were *already present and grasped with the hands*; nay, because Faith makes us more CERTAIN of "things hoped for" than if they were seen with the eyes, or demonstrated by reason, it happens that some interpret *υποστασις* in our text as CERTITUDE or CERTIFICATION: Dum videlicet adeo certos de iis nos facit, atque *si re ipsa iam praestita* essent, ac manibus tenerentur; certiores vero, quam si vel oculis essent conspecta, vel ratione demonstrata. Quo fit, ut *υποστασιν* nonnulli certitudinem vel certificationem interpretentur.³ But here the EFFECT of *υποστασις* is described, not *υποστασις* itself.

SUAREZ (†1617), Tract. I, disp. II, sect. V, num. 7, repeats the secondary interpretation of Thomas of Acquin, viz., that Faith is called the "substance of things hoped for," because by Faith we have what is contained in the Symbolum—the ESSENTIALS OF SALVATION SUBSTANTIALLY:

¹ *Op. cit.*, 274.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

Fides est substantia rerum sperandarum; nam in Symbolo continentur omnia, quae ad hanc substantiam pertinent, nam ibi docetur Deus, qui est objectum beatitudinis, quam speramus.¹ This interpretation of our text has nothing whatever to do with the original Pauline description of *πίστις* in Heb. xi, 1.

BELLARMINE (†1621), *De Christo*, Lib. II, c. IV, in discussing the terms *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία*, not only summarizes pointedly the Greek Patristic view of *ὑπόστασις*, as a *modus existendi*, but also shows that the New Testament usage of the word (there are only five instances of the use of *ὑπόστασις* in the New Testament; viz., Heb. i, 8; iii, 14; xi, 1; and 2 Cor. ix, 4; xi, 17) is constant and means that "*foundation*" or "*basis*" which exists per se and supports other things in their existence: His enim locis explicatur nomen *ὑπόστασις* in genere significare fundamentum seu basim, quae alia sustentat, et ipsa per se subsistit.² This is the meaning of *ὑπόστασις* in Heb. xi, 1, because Faith is the foundation of justice and not only exists per se, but even gives existence to "things hoped for" — *things which in se are not yet, but which through Faith seem already in some way to exist*: Hic autem postea hoc nomen traducitur et accommodatur ad Fidem, quia Fides est fundamentum iustitiae, et non solum ipsa per se existit, et etiam dat subsistentiam rebus speratis, quae enim *speramus in se non sunt, sed per Fidem quodammodo iam existere videntur*.³ What is of interest in this citation of Bellarmine is not so much that he repeats emphatically the current Greek Patristic exegesis of our text, but that he regards as equivalent the two senses of "substantia," FUNDAMENTUM and QUAE ALIA SUSTENTAT ET IPSA PER SE SUBSISTIT. *ὑπόστασις* in the sense of FUNDAMENTUM is, as we have repeatedly noted, a derived usage, or better, a popular and plastic expression of the primary meaning of the term.

¹ *Opera Omnia*, XII, 29.

² *Opera*, I, 208.

³ *Op. cit.*, I, 204.

THE PISTIS

... as for Estius, Heb. xi, 1
 ... rather a description of the
 ... ex se parit certam spem
 ... illa, quae ex Dei promissis
 ... iam reipsa subsistere sive

Again we notice that our
 ... interpretation, emphasizing
 ... ANTICIPATED REALITY (iam
 ... REPRESENTATION OF REALITY

... that in our text justify-
 ... Definit igitur hic fidem
 ... significans et salvificam.²

... as CONFIDENCE; and
 ... the fact that he lays down
 ... which have been so
 ... Capellus notes that

... in various senses, and, what
 ... says that it is employed in
 ... as a subsisting PERSON

... or habit of CONFIDENCE:
 ... actum fiducialem.³ Then
 ... for this interpretation of

... is derived from the
 ... meaning of submission joined
 ... noun *stasis* which means a

... consideranda I, prepositio, II,
 ... eodem sensu quo sumitur
 ... utrobique submis-

... Nomen *stasis* con-
 ... stationem standi. . . . Ita
 ... in statione manens ac rem

... N. T., p. 77.
 ... Part II, p. 1114.

promissam expectans cum animi submissione.¹ Then follows the confirmation of his view from the usage of *ὑποστασις* in the LXX as FIDUCIA (Ps. xxxix, 7; Ruth i, 12; Ezek. xix, 5; and in the N. T. 2 Cor. ix, 4; and xi, 17; and in Heb. iii, 14). We have here the results of a philological playing with the term *ὑποστασις*, which are quite foreign to the sense of the term in the Greek Patristic literature, and which show a superficial knowledge of Greek.

CAMERON († 1625) interprets *ἐλπίζοντων ὑποστασις* as EXPECTATION OF THINGS HOPED FOR, and like Capellus confirms the same by the usage of *ὑποστασις* in the afore-said passages of the LXX. Speaking of *ὑποστασις* he says: Sed eo potius sensus accipienda est in N. T. haec vox, quo in Veteri apud LXX. Atque תַּחֲלִית h.e. EXPECTATIONES, interpretantur per hanc vocem *ὑποστασιν*.² The traditional Greek exegesis is here, as in Capellus, entirely abandoned.

TIRINUS († 1636) follows the Greek exegesis of *ὑποστασις*. In his further explanation he remarks that, although "things hoped for" do not yet exist (nondum existunt), yet Faith makes them *to subsist in the intellect* (facit subsistere in intellectu), so that the believer is as certain about them as if they *already de facto* existed: Res quae sperantur et nondum existunt, facit subsistere in intellectu, id est tam certas in animo hominis haberi *ac iam de facto* existerent.³ Tirinus here shows with great clarity how the notion of *conviction* in *πίστις* depends on *ὑποστασις*, by which "things hoped for" are MADE TO SUBSIST IN THE INTELLECT OF THE BELIEVER. Tirinus is also the first to *reject* the interpretation of *ὑποστασις* as FIDUCIA.

CORNELIUS A LAPIDE († 1637) gives two possible interpretations of our text according as *ὑποστασις* is understood either as FOUNDATION, or as REALITY:

¹ *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1115.

² *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1114.

³ *Comm. in S. S.*, II, 483.

1. *Ἰπστας* = FOUNDATION. Cornelius says that if *υποστας* means FOUNDATION, then our text must be interpreted as follows: Faith is the BASIS or FOUNDATION of "things hoped for": *Fides ergo est substantia, id est BASIS et FUNDAMENTUM, rerum sperandarum.*¹ But, as we have shown so often, *υποστας* means FOUNDATION only by reason of a popular philological derivation, or by reason of a dogmatic analogy; and, hence, it is no true interpretation of our text.

2. *Ἰπστας* = REALITY. This preferred interpretation of our text is the current Greek exegesis of the same. Cornelius thinks that *υποστας* must be understood in the same sense as found in c. iii, 14 of the same Epistle, viz., a SUBSISTING and EXISTING THING, *Idem est quod SUBSISTENTIA et EXISTENTIA.*² Our author then explains how "things hoped for," which do NOT YET SUBSIST OF THEMSELVES, yet through certitude HAVE THAT KIND OF EXISTENCE (to the believer) by which they are regarded as ALREADY EXISTING: *Fides facit ut bona futura quae nondum existunt certa habeamus, certoque futura credamus et speremus, perinde ac si iam subsisterent; eaque coram nobis cerneremus: fides enim illa ipsa quasi praesentia et certissima oculis mentis subiicit, sicque per suam certitudinem, quamdam subsistentiam dat rebus speratis et futuris in intellectu et mente fidelium.*³ *Πιστις* makes "things hoped for" so REAL to the believer that, in spite of the fact that they are future, they are regarded as ALREADY EXISTING (*ac si iam subsisterent*). In a word, *πιστις* through *υποστας* is the ANTICIPATION OF A FUTURE REALITY. The effect of this MAKING "THINGS HOPED FOR" REAL TO THE BELIEVER is CERTITUDE, and, hence, we can call *πιστις* here, as does the Peshitto, — PERSUASIO ET CERTITUDO de eis rebus quae sunt in spe, *perinde ac si iam existerent actu.*⁴

¹ *Comm. in S. S., XVIII, 518.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

HUGO GROTIUS (†1645), following the new exegesis of Capellus, interprets *ὑποστας* of our text as FIRM EXPECTATION, and confirms the same by the usual appeal to the LXX and, also, to what will become the classical reference to the Ancient Greeks (*i.e.* Polybius): *Rerum sperandarum FIRMA QUÆDAM EXPECTATIO*.¹ Grotius also instances the usage of "substantia" in Tertullian (*De Cultu Fem.*, II, 2), which we have already considered.²

THOMAS GATAKERUS (†1654) adopts the exegesis of Castalio: *ὑποστας* = *SUBIECTIO*. The interpretation reads as follows: *SUBIECTIO* quod absentia nobis subiiciat ac proponat, efficiatque ut praesentia esse videantur, nec secus iis assentiamur quam si cerneremus.³ This exegesis is essentially the Greek Patristic interpretation of our text, in which the REALITY OF "THINGS HOPED FOR" BY PRESENTATION is the keynote.

Like Cornelius a Lapide, MENOCHIVS (†1655) notes two traditional interpretations of our text;

1. Faith is the FOUNDATION SUSTAINING OUR HOPE; *Fundamentum spem nostram sustentans*.⁴

2. Fides is the SUBSISTENTIA and EXISTENTIA of "things hoped for": *Fides est subsistentia sive existentia rerum sperandarum*.⁵ It is a repetition of an interpretation already well known to us.

Although MATTHEW POLUS' (†1669) interpretation of Heb. xi, 1 is but a synopsis of the interpretations in *Critici Sacri*, yet, since *ὑποστας* began to be interpreted as FIDUCIA at this time, it will be useful to note the argument that our author contributes for the same: *Probatur haec expositio: (1) ex origine vocis, ab ὑφιστάσθαι, quod est firmi-*

¹ *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1131.

² Cf. p. 48 ff.

³ Cf. Poli, Matthaei, *Synopsis Crit. Et Alior.*, IV, 1353.

⁴ *Comm. Tot. S. S.*, II, 248.

⁵ *Ibid.*

ter stare, non cadere, non fugere, non cedere, ut apud Plut. et Synes; (2) ex usu vocis, tum Heb. iii, 14, tum apud LXX qui *προστας* pro spe et expectatione ponunt, Ruth i, 12; Ps. xxxix, 8; Ezek. xix, 5; tum in Polybio.¹

DANIEL BRENIUS (c. 1666) repeats the Greek expression for the two ways by which "things hoped for" are made REAL to the believer, viz., by ANTICIPATED POSSESSION and by PRESENTATION. Our author says that Fides is called the "substantia rerum sperandarum," quia facit ut res in expectatione positae, quae *nondum actu possidentur, velut praesto sint*, animo apprehendantur.²

WILLIAM BURKITT (†1703) connects the two interpretations of *προστας* — FIRM EXPECTATION and SUBSISTENTIA — in these words: Speaking of Faith, it is a CONFIDENT AND FIRM EXPECTATION of good things which God has promised, giving the good things hoped for a REAL SUBSISTENCE in our minds and souls.³

The secondary interpretation of *προστας* by NATALIS ALEXANDER (†1724) is FOUNDATION, but his primary interpretation is the traditional one — PRESENTATION OF REALITY: Quia futura bona caelestia et aeterna: quae sunt obiectum spei nostrae, *in nobis quodammodo subsistere facit*, de illis adeo certos nos reddens *ac si ipsa iam praestita essent*, ac manibus tenerentur.⁴

GEORGIUS RAPHELUS (†1750) merely adopts Gerhard's interpretation of *προστας* as FIDUCIA, and gives the usual references to the LXX; and he is the *first* to note down the exact reference to Polybius (*De Horatio Coclite*, Lib. VI, c. 55, and Lib. V, c. 16).⁵

¹ *Synopsis Crit. et Alior.*, IV, 1354.

² *Opera Theologica*, In Part. N.T., 110.

³ *Expository Notes with, etc.*, Heb. xi, 1.

⁴ *Comm. Literalis et Moralis in Omnes Epist. Sancti Pauli Apost.*, etc., Tom. II, 496.

⁵ *Annotationes Philologicas in N. T.*, III, 687 sq.

WOLFIUS (†1738) also accepts the interpretation of *υποστασις* of our text as FIDUCIA, although he notes the Patristic exegesis and also shows the resemblance between the Pauline *πιστις* of Heb. xi, 1 and Philo's *πιστις* in *De Abrah.* Our author says very plainly: Assentior illis, qui *υποστασιν* de CERTA FIDUCIA ad res speratas accipiunt.¹

Also for DODDRIDGE (†1751) Faith is the CONFIDENT EXPECTATION² of "things hoped for."

BENGEL (†1751), on the contrary, goes back to the Patristic literature for his interpretation, and sums up in most pointed phrases the current Greek exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*: Faith is the substance by which the FUTURE THINGS HOPED FOR ARE PRESENTED OR SET BEFORE US AS PRESENT.³

We shall close the Middle Age period of the exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* with CALMET (†1757). *Υποστασις*, for him, is FOUNDATION which (from a further description) is evidently nothing more than the traditional Greek interpretation of our text: Fides est fundamentum: *has* (things hoped for) *praesto exhibit fides*, ipsamque illarum veritatem et *possessionem quoddammodo praebet*: imo ipsa est substantia earum rerum, quas per spem *anticipatis*.⁴ We have here the Greek exegesis of our text in which *πιστις* MAKES "things hoped for" REAL either BY PRESENTATION or by ANTICIPATED POSSESSION. The curious thing about it, however, is that this typical Greek exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* is equated by the interpretation FOUNDATION OF "THINGS HOPED FOR."

Recapitulation

We are now in a position to note the RESULTS of our investigation into the exegesis of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις* of

¹ *Curae Philologicae et Criticae in X. post. S. Pauli Epist.*, 738.

² *The Family Expositor*, VI, 102.

³ *The Gnomon of the N. T.*, II, 654 sq.

⁴ *Comm. Liter. in Omnes Lib. Vet. et Nov. Test.*, X, 635.

Heb. xi, 1 during the Middle Ages, and to estimate their value. As in the Patristic period, so in the Middle Ages, the interpretation of the verse has hinged upon the meaning of *υποστασις*:

I. A. *Υποστασις* = REALITY:

1. ANTICIPATION OF REALITY,
2. EMPHASIS OF REALITY,
3. PRESENTATION OF REALITY.

Walafrid Strabo, Hrabanus, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Hugo of St. Victor, Gilbert, Thomas of Acquin (secondary interpretation), Bonaventure, Vatablus, Calvin, Clarius, Castalio, Is. Casaubon, Estius, Tirinus, Bellarmine, John Piscator, Cornelius a Lapide, Gatakerus, Menochius, Brenius, Burkitt, Natalis Alexander, Bengel, Calmet.

B. *Υποστασις* = CERTITUDE OF REALITY: — Estius.

II. *Υποστασις* = FOUNDATION.

Estius, Bellarmine, Cornelius a Lapide, Natalis Alexander, Calmet, Clarius, Menochius.

III. *Υποστασις* = CONFIDENCE, EXPECTATION.

Erasmus, Luther, Capellus, Cameron, H. Grotius, Gerhard, G. Raphelus, Wolfius, Burkitt, Doddridge.

IV. *Υποστασις* = CONTENTS, ESSENCE.

Thomas of Acquin, Suarez, Castalio.

V. *Υποστασις* = FORTITUDE. Bonaventure.

Accordingly, the exegesis of Heb. xi, 1 during the Middle Ages is characterized by several interpretations of *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*. The traditional Greek interpretation which emphasized the REALITY of "things hoped for" either by ANTICIPATION or by REPRESENTATION was preserved and copied more generally than any other. Besides the Greek, five other interpretations came into vogue according as *υποστασις* was understood to mean (a) CERTITUDE, (b) FOUNDATION, (c) CONTENTS, (d) CONFIDENCE, (e) FORTITUDE.

The sense CERTITUDE arose by mistaking the *effect* of *υποστασις ελπιζομενων* (the CERTITUDE regarding the

REALITY of "things hoped for," produced by a vivid REPRESENTATION of the objects of hope to the mind) for *υποστασις* itself (that which makes "things hoped for" REAL to the believer by a vivid REPRESENTATION of them).

The meaning FOUNDATION came into use either by reason of a popular philological derivation of *υποστασις* from *υπο* and *στασις*, yielding the naïve sense FIRM STANDING or FOUNDATION, as is certainly the case with FORTITUDE, or by reason of an a priori analogy between *salvation* and an *edifice* in which *πιστις* was compared to the FOUNDATION of salvation. Of course, the latter sense is no interpretation of Heb. xi, 1 at all.

Υποστασις in the sense of CONTENTS shows the influence of the Latin equivalent *substantia*. But *υποστασις* in the sense of FIDUCIA and FIRM EXPECTATION is the interesting "find" of our investigation into the exegesis of the Middle Ages. It is interesting, because it is an entirely NEW INTERPRETATION that breaks completely from the Greek and Latin exegesis of Heb. xi, 1. It will be even more interesting to see what interpretation will prevail in the Modern exegesis of our text. Will the Greek Patristic exegesis with its roots in the very literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1 be preserved? Will the new interpretation of *υποστασις* as FIDUCIA find more champions, or will a still NEWER interpretation spring up in the period which we now proceed to examine?

4. IN MODERN EXEGESIS

For the twofold reason (*a*) that the number of commentaries on Heb. xi, 1 during the Modern Period is very great, and (*b*) that the Moderns merely repeat the interpretations of our text as developed in the two preceding Periods, we need not give to it the same detailed examination we have devoted to that of the Patristic Literature and the Middle Ages. And for the sake of even greater brevity we shall group the Modern authors in classes differentiated by the

various interpretations followed. However, we shall endeavor to cite as much from these authors as is absolutely necessary to convey their exact meaning. The interpretation of Heb. xi, 1, for the Modern, as for the older exegetes, hinges on the word *υποστασις*. Hence, their interpretations vary with their understanding of this pivotal term.

I. A. *Υποστασις* = REALITY: Faith is the REALITY (metonymically) of "things hoped for." So Rosenmüller: "Illud quod facit, ut iam extent, quae sperantur."¹ In the same sense John Owen interprets *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*: "It (*πιστις*) gives those things hoped for, and as they are hoped for, a REAL SUBSISTENCE, *υποστασις*, in the minds and souls of them that do believe."² Seiss repeats the same from the true point of view that the object of *πιστις* is revelation: "Our taking God at His word, enables us to act as if we saw them (*i.e.*, "things hoped for"). They thus receive a REAL SUBSISTENCE in our minds."³ F. S. Sampson has found the best English equivalent for the Greek sense of *υποστασις*, viz., REALIZATION: "It (*πιστις*) gives them (*i.e.*, things hoped for) the force of PRESENT REALITIES," and for this reason: "As Faith REALIZES things hoped for."⁴ H. J. Ripley, conscious of the dynamic force of *πιστις*, thus exegetes our verse: "It (*πιστις*) gives substance, as it were, to things which as yet are only objects of hope, so that those things have the force of REALITIES, ACTUALLY EXISTING AND WITHIN OUR GRASP, and consequently they engage our affections and determine our purpose."⁵ Like Seiss, Junkin says: "Thus it is a REALITY — a PRESENT SUBSISTENCE in the believing mind and heart, of the things held up before us in the Gospel."⁶ MacEvilly

¹ *Scholia in N. T.* vol. V, 274.

² *An Exposit. of the Epist. to the Heb.*, etc., IV, 361.

³ *Popular Lectures on the Epist. to the Heb.*, 318.

⁴ *A Crit. Comm. on the Epist. to the Heb.*, 409.

⁵ *The Epist. to the Heb.*, with *Explanat. Notes*, 135.

⁶ *A Comm. upon the Epist. to the Heb.*, 387.

(secondary interpretation) says that Faith through *υποστασις* "gives these things we hope for a new and ANTICIPATED EXISTENCE in our minds."¹ Henry Cowles, considering this world of sense, says: "Faith comes to our help to give substance — A SENSE OF SOLID REALITY — to what we hope for in the realm of spiritual life."² Thus also Corluy: "Essentia per se stans — si iam resolvitur synecdoche, fides eo sensu dicitur substantia rerum sperandarum, quatenus est firma mentis persuasio, qua in mente credentium futura bona ANTICIPATAM SUBSISTENTIAM nanciscantur."³ Van Steenkiste equates *πιστις* as a "reality" with "quasi fundamentum," but obviously only as an analogy: "Fides facit ut res sperandae in nobis *subsistant*, quasi sit fundamentum quo spes nitatur."⁴ Westcott, impressed with the correct understanding of *ελπιζομενων* as "things of the future,"⁵ interprets the text thus: "Faith is that which causes the REALITY of things to come TO EXIST now."⁶ Prat similarly says: "Enfin elle est la RÉALITÉ des choses que nous espérons, en tant qu'elle est une prise de possession anticipée des biens à venir et qu'elle empêche nos espérances d'être vains ou fantastiques."⁷ Dummelow in the light of the context of the whole Epistle (in which *earthly things* are contrasted with *heavenly things*, as types, copies, or shadows are contrasted with REALITIES) solves the mystery of *υποστασις* in these words: "Faith is that by which the invisible becomes REAL and the future becomes PRESENT. Faith gives REAL-

¹ *An Exposit. of the Epistles of St. Paul, etc.*, 225.

² *Epistle to the Heb.*, etc., 109.

³ *Spicilegium*, etc., II, 210.

⁴ *Comm. in Omnes Epist. S. Pauli*, II, 602.

⁵ Aristotle also so defined it: *ελπις του μελλοντος εστιν*. Cf. his book, *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, c. I, 449 b, 27, in Biehl's edition, *Parva Naturalia*; cf. also: *αλλα του μεν παροντος αισθησις, του δε μελλοντος ελπις, του δε γενομενου μηνμη* (*ibid.*).

⁶ *The Epist. to the Heb.*, 351.

⁷ *La Théologie de Saint Paul*, 548.

ITY to things hoped for, and puts to the test things unseen. They (things hoped for) exist apart from Faith, but it is by Faith that they are REALIZED."¹

B. *Προστασις* = ASSURANCE or PLEDGE OF REALITY: Faith is the ASSURANCE or PLEDGE OF THE REALITY of "things hoped for." So Conrad Lomb: "Hinc fides CERTISSIMUM PIGNUS est rerum sperandarum."² Jos. Longking, in a somewhat confused way, writes: "By Faith being the 'Substance'—the 'sure expectation,' or 'confidence'—of those 'hoped for things,' is meant that it enables its possessor to entertain SUCH A SENSE OF THEIR REALITY, and that they will become HIS AT SOME FUTURE PERIOD, as to furnish an ASSURED TRUST, a stable foundation, on which to build his 'hope' of realizing them."³ Sam. T. Lowrie says simply: "Now Faith is the ASSURANCE of things hoped for."⁴ Bernardine à Piconio interprets *προστασις* more pointedly: "Faith is the ASSURANCE OF THE REALITY of that which we expect."⁵ C. J. Vaughan gives this exegesis of *προστασις*: "ASSURANCE of (things hoped for), as in four out of the five places where the word (*προστασις*) occurs in the New Testament."⁶ Edgar Goodspeed understands it in the same sense: "Now Faith is the ASSURANCE of things hoped for."⁷ Dummelow, besides his explanation above, notes that RV. uses ASSURANCE for *προστασις*, and then explains it: "What is meant is that Faith is that which gives ASSURANCE or CERTAINTY of things still in the future. They exist apart from Faith, but it is by Faith that they are REALIZED."⁸ H. R. Boll, much like the Greek

¹ *A Comm. on the Holy Bible, etc.*, 1026.

² *Comm. in Divi Pauli Apost. Epist. ad Heb.*, 220.

³ *Notes on the Epist. of Paul the Apost. to the Heb.*, 334.

⁴ *An Explanation of the Epist. to the Heb.*, 407.

⁵ *An Exposit., etc. — The Epist. to the Heb.*, 397.

⁶ *The Epist. to the Heb., etc.*, 213.

⁷ *The Epist. to the Heb.*, 96.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 1026.

Patristic writers, interprets our passage as follows: "It is Faith that makes the glories we hope for REAL to us, so that they are not dreams, air castles, vain imaginations, but a REAL INHERITANCE. It is not only the basis of our hopes, but our ASSURANCE of them. All this is involved in the expression: Faith is the ASSURANCE of things hoped for."¹

II. *ὑποστασις* = FIRM PERSUASION, or CONVICTION. Hence, Faith is the FIRM PERSUASION, or CONVICTION of "things hoped for." Thus Bernadine à Piconio: "The writer apparently uses the word *υποστασις*, translated in the Vulgate "substance," which is its proper meaning here as in 2 Cor. xi, 17, in a subjective sense, meaning CERTITUDE, CONVICTION, or CONFIDENCE."² More clearly Weinel says: "Glaube ist ein ÜBERZEUGTSEIN von der unsichtbaren Welt, auf die man hofft."³ Johannes Weiss, while slightly exaggerating the sense of *υποστασις*, yet interestingly interprets our verse thus: "*ὑποστασις*, eigentlich die feste Substanz oder das Fundament, wird in der hellenischen Prosa von der UNERSCHÜTTERLICHEN Festigkeit des Willens oder des Mutes oder der ÜBERZEUGUNG gebraucht."⁴ Paul Feine, speaking of the "berühmte Definition des Glaubens" (given in Heb. xi, 1), says: "Ein Doppeltes wird damit hervorgehoben: (1) dass es sich im Glauben um HEILSREALITÄTEN handelt, welche in dieser Welt noch nicht in die Erscheinung treten, daher unsichtbar und Gegenstand der Hoffnung sind; (2) dass der Glaube doch aber eine UNERSCHÜTTERLICHE ÜBERZEUGUNG von der Wirklichkeit dieser Güter ist."⁵

III. *ὑποστασις* = FOUNDATION, or ROOT, so that Faith is the FOUNDATION or ROOT of "things hoped for." Thus

¹ *Lessons on Heb.*, 140.

² *Op. cit.*, 396.

³ *Biblische Theologie des N. T.*, 599.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, I, 322.

⁵ *Theologie des N. T.*, 656.

Conrad Lomb, mistaking the etymology of *υποστασις*, writes: "Sicut enim substantia SUSTENTAT accidentia, ita fides SUSTENTAT spem nostram, adeo ut nulla in nobis sit futura spes, si non sit fides, quae eam *fulciat et sustineat*." ¹ MacEvilly, applying it to justification, calls Faith the "ROOT and FOUNDATION of justification." ² Stentrup thus designates *πιστις*: "Das FUNDAMENT und die Wurzel all der Güter, die durch Christus uns geworden sind." ³ Many other modern exegetes have interpreted *υποστασις* in the sense of FOUNDATION, but since they have further explained their usage in terms of one of the other interpretations of our text, we shall consider their exegesis in other and more proper classifications.

IV. *Τποστασις* = CONFIDENCE: Faith is the CONFIDENCE of "things hoped for." Thus Stuart understands *ελπιζομενων υποστασις*: "The writer has just been exhorting his readers not to cast away their CONFIDENCE or BOLDNESS which would ensure a great reward (Heb. x, 35). This sense is evidently appropriate here." ⁴ Kuinoel for confidence puts "expectation": "FIRMA EXPECTATIO rerum sperandarum." ⁵ Max. Roeth identifies *υποστασις* with *υπομονη*: "Et Fides vel maxime consistit in EXPECTATIONE (*υποστασις* idem sonat quod *υπομονη* (x, 36; iii, 14)) rerum sperandarum." ⁶ Olshausen, without assigning any reason for his interpretation, rather curtly disposes of the difficult *υποστασις*: "Here it (substantia) is, of course, to be taken in the sense of FIDUCIA, FIRMLY GROUNDED CONFIDENCE." ⁷ Lünemann though mentioning the other interpretations prefers "Innere ZUVERSICHT auf das was noch gehofft wird,

¹ *Op. cit.*, 219.

² *Op. cit.*, 225.

³ *ZkTh.* (1877), s. 73 sq.

⁴ *Comm. on the Epist. to the Heb.*, 484.

⁵ *Comm. in Epist. ad Heb.*, 386.

⁶ *Epist. Vulgo ad Heb. etc.*, 178.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, VI, 540.

in die Wirklichkeit noch nicht eingetreten ist.”¹ Delitzsch after once having rejected the interpretation *ὑποστασις* = CONFIDENCE finally adopted it on the strength of the usage of the term in the LXX and the *κοινή*: “A STEADFAST CONFIDENCE with regard to the objects of hope, in contrast to the wavering and despondency which would faithlessly abandon them.”² Milligan explains *πίστις* as “A FIRM AND WELL-GROUNDED CONFIDENCE in reference to the objects of hope.”³ Bill⁴ calls it “STANDHAFTE ZUVERSICHT,”⁵ and Philip Schaff “CONFIDENCE” (as in Heb. iii, 14).⁶ Bey-schlag says: “Faith is a FIRM CONFIDENCE, a MORAL CERTAINTY with regard to objects of hope.”⁷ F. W. Farrar notes other interpretations, but equates *ὑποστασις* with CONFIDENCE. In this sense he accepts the term in iii, 14 (comp. 2 Cor. ix, 4; xi, 17), and he thinks “this sense to be the most probable meaning of the word here.”⁸ Bernhard Weiss speaks of “ein ZUVERSICHTLICHES VERTRAUEN auf gehoffte Dinge,” adding, es “ist ja der Grundbegriff von *πίστις* überall der des Vertrauens.”⁹ Stevens very summarily explains the difficulty: “Now Faith is the FIRM CONFIDENCE with respect to objects of hope.”¹⁰ And even more briefly is it expounded by H. J. Holtzmann: “Eine ZUVERSICHT auf Gehofftes.”¹¹ It is a remarkable fact that, in the classic work on *Πίστις* in the New Testament, Schlatter

¹ *Kritisch. exeget. Handbuch über den Hebräerbrief*, 348.

² *Op. cit.*, II, 210.

³ *The N. T. Comm.* IX, 800.

⁴ *Der Brief an die Heb.* etc., 563. Cf. fuller definition: Das vielfach gedeutete Wort *ὑποστασις* hat, wie jetzt fast allgemein anerkannt ist, hier dieselbe Bedeutung wie iii, 14, nämlich “standhafte Zuversicht.”

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *A Popular Comm. on the N. T.*, IV, Hebrews, 75.

⁷ *N. T. Theology*, etc., II, 335.

⁸ *The Epist. of Paul the Apostle to the Heb.*, etc., 161.

⁹ *Der Brief an die Heb.*, etc., 281.

¹⁰ *The Theology of the New Testament*, 515.

¹¹ *Lehrbuch der neutest. Theologie*, II, 346.

rightly repudiates the contention that *υποστασις* meant "Confidence" in the *κοινή διαλεκτος* in the emphatic words: "Zuversicht heisst das Wort in keiner derselben";¹ and although even here he understands the term as fundamentally "Stehn" ("in *υποστασις* geht der Begriff 'Stehn' niemals verloren"),² yet the inference by which he arrives at "Zuversicht" for the interpretation of the term in Heb. xi, 1 is most interesting. It is largely by the force of a supposed contrast between *υποστολη* in the preceding verse with *υποστασις* of our verse that this interpretation is reached. "Nicht 'weichen,' sondern festes, freudiges, zuversichtliches Stehn, das ist Glaube."³ He then shows that this is none other than "Zuversicht": "Das Gehoffte ermöglicht das feste Stehn, es wirkt die *Zuversicht* und wehrt dem Weichen. Und da der Grund der Zuversicht ihr auch den Inhalt und das Ziel bestimmt, so ist der Glaubende, wenn er auf dargebotenen Verheissungsgute Stellung nimmt, demselben bleibend zugewandt."⁴ Many others also interpret *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 in the sense of CONFIDENCE, as Schultz, Stein, Stengel, Von Gerlach,⁵ Böhme, Tholuck, Bleek, De Wette, Bloomfield, McLean, Ebard, Alford, Moll and "most modern interpreters."⁶

V. *Υποστασις* = ANTICIPATED POSSESSION OR TITLE-DEEDS: Faith is the ANTICIPATED POSSESSION OR TITLE-DEEDS of "things hoped for." Thus Shepardson: "Faith deals essentially with the future and with invisible things; and is that power by which WE BECOME ASSURED OF OUR ULTIMATE POSSESSION of these future things."⁷ Beyschlag also writes: "The relation between God and man advances

¹ *Der Glaube im Neuen Test.*, s. 582.

² *Op. cit.*, 581.

³ *Op. cit.*, 459.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Delitzsch, *Op. cit.*, II, 207.

⁶ Milligan, *op. cit.*, 299.

⁷ *Studies in the Epist. to the Heb.*, 470.

by a progressive revelation on God's side and a GROWING POSSESSION through Faith on man's side. . . . The Faith which lays hold of these things with inner sense (cf. the *τον αορατον ως οραν*, xi, 27) is a thinking, a knowing; but it is more than that, it is at the same time a grasping with the will: A LAYING HOLD ON IN ORDER TO POSSESS."¹ Finally, Moulton, on the evidence of the Papyri, has this ingenuous interpretation: "Faith is the TITLE-DEEDS of things hoped for. . . . Men and women who have received a promise from God counted that promise as being the TITLE-DEEDS to something they could not see yet, but which they were going to see some day."²

We may now briefly state the results of the Modern Period of the Exegesis of Heb. xi, 1:

I. *Προστασις* = REALITY or the "assurance of reality," — Rosenmüller, John Owen, Seiss, F. S. Sampson, Lomb, Longking, H. J. Ripley, Junkin, Lowrie, MacEvilly (secondary interpretation), Henry Cowles, Corluy, Van Steenkiste, Westcott, Bernadine à Piconio (secondary interpretation), C. J. Vaughan, Goodspeed, R. H. Boll, Prat, Dummelow, etc.

II. *Προστασις* = CONVICTION, — Bernadine à Piconio, Weinel, Johannes Weiss, Paul Feine, etc.

III. *Προστασις* = FOUNDATION, — Lomb, MacEvilly, Stentrup, etc.

IV. *Προστασις* = CONFIDENCE, — Stuart, Kuinoel, Max. Roeth, Olshausen, Lünemann, Delitzsch, Milligan, Bill, Schaff, Beyschlag, F. W. Farrar, Bernhard Weiss, Stevens, H. J. Holtzmann, Schlatter, Schultz, Stein, Stengel, Von Gerlach, Böhme, Tholuck, Bleek, De Wette, Bloomfield, McLean, Ehard, Alford, Moll, and "most modern interpreters."

V. *Προστασις* = ANTICIPATED POSSESSION, or TITLE-DEEDS, — Shepardson, Beyschlag, Moulton.

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 335.

² *Op. cit.*, 28.

The characteristics of the Modern Exegesis of our verse are :

- (a) No new interpretation was produced ;
- (b) The Patristic understanding of *ὑποστασις* as "reality" just barely held its own, and the English vocabulary gave this rich equivalent for *ὑποστασις*, "realization" ;
- (c) The most important note is the outstanding fact that Erasmus' interpretation of *ὑποστασις* as "confidence" gradually gained momentum, until it became the popular explanation of the term.

Recapitulation and Conclusion of the Historical Part

After investigating what men have thought of Heb. xi, 1 from the first time that the verse appeared in extant literature to the modern exegesis of our text, we are now prepared to state the net RESULTS and to estimate their value. Every exegesis of "die schönsten and die stärksten Worte über den Glauben, die im Neuen Testament stehen"¹ hinges upon *ὑποστασις*. Hence, according to the understanding of *ὑποστασις* interpretations will be differentiated. From the summaries of the RESULTS of our exegetical investigation, it is evident that the various interpretations can be reduced to two, — REALITY and CONFIDENCE of "things hoped for." The remarkable feature of this exegesis of our text is the striking contrast between : (1) *One interpretation* (Faith makes REAL the objects of hope) that goes back in an unbroken historical chain to the unanimous understanding of the Greek Patristic writers, and (2) *the other interpretation* (Faith is the CONFIDENCE of "things hoped for") that sprang up in the 16th century and to-day has become the popular exegesis of Heb. xi, 1. The former has its roots in the living language of our text, and is the closest link to the literary milieu that gave birth to the Epistle ; whereas the latter, the creation of dogmatic tendency, is removed by

¹ Weinell, *Op. cit.*, 600.

fifteen centuries from the living language of Heb. xi, 1, and is altogether unmindful of the etymology of *υποστασις*.

It is indeed a striking contrast. Now what is the key to the true interpretation of our text?

Is it PHILOLOGY? Hardly; for, as we shall see later, all interpretations claim the confirmation of PHILOLOGY. Hence, this science of itself cannot absolutely decide the question. From the philological point of view, however, we may say that that interpretation which the Greek Patristic writers champion has this undoubted advantage—the Greeks themselves had the best practical philological sense of their own tongue.

Is it CONTEXT? Likewise, all interpretations claim the support of the CONTEXT. Hence, this of itself cannot settle the matter.

Neither can it be the *A PRIORI CONCLUSION* of Protestant theologians that *πιστις* is essentially FIDUCIA. No scholar will admit such an a priori conclusion as a basis for a critical exegesis of Heb. xi, 1. The investigation would lack the objectivity required for a critical study.

What, then, is the key to the critical exegesis of Heb. xi, 1? Assuming only one incontestable law of language, viz., that unless the context, or the usage and the spirit of the author expressly exclude it, *των ελπιζομενων υποστασις* was used in the current understanding of the expression. The Greek literary history of *υποστασις*, reaching its crest of decisive importance in the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1, alone can determine this meaning. The Greek Patristic literature is an important part of this literary history. Hence, for all critical students of the Holy Scriptures, the exegetical history of Heb. xi, 1, from Clement of Alexandria to Johannes Weiss, has two important values: (1) It not only gives in detail the exact exegesis and problems of our text; (2) but it also advances the probability that that interpretation is the correct one which was unanimously understood in the

Greek Patristic literature, as FAITH IS THAT WHICH MAKES REAL THE OBJECTS OF HOPE, and which later found stout defenders in an unbroken historical chain down to our own times. But, of course, the Patristic literature is not absolutely decisive in determining the current meaning of *των ελπιζομενων υποστασις* in the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1. It remains to inquire what interpretation the literary history of *των ελπιζομενων υποστασις* in the period preceding the Epistle to the Hebrews, and concurrent with it, favors; and to what interpretation the philological investigation of the terms, the examination of the context, and harmony with the spirit of the author, lean.

PART II — EXEGETICAL



CHAPTER I

HISTORICO-LITERARY INVESTIGATION OF ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΣ

I. IN THE HELLENIC WORLD

THE two outstanding results of the Historical Part of this investigation are the establishing of the original text of Heb. xi, 1, and the record of the various interpretations of the same. Among these interpretations the Greek Patristic exegesis not only predominates, but also has an admittedly historico-literary and, hence, the highest critical value for the explanation of the passage in question on the basis of a sound historical method. For, historically it forms an integral part of Greek literary history, viz., the later phase of the κοινή διαλεκτος, the literary milieu of our verse. Accordingly, the Greek Patristic interpretation of the pivotal word in Heb. xi, 1 has a probability not enjoyed by later exegesis.

As we now proceed to investigate the literary value of *υποστασις*, from its first usage in extant Greek literature to that in the κοινή διαλεκτος, it will be most important to note any similarities with or differences from the Patristic notion of the term. But, above all, in this investigation, we must keep an ever-vigilant outlook for the original meaning of *υποστασις* and its historical development down to the literary period in which Heb. xi, 1 was penned. For, very probably the author of our verse used *υποστασις* in that sense which was prepared by the historico-literary development of the term, and which was current when the Epistle to the Hebrews was written.

Υποστασις began its literary career apparently as a well-established term. In the medical vocabulary of HIPPOCRATES (b. 460 B.C.) the word is used again and again to designate "sediment" in urine. Thus in *Prognosticon*, c. 12, the "Father of Medicine" says that urine is best when the υποστασις is white, smooth, and consistent during the whole course of the disease up to the crisis: Ουρον δε αριστον εστιν, οταν η λευκη η υποστασις και λειη και ομαλη παρα παντα τον χρονον, εστ' αν κριθη η νουσος.¹ This condition, says Hippocrates, indicates freedom from danger and an illness of short duration. But if the urine is deficient, and if it is sometimes passed clear and sometimes with a white and smooth sediment, the disease will be more protracted: Ει δε διαλειποι και ποτε μεν καθαρον ουρεοι, ποτε δε υφισταιτο το λευκον τε και λειον και ομαλον, χρονιωτερη γινεται η νουσος.² It is clear that υποστασις in the first, and υφισταιτο in the second passage, point to *sediment*. This meaning is further confirmed by Hippocrates' definition of unhealthy urine: Farinaceous υποστασεις in the urine are bad: κριμνωδες δε εν τοις ουροις υποστασεις πονηραι.³ These citations make it unmistakable that υποστασις was used by Hippocrates to signify *sediment*. Furthermore, the second citation indicates the verb form (υφιστασθαι) from which υποστασις is derived. For, obviously, the clause of the first, οταν η λευκη η υποστασις και λειη και ομαλη, has the same sense as this clause of the second citation, ποτε δε υφισταιτο το λευκον τε και λειον και ομαλον. Hence, υποστασις in the sense of *sediment* is derived from the form υφιστασθαι, and it means either (a) "that which remains firm" as opposed to "that which flows away" (υπορρυσις)⁴; or (b) "that

¹ *Hippocratis Opera Quae Feruntur Omnia*, edidit H. Kuehlewein, I, 89, 16 sq.

² *Ibid.*, I, 89, 19 sq.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 90, 5 sq.

⁴ Cf. further evidence for υποστασις in Liddell and Scott, *A Greek Lexicon*, Hippocrates, 741 H and 822 D (Foerster's edition).

which settles at the bottom" as opposed to "that which drains off."¹ In a word, *υποστασις* is the *solid matter* in contrast to the more fleeting and transient stuff.

In *Μοχλικον*, c. 38, Hippocrates also used *υποστασις* in the sense of "base" or "something solid." In this chapter our author formulates the rules for reduction and adjustment of broken limbs by forcible extension. *Υποστασις* occurs in the rules for applying extension to a broken thigh. When this is done on a bench, Hippocrates cites the common method: A bench is used six cubits long, two cubits broad, and one fathom in thickness, having two axles at each end, and at its middle two moderate-sized pillars, "upon which something like the step of a ladder rests for the *υποστασις* to the wood": Εφ' ὧν ὡς κλιμακτηρ ἐπεσται ἐς τὴν υποστασιν τῷ ξύλῳ.² Here *υποστασις* is used as "something firm or solid" for support. For it is not the pillars, but rather the transverse piece (like the step of a ladder) on the pillars that serves as an *υποστασις* for the wood, or as the *base*, upon which the wood rests (*ἐπεσται*) firmly.

This second usage of *υποστασις* as the base, or "that which makes firm" in opposition to "that which is movable," shows the element it has in common with the first usage of the term (as "that which settles or stands" in contrast to "that which flows away"). Both are evidently popular meanings of *υποστασις*.

Side by side with this medical and popular meaning, *υποστασις* has found a place in the vocabulary of philosophers, if Stobaeus can be trusted for preserving the very words of ANTIPHON (b. 480 B.C.). For, in speaking of time (*χρονος*), Stobaeus quotes Antiphon as qualifying it by this contrast: *νοημα η μετρον του χρονου, ουχ υποστασιν*,³ i.e., time is either a theoretical concept (*νοημα*) or a measure (*μετρον*),

¹ *Ibid.*, Hippocrates, 686, 38 (Foesius' edition).

² *Op. cit.*, II, 269, 17 sq.

³ Diels' *Doxog. Graec.*, 318, 22 sq.

but not an *υποστασις*. The contrast to *νοημα* shows that *υποστασις* is here *tangible matter* as opposed to *idea*. It is a striking fact that the same notion of time (expressed in terms of *επινοια* in contrast to *υποστασις*) is repeated by later philosophers.¹ *Υποστασις* is here used as a tangible *REALITY* in contrast to a mere *THEORETICAL CONCEPT*.

Again, if we can trust Plutarch and Stobaeus for quoting the terminology used by DEMOCRITUS (b. 460 B.C.) and EPICURUS (b. 342 B.C.), then the use of *υποστασις* as "REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE" (*εμφασις*) is more ancient than is generally supposed. In *De Placitis Philosoph.* IV, 14, (1), Plutarch says: Democritus and Epicurus were of the opinion that the images in the mirror (*κατοπτρικας εμφασεις*) happen according to the *υποστασιν* of the portrait placed before it by ourselves, though the images exist perverted in the mirror: *τας κατοπτρικας εμφασεις γινεσθαι κατ' ειδωλων υποστασεις, ατινα φερεσθαι μεν αφ' υμων, συνιστασθαι δε επι του κατοπτρου κατα αντιπεριστροφην*.² The sense can only be: The mirror-image happens according to the "REALITY OF THE PORTRAIT" (*κατ' ειδωλων υποστασεις*) placed before the mirror, with only this difference, the mirror-images represent things perverted (*κατα αντιπεριστροφην*). In other words, we have here an evident instance where *υποστασις* means "REALITY" in contrast to *εμφασις* "A MERE APPEARANCE," since the picture in the mirror is only the reflection of the reality in front of the mirror. It is interesting to observe that for the existence of the *image* in the mirror, not *υφιστασθαι* is used but *συνιστασθαι*. This fine distinction is an important confirmation of the correctness of the interpretation of *υποστασις* as the *reality of the object*.

Hence, if we can trust Plutarch and Stobaeus for quoting the very terminology employed by Antiphon, Democritus,

¹ Cf. my discussion on Possidonius, p. 107 ff.

² Diels' *Dozog. Graec.*, 406, 10 sq.

and Epicurus, then we must note another meaning for *υποστασις* in philosophy that is contemporary with its meaning in medicine and in the more popular language. Is there any relation between these two senses of the term? On the one hand, we have the meaning — “*that which settles or stands firm*” in contrast to “*that which is drained off or passes away*”; and on the other hand, — “*REALITY*” in contrast to “*mere appearance*” (*εμφασις*). The former is the *naïve sense*, an idea proper to a primitive and more realistic way of thinking, whereas the latter belongs to the *popular philosophical world of thought*, the term of a later and more abstract way of thinking. It is indeed a natural mental development that the naïve contrasts, “sediment” — “flowing water,” “tangible” — “fleeting,” “base of support” — “movable things,” should precede the *more philosophical contrasts*, “reality” — “image,” “reality” — “mere appearance.” Yet both usages of *υποστασις* have something in common. Schlatter also frankly admits this: “In *υποστασις* geht der Begriff ‘Stehn’ niemals verloren. Auch seine abstraktere Wendung, in der es die Wurzel unseres Substanz geworden ist, geht vom Stehen aus im Gegensatz zum Schein, der sich auflöst und verschwindet u. s. w.”¹ In both usages there is the common idea — “something standing” in contrast to “something fleeting.” It is obvious that when *υποστασις* with its current popular meaning was brought into the field of a more progressive terminology, the fundamental notion of the term should take on a new shade of meaning: “*That which settles or stands firm*” in contrast to “*that which is drained off or passes away*” becomes “*that which settles or stands firm as an objective REALITY*” in contrast to “*that which flits away under the test of experience, as a MERE APPEARANCE.*” It is also important for the exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, to notice even here that like it (*εστι δε πιστις ελπιζομενων*

¹ Cf. *Der Glaube im Neuen Testament*, 581.

υποστασις, πραγμάτων ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων) this meaning of υποστασις as "REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE" is also epistemological. For not only is πιστις universally defined by the Greeks in epistemological¹ terms, but also in the second part of Heb. xi, 1, ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων obviously gives the verse an epistemological setting. Therefore, when the two meanings of υποστασις thus far found are considered, Heb. xi, 1, would seem to have been written in the light of philosophical usage.

Like Hippocrates, ARISTOTLE (b. 384 B.C.) in *Meteorol.* II, 3, (14) uses υποστασις in the popular sense of "sediment." In this chapter our author discusses salts. He notices that, on the one hand, the sea receives water from rivers, which becomes salty only after mixing with the sea water; and on the other hand, that the sweetest drinks taken into the human system become briny urine in the bladder. In both cases, Aristotle thinks that the saltiness is due to the mixture of some *solid particles* with a fluid. Thus he explains the saltiness of sea water: *δηλον οτι καν τη θαλαττη το εκ της γης συγκαταμιγνυμενον τω υγρω αιτιον της αλμυροτητος.*² It is in a similar explanation of the saltiness of urine that υποστασις occurs: *Εν μεν ουν τω σωματι γινεται το τοιουτου η της τροφης υποστασις δια την απεψιαν.*³ The solid residuum of the food (*η της τροφης υποστασις*) on account of its indigestibility (*δια της απεψιαν*) accounts for the saltiness of the urine in the body, just as earthy particles (*το εκ της γης*) are the cause of saltiness (*αιτιον της αλμυροτητος*) in

¹ "Religious Faith, even under the Polytheistic form it assumed in Greece, implies that what exists and happens in the world depends on certain causes concealed from sensuous perception." Cf. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, i, 52; also Clement of Alexandria says that Epicurus defined πιστις as *α προληψις διανοιας*, and then accepts his definition of προληψις: *Επιβολην επι τι εναγες, και επι την εναγη του πραγματος επινοιαν* (*Stromata*, ii, 4, Migne, P. G., 8, 948 B).

² *Opera Omnia*, III, 580, 6 sq.

³ *Ibid.*

the sea. *Υποστασις* here means *solid residuum*¹ in contrast to the *transient* matter of digestible food.

In the same book, *Meteorol.*, IV, 5, (7), Aristotle (a) again designates sediment by the term *υποστασις*, (b) infers that the term is derived from *υφιστασθαι*, and (c) shows that *υποστασις* as *sediment* really means either "that which is solid" in opposition to "that which is in a liquid state," or "that which settles" in opposition to "that which is in a gluey state." In this chapter Aristotle discusses the quality of hardness (*Πηξεως ουν περι ρετον*).² One of the means for making things hard is drying or evaporation, and it is in the context of this theme that *υποστασις* occurs. Our author states that water, or things soaked in water, or placed in water, can be dried. The various kinds of liquids that can be so dried are wine, urine, whey, and *whatever has no υποστασιν at all*, or a *moistened υποστασιν*; but not those that are moistened by gluing, for in such the stickiness is the cause of *του μη υφιστασθαι μηδεν*, as is the case with oil and pitch: *Τδατος δ' ειδη τα τοιαδε, οινος, ουρον, ορρος, και ολωσ οσα μηδεμιαν η βραχειαν εχει υποστασιν, μη δια γλισχροτητα· ενιοις μιν γαρ αιτιον του μη υφιστασθαι μηδεν η γλισχροτης, ωσπερ ελαιω, η πιττη*.³ What is the meaning of *υποστασις* in this passage?

(a) Undoubtedly, the *μηδεμιαν υποστασιν* means no "solid matter at all" as opposed to "fluidity."

(b) *Βραχειαν υποστασιν* signifies a "moistened sediment" or a "moistened solid" as opposed to a "pure solid."

(c) The reason why the *υποστασις*, moistened by gluing, is excluded from those mixtures that dry and thus become hard, is that the stickiness (*γλισχροτης*) of such a mixture is the cause of "no settling whatever" (*του μη υφιστασθαι μηδεν*).

¹ The term has the same meaning in *Meteorol.*, II, 3, (22); *P. A.*, II, 2, (8); III, 9, (6); IV, 2, (7).

² *Opera Omnia*, III, 615, 6.

³ *Op. cit.*, III, 615, 27.

The use of *υφιστασθαι* is fortunate. For it shows, by practically identifying *υποστασις* with *το υφιστασθαι*, that Aristotle, like Hippocrates, before him, derived *υποστασις* from *υφιστασθαι*. The fundamental notion of *υποστασις* for Aristotle seems to be "solid matter" as opposed to "that which evaporates," or "that which is solid" as opposed to "that which is fluid and transient." We certainly have here the primitive meaning of *υποστασις*.

Aristotle's disciple THEOPHRASTES (b. 371 B.C.) also uses *υποστασις* as a kind of "sediment," "*that which settles at the bottom*" in contrast to "*that which is drained off*." In *De Odoribus*, 6, (29), he describes the manufacture of the famous Egyptian perfume: Crushed myrrh liquefied in balsam oil is placed over a slow fire. Then the myrrh settles down to the bottom just like mud; when the water is drained off, this *υποστασις* they press hard by working it: *συνιζανειν δ' εις βυθον την σμυρναν και τουλαιον καθαπερ ιλυν· οταν δε τουτο συμβη το μεν υδωρ απηθειν την δ' υποστασιν αποθλιβειν οργανοις*.¹ Here *υποστασις* is obviously "*that which settles or stands*," as solid matter, in contrast to "*that which is drained off*," as fluid. Again we have the naïve primitive sense of *υποστασις*.

Υποστασις, as a philosophical term used by Antiphon, Democritus, and Epicurus, to express "REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE" (*εμφασις*), also found its way into the vocabulary of Stoic epistemologists. BOETHUS OF SIDON (flourished about 200 B.C.)² seems to be one of the first³ Stoics to use *υποστασις* in this sense. His teaching has been

¹Theophrasti Eresii Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. F. Wimmer, 369, 14 sq.

²Cf. Zeller for the dispute about the exact date of Boethus, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III Teil, I Abt., s. 46, (1).

³Chrysippus before him, in a discussion *Περί Τοπου*, has used *υποστασις* probably also in the sense of "reality". For speaking of *χρονος* as something *κενον*, he says: *Κατα γαρ την αυτον υποστασιν απειρον εστι*. (Cf. Diels' *Dozog. Graec.*, 461, 2.)

preserved by Stobaeus (*Ecl.* I, 26, 5). In discussing the question as to whether the heavens seem to be broader than they are high, this observation of Boethus is quoted: The expansiveness is received "according to the *φαντασιαν*," not "according to the *υποστασιν*": Βοηθος δε προς την *φαντασιαν* δεχεται το αναπεπταμενον, ου κατα την *υποστασιν*.¹ The phenomenon, which everybody knows is only apparent, is explained in terms of a contrast between "*προς την φαντασιαν*" and "*κατα την υποστασιν*." On the one hand, *φαντασια*² for the Stoics means "representation" as well as "imagination," and, on the other hand, the context obviously demands a contrast between "*what is only apparent*" and "*what is real*." It is evident that *υποστασις* here means "*REALITY*" in contrast to "*MERE APPEARANCE*" (*φαντασια*).

¹ Diels, *Doxog. Graec.*, 363, 12 sq.

² TURNER summarizes briefly Stoic epistemology thus: "1. The Stoics start with the Aristotelian principle that all intellectual knowledge arises from sense-perception. Sense-perception (*αισθησις*) becomes representation, or imagination (*φαντασια*), as soon as it rises into consciousness. During the process of sense-perception the soul remains passive, the object producing its image on the mind, just as the seal produces its impression on wax. The process was, therefore, called a *τυπωσις*, although Chrysippus is said to have substituted the word *ερεπουσις*, alteration of the soul. When the object of knowledge is removed from the presence of the senses, we retain a memory of it, and a large number of memories constitutes experience (*εμπειρια*). 2. The next step is the formation of concepts. Concepts are formed either (a) spontaneously, i.e., when, without our conscious coöperation, several like representations fuse into universal notions (*προληψεις* or *κοιναι εννοιαι*); or (b) consciously, i.e., by the reflex activity of the mind, which detects resemblances and analogies between our representations, and combines these into reflex concepts, or knowledge (*επιστημη*). Neither spontaneous nor reflex concepts are, however, innate; spontaneity does not imply innateness. 3. As, therefore, all our knowledge arises from sense-perception, the value to be attached to knowledge depends on the value to be attached to sense-perception. Consequently, the Stoics decided that apprehension (*καταληψις*) is the criterion of truth. That is true which is apprehended to be true, and it is apprehended to be true when it is represented in the mind with such force, clearness, and energy of conviction, that the truth of the representation cannot be denied." Cf. *History of Philosophy*, pp. 165, 166.

For the historical usage of *υποστασις*, POLYBIUS (205–123 B.C.) merits a special consideration, not because he has developed the meaning of the term in any way, but rather in this, that one of his usages of the term has been seized upon and repeated again and again as the standard example of the meaning “fiducia” by those exegetes who, following Erasmus and Luther, interpret *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 as “confidence.” Besides, with Polybius the *κοινή* period—the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1—is unmistakably already begun.¹ Hence, we must examine very critically the various meanings of *υποστασις* in the writings of Polybius.

In *Histor. Reliquiae*, IV, 50, (10), Polybius uses *υποστασις* in the sense of “firmness.” In the previous chapter, our author outlines the causes of the war between the Byzantians and the Rhodians (aided by Prusius), in the prosecution of which the Byzantians were chiefly encouraged by the promise of help from the powerful prince Achaeus. In the chapter in which *υποστασις* occurs, the enthusiastic and energetic management of the war by the Byzantians is noted. To dampen this enthusiasm and to frighten the Byzantians out of the war, the Rhodians assembled a powerful fleet and demonstrated their strength in the very sight of Byzantium. The Byzantians paid no heed whatever to this naval exhibition. In fact they rather pressed still more Achaeus to hurry with his forces, and complicated matters for Prusius in Bithynia. But the Rhodians, seeing the *υποστασιν* of the Byzantians, laid a plan by which they really accomplished their purpose: *Οι δε Ροδιοι, θεωρουντες την των Βυζαντιων υποστασιν, πραγματικως διενοθησαν προς το καθικεσθαι της προθεσεως.*² The previous meaning of *υποστασις* as “firmness” or “solidity” would fit into the context of this

¹ “That is natural in the professional Atticist, who could not forgive Polybius for writing the current common Greek of his time.” (Cf. Murray, *A History of Ancient Greek Literature*, p. 392.)

² *Polybii Historiarum Reliquiae, Graece et Latine*, etc., 237.

passage. For it is clear that *υποστασις* here describes the action of the Byzantians whom the Rhodians tried to frighten. "Firmness" would very aptly describe the action of the Byzantians, when the Rhodians vainly tried to intimidate them by the naval demonstration. The *unmistakable firmness* of the Byzantians is here described by *υποστασις*.

We note another example of "firmness." This, the most interesting citation quoted by Polybius, occurs in *Histor. Reliquiae*, VI, 55, (2). It is the usage of *υποστασις* quoted and repeated again and again by most of the exegetes who interpret *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 as "fiducia" or "confidence." The term is found in a description of the classic incident of *Horatius at the Bridge*. That Roman hero was engaged with two enemies at the farther end of the bridge, when he perceived that many more warriors were coming to the assistance of the enemy. Hence, he was apprehensive that they would eventually force their way into the city. To avert this calamity he turned round to his companions, ordered them to the other end of the bridge with instructions to destroy the same. While they were employed at this work, Horatius, though covered with wounds, still maintained his post, and held back the enemy; for the enemy were dumbfounded, not so much by his power, as by his *υποστασις* and intrepid courage: *Ουχ ουτω την δυναμιν, ως την υποστασιν αυτου και τολμαν καταπεπληγμενων των υπεναντιων*.¹ What is the meaning of *υποστασις* here?

1. Some have translated *υποστασις* by "praesentia animi"²; others by "firmness"³; and many exegetes look upon this as the classic example of "fiducia."⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, 371.

² *Ibid.*

³ *The General History of Polybius*, translated from the Greek by Mr. Hampton.

⁴ Georgius Raphaelus, *Annotationes Philologicae in N. T.*, III, 687 sq.; Hugo Grotius, *Critici Sacri*, VII, Part II, p. 1131; Matt. Polus, *Synopsis Crit. et Alior.*, IV, 1354, etc.

The interpretation, "presence of mind," is excluded not so much by the context, which favors a number of interpretations, but by what we already know about the usage of *υποστασις*. It has nothing to do with "presence of mind."

2. If *υποστασις* means "*firmness*" in the passage under discussion, then the thing that dumbfounded the enemy was not Horatius' "presence of mind" to think of destroying the bridge (though that meant cutting off his chance of escape), but rather, his "unyielding firmness" and intrepid courage that inspired a single man to fight so many. Since Polybius uses this meaning elsewhere for *υποστασις*, it must be the preferred explanation.

3. Is there any probability for the interpretation of *υποστασις* in this passage as "confidence"? If *υποστασις* here means "confidence," then the thing that amazed the enemy was the "confidence" of Horatius and his intrepid courage. But, we ask, what was the "confidence" of Horatius all about? The most probable object of such a "confidence" that could "dumbfound the enemy" would be the "confidence" of Horatius in his ability to fight so many men. But the fact that Horatius, after the bridge was once broken, plunged into the stream to his death, shows clearly that he had no "confidence" to conquer ultimately the enemy. Horatius had no such confidence, nor could the enemy reasonably give him credit for having it. It is indeed a remarkable bit of evidence to note what Schlatter in his classic on "*Πιστις* in the New Testament" thinks about the meaning of *υποστασις* in this passage of Polybius. Although Schlatter himself interprets *υποστασις* of Heb. xi, 1 as "*Zuversicht*" (*fiducia*) still he is frank enough to observe that neither this passage in Polybius nor any other Greek usage of *υποστασις* which he had seen means "*Zuversicht*." His words are: "*Über diesen verbalen Gebrauch (ανυποστατος = 'without firmness')*¹ geht *υποστασις* in Stel-

¹ This is the "verbalen Gebrauch" referred to here.

len wie *Pol.* 6, 55, 2; 4, 50, 10; *Jos. Ant.* 18, 1, 6, nicht hinaus; *Zuversicht* heisst das Wort in keiner derselben, so traditionell ihre Citation in den Kommentaren als Beleg für den Begriff *Zuversicht* geworden ist."¹ But if we have "firmness" in Polybius, it is nothing other than a transference of the original meaning concerning material things to spiritual things (condition of mind).

The development of the meaning of *υποστασις* from "that which settles or stands" (sediment) in contrast to "that which is drained off or passes away" to "reality" in contrast to a "theoretical proposition of the mind" (*επινοια*), was already indicated in the writings of Antiphon. He used *νοημα* for the concept of the mind. In POSEIDONIUS (b. 135 B.C.) we meet with a synonym — *επινοια*. The citation is preserved by Diogenes Laertius in his *Vitae Philosophorum*, 7, (135). Here *κατ' επινοιαν* is directly contrasted with *καθ' υποστασιν*. Diogenes is discussing the measurement of bodies. One that has length, breadth, and depth is called a solid body (*στερεον σωμα*). Then he takes up the question of the surface (*επιφανεια*). The surface is defined in two ways, either in a naïve and realistic way, as the *extremity* of a body, or in an abstract way, as something having length, breadth, not depth: *επιφανεια δ' εστι σωματος περας η το μηκος και πλατος μονον εχον, βαθος δ' ου*.² Then Diogenes adds that Poseidonius in his third book on Heavenly Bodies equates this definition of surface in these terms: *και κατ' επινοιαν και καθ' υποστασιν*. The text follows: *ταυτην δε Ποσειδωνιος εν τριτω περι μετεωρων και κατ' επινοιαν και καθ' υποστασιν απολειπει*.³ In other words, *surface* in terms of length, breadth, and depth (lacking here) is for Poseidonius what we would to-day call a *mathematical concept* (*κατ' επι-*

¹ *Der Glaube im Neuen Testament*, 582.

² *Diogenis Laertii de Clar. Philosoph. Vitae etc.*, Recensuit Cobet, 188, 15 sq.

³ *Ibid.*

νοια)¹ in contradistinction to the realistic definition of *surface* as the *real extremity of a body* (σώματος περας), which the learned Stoic expressed as "*that which exists in reality*" (καθ' υποστασιν).

In STRABO (b. 63 B.C.) *υποστασις* means something similar to "sediment"—it is the "SOLID RESIDUUM" as opposed to "WHAT CAN BE DRAINED OFF" by water and a sieve. In *Geograph.*, III, 2, (10) Strabo says that Polybius mentions the silver mines near Alexandria. The process of manufacture is briefly summarized as follows: The silver bullion they break, and by means of sieves they suspend the same in water; they again break the *υποστασις*, and once more the mass (strained with running water) is broken: Την δε συτρην βωλον την αργυριτην φησι κοπτεσθαι και κοσκινοις εις υδωρ διαττασθαι. κοπτεσθαι δε παλιν τας υποστασεις, και παλιν διηθουμενας αποχεομενων των υδατων κοπτεσθαι.² The fifth *υποστασις* they melt, and after the lead is drained off they extract the pure silver: υποστασιν χωνευθεισαν, αποχυθεντος του μολιβδου, καθαρον τον αργυρον εξαγειν.³ *Υποστασις* here unmistakably means the "COMPACT RESIDUUM" as opposed to "THAT WHICH IS STRAINED OFF" by the water and the sieve. This usage of the term confirms the repeated observation that the fundamental meaning of *υποστασις* is not "*sediment*" as sediment, but "that which remains firm or is the solid matter" in contrast to "that which is drained off." Of course, this heavier matter will sink to the bottom, if any water is left in the mixture, and this can be called "sediment." But it need not be what we call ordinarily "sediment." In this in-

¹ Cf. another example of Poseidonius' use of *επινοια* in Diels' *Doxog. Graec.*, 458, 11: διαφερειν δε την ουσιαν της υλης την ουσιαν κατα την υποστασιν επινοια μονον. For the expression κατ' επινοιαν, cf. *Ibid.*, Index, *επινοια*; also cf. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Index, *επινοια*.

² *Strabonis Geographica*, Recognovit Augustus Meineke, I, 200, 1 sq.

³ *Ibid.*

stance, *e.g.*, the term "sediment" would not sufficiently describe *υποστασις*. It is rather a "COMPACT RESIDUUM" in contradistinction to that part of the mixture "WHICH CAN BE DRAINED OFF." Here *υποστασις* seems to be the emphasis of the "SOLIDITY" in contrast to the "FLUIDITY" of the mixture.

As we advance in the *κοινη* period, we see that the old contrast between *υποστασις* and *εμφασις* becomes more and more general, if not also more emphatic. So in *Περὶ Κοσμου* (50 B.C.),¹ VI, 21, we meet *υποστασις* again as the "EMPHASIS OF REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE." Speaking of the phenomena that take place in the sky during a storm, the author says that, of those things which appear in the atmosphere, some are *κατ' εμφασιν*, and some are *καθ' υποστασιν*: *τα μεν εστι κατ' εμφασιν, τα δε καθ' υποστασιν*.² Examples of those *κατ' εμφασιν* are the rainbow (*ιριδες*), the magic wands (*ραβδοι*), and the like; whereas the examples of the *καθ' υποστασιν* are the flashes of lightning (*σελα*), the rumbling thunder (*διαττοντες*), and the comets (*κομηται*), and similar things: *Κατ' εμφασιν μεν ιριδες και ραβδοι και τα τοιαυτα, καθ' υποστασιν δε σελα τε και διαττοντες και κομηται και τα τουτοις παραπλησια*.³ The contrast here between the *rainbow, magic wands, and such like, which are only appearances* (*κατ' εμφασιν*), and the *flashes of lightning, thunder, and the comets* which are realities (*καθ' υποστασιν*), shows that *υποστασις* here signifies that which is *real* in contrast to that which is only *apparent*, or *reality* in contrast to *appearance*.

The witness of DIODORUS (flourished 25 B.C.) to the his-

¹ "Diese Schrift wird demnach keinesfalls vor der Mitte des ersten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts verfasst sein; wahrscheinlich ist sie aber noch etwas jünger; doch wird man ihre Entstehung nicht über das erste Jahrhundert nach dem Anfang unserer Zeitrechnung herabrücken dürfen." Cf. Zeller, *Op. cit.*, II Teil, I Abt., s. 644.

² Cf. *Aristotelis, Opera Omnia*, III, 633, 18 sq.

³ *Ibid.*

tory of *υποστασις* is most interesting, because as we approach with him the very milieu of Heb. xi, 1, we notice that the philosophical sense of the term has become popular without losing its first naïve sense. *Υποστασις* is one of the common words in the vocabulary of Diodorus. We shall note only the most important instances :

1. *Υποστασις* = THE "SETTLINGS" (OF A CLOUD) OR
"TANGIBLE MATTER."

Diodorus, like the Greek classical writers, uses *υποστασις* in *Bibliotheca Historica*, I, 18, (7) to signify "*that which settles down in a cloud*" in opposition to "*that which floats away*." Here, in speaking of the cause for the increase of the waters of the Nile, Diodorus rejects the opinion that it is due to snows fallen perhaps in remote parts. For all rivers increased by snows give forth cool breezes and heavier atmosphere; but concerning the Nile, it alone of all rivers has this distinction: neither the *υποστασεις* of cloud exist, nor do the breezes become cold, nor does the air thicken: *περι δε τον Νειλον μονον των ποταμων ουτε νεφους υποστασεις υπαρχουσιν ουτ' αυραι ψυχραι γινονται ουθ' ο αηρ παχυνεται*.¹ It is the tangible matter of the cloud (rain-drops) that *υποστασεις* here signify.

2. *Υποστασις* = "FOUNDATION"

In the same work, I, 66, (6), Diodorus uses *υποστασις* to signify "FOUNDATION." This chapter is devoted to the royal tombs of Egypt. After describing their magnificence and costliness, he continues: Generally it is said that the kings made the *υποστασιν* of the tomb such in expense and so great in size, that, if they had not completed the attempt to finish it, no superiority whatever in others remained for the prosecution of such work: *Καθολου δε τοιαυτην τη πολυ-*

¹ *Bibliotheca Histor.*, ed. Fred. Vogel, I, 66, 9 sq.

τελεία και τηλικαυτην τω μεγεθει την υποστασιν του ταφου λεγεται ποιησασθαι τους βασιλεις, ωστ' ει μη προ του συντελεσαι την επιβολην κατελυθησαν, μηδεμιαν αν υπερβολην ετεροις προς κατασκευην εργων απολιπειν.¹ Ὑποστασις is here used in the sense of "FOUNDATION," a meaning quite similar to Hippocrates' usage of the term as "base."

3. Ὑποστασις = "SETTLING DOWN" (OF PEOPLE)

In *Bibliotheca Historica*, XVII, 69, (7), the story of Alexander's triumphant return from the East with Persian kings as his captives is told. These latter were so mutilated that they excited the pity of the Greeks and the tears of Alexander. On the request of the captives, it was decided to allow them to return home; but on second thought, the Persians, unable to undergo the humiliation of returning to their country in such mean condition, determined to remain in Greece. Accordingly, [they came to Alexander a second time, laid before him their new resolution and their need of help for their domestic ὑποστασις: Διο και παλιν εντυχοντες τω βασιλει, και την ιδιαν κρισιν δηλωσαντες, εδεοντο προς ταυτην υποστασιν οικειαν παρεχεσθαι την βοηθειαν.² This request was granted by Alexander, and each Persian received a certain sum of money to "settle down" in Greece. Here ὑποστασις means "settling down" as opposed to "proceeding." This employment of the term also throws some light on its usage as "sediment." For it points out the common element — "that which settles down or remains firm" (either in the land or in water) as opposed to "that which disappears or is removed" (in one way or another).

4. Ὑποστασις = "REALITY"

In *Bibliotheca Historica*, I, 28, (7), Diodorus describes the first rulers of Attica. Some of these, it was thought,

¹ *Bibliotheca Histor.*, ed. Fred. Vogel, I, 112, 25 sq.

² *Bibliothecae Histor.*, ed. C. Mullerus, II, 180, 15 sq.

came from Egypt and were popularly represented as half-serpent and half-man, *i.e.*, half-Egyptian and half-Greek. Such a one was Peteus, a man of twofold form, concerning whose nature the Athenians were unable to give (*κατα την ιδιαν υποστασιν*) the true origin: *διφύους δ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότος, τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους μὴ δύνασθαι κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν υποστασιν ἀποδοῦναι περὶ τῆς φύσεως ταύτης τὰς ἀληθεῖς αἰτίας*.¹ What does *κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν υποστασιν* mean? The Athenians were unable to give the origin of the nature of Peteus according to the proper *υποστασις*. It is indirectly admitted that their imagination had discovered tales of his origin and nature. But they did not know the *real* origin. We have here the old contrast between *reality* (*υποστασις*) and the work of the imagination.

In *Bibliotheca Historica*, XVI, 33, (1), our author says that the Phocaeans, after being defeated by the Boetians, were again incited to war by the self-seeking Onomarchus. A dream, showing this man the appearance (*εμφασιν*) of great increase and glory, spurred him on to this *υποστασιν*: *Ἐπῆρε δ' αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν υποστασιν ταύτην οὐκ εὐφραδὺς ἐμφασιν δὲ μεγάλης ἀύξεσός τε καὶ δόξης*.² "Mere plan," as the sense of *υποστασις*, will not suffice. For he carried out an action. Furthermore, there is an obvious contrast between *εμφασιν* (the mere appearance) in Onomarchus' dream and *υποστασιν* (the realization) to which the dream incited. We have here in *υποστασις* the *reality of action* in contrast to the *appearance of glory* that caused the action.

We find, then, that Diodorus uses *υποστασις* in the sense of "solid matter," "foundation," "firm settlement," "reality." The first three meanings evidently are based on the naïve primitive meaning, "sediment," with which they have in common "solidity" and "firmness," while the last meaning

¹ *Bibliotheca Histor.*, ed. Fred. Vogel, I, 46, 12 sq.

² *Bibliothecae Histor.*, E. C. Mullerus, II, 88, 44 sq.

represents the developed sense in the advanced terminology of the popular philosophy.

The first use of *υποστασις* in the clear sense of "REALITY" was found in the striking contrast between *υποστασις* ("REALITY") and *εμφασις* or *φαντασια* ("MERE APPEARANCE"), or in the practically identical contrast between *υποστασις* ("REALITY") and *νοημα* or *επινοια* ("THEORETICAL OR MATHEMATICAL CONCEPT"). We noticed also that this contrast becomes more and more general, as we approach the milieu of Heb. xi, 1. This stage in the development of the term was certainly reached in the writings of PHILO (b. 25 B.C.). In *De Mundi Incorruptibilitate*, our author discusses the reasons why the earth cannot be destroyed by fire. In his argumentation, Philo first of all distinguishes three elements in fire, viz., "live coal" (*ανθραξ*), "flame" (*φλοξ*), and "splendor" (*αυγη*). Then he continues, should the material particles of the earth be dissolved or disappear in any way, there could be no "live coal," nor "flame," nor "splendor." Because the material particles are the food of the "flame"; and without the "flame," there could be no *αυγη*, inasmuch as *αυγη lacks proper υποστασις: οτι υποστασιν ιδιαν ουκ εχει*.¹ "Splendor" is only a quality of "flame"; and so long as the "flame" is REAL, "splendor" partakes of that REALITY; but just as soon as the "flame" no longer exists, then "splendor" automatically ceases to be, i.e., it loses its reality. Thus, Philo can only mean that *αυγη* has not "its own reality" (*ιδιαν υποστασιν*).

In this same meaning of the term we come now to *the most interesting passage* in the whole historico-literary investigation of *υποστασις*. The following citation of Philo is remarkable for these reasons: (a) The passage was written in the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1; (b) like our verse, it is concerned with the perception of the invisible world; and

¹ *Opera Quae Reperiri Potuerunt Omnia* etc., Ed. Thomas Mangey, II, 505, 35.



(c) it is another example of the Greek epistemological contrast between *υποστασις* as REALITY and *εμφασις* (here *σκια, σχηματων οψις, αισθητον, ορατον, φαντασια*) as MERE APPEARANCE. This important passage is found in *Quod a Deo Mittantur Somnia*, c. XXXII. The dream under discussion here is the vision of the heavenly ladder vouchsafed to Jacob. The immediate context in which our citation occurs, is an exegesis of the words spoken by Jacob, when on awakening he exclaimed in fear and wonder: "Surely the Lord is in this place, and I knew it not. . . . This is the gate of heaven." The cause of Jacob's fear and wonder is then analyzed by Philo to be the fact that God, who is incorporeal (*ασωματος*), was manifested here locally, a phenomenon proper to corporeal things (*σωματα*). But, continues Philo, the whole world is the abode of God, in that it manifests His Goodness, and in this sense the visible world can be rightly called the "Gate of Heaven." The "invisible world," of which the truth that "God is in this place" is an example, is then called "the world knowable to the intellect only" (*νοητος κοσμος*) in contrast to the "visible world" (*αισθητος και ορωματος κοσμος*) which is called the gateway of the former. For as men who wish to see cities enter in through the gates, so also they who wish to comprehend the invisible world (*αιειδη κοσμον*) are conducted in their search by the appearance of the visible world (*υπο του ορατου φαντασις*). Then follows the reason: the intellectual world is guaranteed as a reality by the reality of the visible world of which it is the real archetype: *Ο δε νοητης υποστασεως κοσμος ανευ ηστινοσουν σχηματων οψεως, μονης δε δια τε αρχετυπου ιδεας τε εν τω διαχαραχθεντι προς το θεαθεν αυτω ειδος ανευ σκιας μετακληθησεται*.¹ What is the meaning of *νοητης υποστασεως*?

As the passage is rather difficult, it will be well to analyze each clause: (1) *Ο δε νοητης υποστασεως κοσμος ανευ ηστινοσουν σχηματων οψεως* = the world of the intellectual

¹ *Op. cit.* I, 649, 14 sq.

(*νοητης*) REALITY (*υποστασεως*), without any visible garment whatsoever, (2) *ανευ σκιας μετακληθησεται* = will be recalled (reproduced in the intellect) without a perishable external appearance, (3) *μονης* = only (a) *δια τε αρχετυπου ιδεας* = through the ideal form of the archetype (Platonic), (b) *τε εν τω διαχαραχθεντι προς το θεαθεν αυτω ειδος* = and in the being shaped according to the archetype made visible in it (the visible world).

Υποστασις is here described as the INVISIBLE REALITY underlying the visible world, and is a synonym for the Platonic *ιδεα* (also *ειδος*) which is an EXISTING and INVISIBLE REALITY; these (the *ιδεα* and the *υποστασις*) become perceptible to the intellect by the ARCHETYPE MADE VISIBLE (in the visible world). The intellectual world is guaranteed as a reality by the visible world of which it is the archetype. Whence it is clear that two things are here emphasized, (1) the REALITY of the INTELLECTUAL and INVISIBLE WORLD, and (2) the superiority of this world over the VISIBLE WORLD which is produced only by being modeled according to the ARCHETYPE.

This citation is of great importance for the language of Heb. xi, 1, not only because it testifies immediately to the literary milieu of our verse, but also because we have here historical evidence that the old Greek epistemological contrast between *υποστασις* (REALITY) and *εμφασις* or *φαντασια* (MERE APPEARANCE) was not strictly limited to a *verbal formula*. For this passage shows that the contrast was also used between *υποστασις* and any synonym of *εμφασις* and *φαντασια*, — such as *σκια*, *σχηματων οψις*, *αισθητον*, and *ορατον*. Hence, if the famous contrast is used in Heb. xi, 1, *ελπιζομενων* and *βλεπομενων* would be only synonyms for *εμφασις* or *φαντασια* or *σκια*, etc. But more important still is the fact that both in Philo and in Heb. xi, 1 we have substantially the same general context, viz., the “perception of the invisible world.” Schlatter thinks that *υποστασιν εργων*

αγαθων εχειν of Ps. Esd. 8, 36 is a parallel expression for Heb. xi, 1: Die nächtsverwandte Parallele zu Heb. xi, 1, die mir bekannt ist, gibt Ps. Esd. 8, 16: "Substantiam operum bonorum habere."¹ But as the Greek text is lost, we cannot come to a final conclusion regarding this passage. Besides, the general context in these two passages is not nearly so similar as between the citation in Philo and Heb. xi, 1.

The use of *υποστασις* in JOSEPHUS' (b. 37 A.D.) *Antiq.*, XVIII, 1, 6, has been determined by various meanings assigned to it by eminent authorities. Johannes Weiss² thinks the term means "conviction"; Schlatter³ translates it as "withstanding"; Dindorf,⁴ as "*animi praesentia*"; and Whiston,⁵ as "resolution." Josephus is here describing the tenets of the followers of Judas the Galilean. They accepted the doctrine of the Pharisees, but were especially celebrated for their love of Jewish liberty, saying that God alone was their Ruler and Lord. Rather than recognize any man as their Lord, they stood unmoved when they themselves were threatened with death and when their relatives and loved ones were threatened with vengeance. "But since the unchangeableness of their *υποστασις* for these things (*επι τοιουτοις*)," says Josephus, "is already well known to many, I shall speak no further about the matter: Εορακοσι δε τοις πολλοις το αμεταλλακτον αυτων της επι τοιουτοις υποστασεως, περαιτερω διελθειν παρελιπον."⁶ *Υποστασις* in this context refers to a firm "sticking to" something invisible, which is believed to be a *true reality*, viz., the exclusive rulership of the Lord. In the light of the contemporary use of *υποστασις* in such contexts (of invisible world in Philo),

¹ Schlatter, *Op. cit.*, 583.

² *Uhrchristentum*, I, 322 (ft. n. (2)).

³ *Op. cit.*, 582.

⁴ *Opera*, Graece et Latine, Recognovit Guillelmus Dindorfius, I, 695, 11 sq.

⁵ *The Works of Flavius Josephus*, etc., translated by Wm. Whiston, 581.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 695, 11 sq.

its meaning here can only be: unshakable realization of the invisible fact.

In *Theologiae Graecae Compendium*, c. 9, CORNUTUS (flourished 68 A.D.) uses the term in a very illustrative way. In the previous chapter, Cornutus recounts the old mythological idea that Oceanus (cf. Homer) by a kind of "mixing" is the beginning (*αρχεγονον*) of the existence of all things, including the gods. In chapter 9, our author says that Zeus is said to be the father of gods and men in a different sense, viz., in this that the nature of the world (*την του κοσμου φυσιν*) becomes the cause of the *υποστασις* of these things, as fathers generate children: *Μετα δε ταυτα αλλως ο Ζευς πατηρ λεγεται θεων και ανθρωπων ειναι δια το την του κοσμου φυσιν αιτιαν γεγονεναι της τουτων υποστασεως, ως οι πατερες γεννωσι τα τεκνα*.¹ The *αιτιαν της τουτων υποστασεως* clearly means "the cause of the EXISTENCE of these" (gods and men). But the addition "*ως οι πατερες γεννωσι τα τεκνα*" reminds us of the famous use of *υποστασις* in the Patristic literature (cf. Tatian) where the existence in the mother's womb is called the *υποστασις* of the future reality of life, or the anticipation of a future reality. Here, nature is the *αιτια* of a similar *υποστασις*, the guarantee and the reason for the existence of gods and men.

As we approached the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1, we noticed the ever-increasing clarity and the more and more general usage of the famous contrast between *υποστασις* (reality) and *εμφασις* (mere appearance). In the period itself, the development reached the crest of precision. We are fortunate, indeed, that this literary usage found its way into the writings of Plutarch. For in *De Placitis Philosoph.*, he not only preserved the words of the Greek Philosophers, but he also summed up in his own more popular words the famous contrast between *υποστασις* and

¹ *Cornuti Theologiae Graecae Compendium*, Recensavit et emendabat Carolus Lang, 9, 1 sq.

εμφασιν. In introducing the opinions of philosophers (*De Placitis Philosoph.*, III, 5, (1)) about the rainbow, PLUTARCH contrasts those aërial phenomena that are *καθ' υποστασιν*, and others that are *κατ' εμφασιν*. As examples of the first, a rain-storm and a hail-storm are adduced, and as examples of the second, the apparent motion of the mainland to the mariner, and the rainbow are given. *Τα δε κατ' εμφασιν* is then defined as *ιδιαν ουκ εχοντα υποστασιν*. The whole text follows: *Των μεταρσιων παθων τα μεν καθ' υποστασιν γινεται οιον ομβρος, χαλαζα, τα δε κατ' εμφασιν, ιδιαν ουκ εχοντα υποστασιν αυτικα γουν πλεοντων ημων η ηπειρος κινεισθαι δοκει· εστιν ουν κατ' εμφασιν η ιρις*.¹ *Υποστασιν* is "REALITY" in contrast to *εμφασιν*—the "MERE APPEARANCE." This conclusion cannot be questioned. For the examples adduced are self-evident: The rain-storm (*ομβρος*) is *καθ' υποστασιν*, and the apparent motion of the mainland to the mariner (*πλεοντων ημων η ηπειρος κινεισθαι δοκει*) is *κατ' εμφασιν*. One has tangible reality, the other has not. Besides, Plutarch adds expressly that things of "MERE APPEARANCE" lack PROPER EXISTENCE OR REALITY (*τα δε κατ' εμφασιν ιδιαν ουκ εχοντα υποστασιν*). In other words, "MERE APPEARANCES" have a kind of existence in so far as they APPEAR. But they lack "PROPER REALITY" or their *own* REALITY; they are "mere appearances." Hence, *τα καθ' υποστασιν* are contrasted with *τα κατ' εμφασιν*, as "REALITIES" are contrasted with "MERE APPEARANCES."

The importance of this citation for Heb. xi, 1 is the fact that in the very milieu of our verse this popular philosophical usage of *υποστασις* was summarized in the clearest possible terms as "REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE" by the popular historian. The refined Greek of the Epistle to the Hebrews makes it very probable that its author

¹ Diels' *Dozog. Graec.*, p. 371, 28 sq. Cf. also Diels' *Prolegomena*, p. 60, *Dozog. Graec.*, where he says that these passages are undoubtedly genuine: "Genuina sunt III, 1-4 et 5, 10-12."

was familiar with a usage of *υποστασις* that had a history and was so emphatically expressed by a contemporary.

Even after Heb. xi, 1 was written, it is but natural that the old Greek contrast between *υποστασις* (reality) and *φαντασια* (mere appearance) should still be current. Thus DIOGENES LAERTIUS (flourished 150 A.D.) contrasts "THINGS AS THEY APPEAR" (*φαινεται τοιαυτα*) with "THINGS AS THEY REALLY ARE" (*καθ' υποστασιν ουτως εχει*). Diogenes is here discussing the need of *αποδειξεις* for *πιστις* in things obscure. He asks, how can things not evident (*αδηλα*) be grasped, if *αποδειξεις* be ignored: *Πως αν ουν καταλαμβανοιτο τα αδηλα, της αποδειξεως αγνοουμενης*;¹ Then follows the reason: *ζητειται δ' ουκ ει φαινεται τοιαυτα, αλλ' ει καθ' υποστασιν ουτως εχει*,² i.e., "the thing sought is not *if it appears to be such* but *if it really* (*καθ' υποστασιν*) is such." It is only another example of *καθ' υποστασιν* in the sense of "IN REALITY."

On the one hand, this notion of *υποστασις* in epistemological contexts as "REALITY" in opposition to "MERE APPEARANCE," or simply as "REALITY" is not only the current meaning of the term in the *κοινη*, but also the fruit of a development whose traces we have pointed out in the Greek classical and early *κοινη* writers down to Diogenes Laertius. On the other hand, in the history of the exegesis of Heb. xi, 1, we have found the same meaning of *υποστασις*. The importance of Diogenes Laertius, as a representative of the current *κοινη* usage of *υποστασις*, and at the same time as a contemporary of the author of the Epistle to Diognetus (where *υποστασις* = *ειδος*), of Tatian (for whom *υποστασις* = the "emphasis of REALITY" in contrast to NON-REALITY), and of Athanagoras (for whom *υποστασις* = the "guarantee of REALITY"), is that his usage of the term forms the historico-literary link between the profane and the Patristic understanding of *υποστασις*.

¹ *De Clar. Philosoph. Vitis etc.*, IX, 11, Ed. Cobet, 249, 18 sq.

² *Ibid.*

Contemporary with the first interpretation of our text by Clement of Alexandria, we find still another meaning of *υποστασις* in the Papyri, and with this evidence we shall close the historico-literary investigation of the word. The characteristic meaning of the term in the Papyri is "property," and the "title-deed" to property. The second sense is so ingenious that Moulton¹ has accepted it as the meaning of *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1. This famous Papyrus 237 (A.D. 186) is called the "Petition of Dionysia." It is the report of a noted legal case in Alexandria. *Υποστασις* occurs again and again in the document. To avoid unnecessary technical questions, we shall merely note one of the instances of this usage, and then add the pregnant commentary of Grenfel and Hunt: In *Petition of Dionysia*, Col. VIII, 26 sq., we read: *επαρχον τα αντιγραφα των συγγραφων ταις των ανδρων υποστασεσιν αντιθεσθαι και τουτο διαταγματι προστεταγεναι ου και αντιγραφον υπεταξα, φανερον ποιων κατακολουθειν ταις του Μεττιου Ρουφου.*² The Commentary follows: "The *υποστασεις* were distinct from the *απογραφαι*, which were only one class of the documents concerning ownership. *Υποστασις*, of which the central meaning is "substance," i.e., property (cf., e.g., *O.P.I.*, CXXXVIII, *κινδυνω εμω και της εμης υποστασεως*), is used here for the whole body of documents bearing on the ownership of a person's property (whether *απογραφαι*, sales, mortgages, etc.) deposited in the archives, and forming the evidence of ownership. By the edict of Mettius Rufus (VIII, 31-43), all owners of house or land property were commanded to register it (*απογραφεσθαι*) within six months of the Edict, and in the *υποστασεις*, wives and children had to insert (*αντιθεναι* 26, or *παρατιθεναι* 34) a statement of their claims, if any."³

¹ Cf. *Egyptian Rubbish Heaps*, 27.

² *Egyptian Exploration Fund*,—Graeco-Roman Branch, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part II, p. 168.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 176.

This usage of *ὑπόστασις* in the sense of "TITLE-DEED" is characterized by two elements: (a) "a document *deposited* in the archives," and (b) "a document forming the *evidence of possession*." "*Deposited*" and "*Evidence of possession*" are readily recognized ideas long current under *ὑπόστασις*; and the rest is legal atmosphere accounted for by the fact that the term found its way into the courts. For we can still see in "TITLE-DEEDS," though obscurely, the first two Greek notions current under *ὑπόστασις*: (a) "That which stands or is stationary" ("a document deposited in archives") in contrast to "that which is drained off, or is fleeting" (other unstable expressions of ownership); (b) "REALITY" ("evidence alone accepted for REAL possession") in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE" (other flimsy evidence not accepted for REAL possession).

It is also possible that the idea of "guarantee" in *ὑπόστασις* used as "TITLE-DEED" may be derived more directly from a similar idea in the famous contrast between *καθ' ὑπόστασιν* ("IN REALITY") and *κατ' ἐμφασιν* ("MERELY IN APPEARANCE"). For the reason why some things (as, *e.g.*, hail-storms) were called *καθ' ὑπόστασιν*, and other things (as, *e.g.*, the rainbow) were classed *κατ' ἐμφασιν*, was that the former struck the senses corrected by experience with a "guarantee" for the "reality" of the things perceived, whereas the latter did not.

Summary and Valuation

We may now summarize the results of our historico-literary investigation :

I. *ὑπόστασις* = "Firm or solid matter" :

a. "Sediment" in contrast to "that which is drawn off or passes away": Hippocrates, Aristotle, Theophrastes, Strabo, Diodorus.

b. "Firmness" — "foundation": Hippocrates, Polybius, Diodorus.

II. ΤΠΟCΤΑCΙC = "reality."

a. "Tangible matter" in contrast to "idea" or "image": Antiphon, Poseidonius.

b. "Reality" in contrast to "mere appearance": Democritus, Epicurus, Boethus, Philo, Diodorus, Plutarch, Josephus ("realization"), and Diogenes Laertius.

c. "Guarantee of reality": Cornutus, Polybius, and Papyrus 237 ("title-deed").

The development of *υΠοCΤΑCΙC* is evident. No. I points to the naïve and realistic world of thought; No. II to the use of the term in a higher philosophical language. The fundamental idea, however, even in No. I is "reality."

The fact that Hippocrates and Aristotle in their actual usage of *υΠοCΤΑCΙC* employed it as a conjugate of *υΦιCΤΑCΘΑΙ* confirms historically the philological assertion that this noun is derived from this form of the verb. Hence, *υΠοCΤΑCΙC* was very probably first of all used to signify "that which stands or settles" as opposed to "that which passes away or is drained off." The further signification of the term ("firmness" and "foundation") represents a natural development of the original notion of *υΠοCΤΑCΙC*.

But the sense of *υΠοCΤΑCΙC* as "REALITY" in contrast to *εΜΦΑCΙC* ("MERE APPEARANCE") with its derived usages,—is it a development of the original meaning of the word, or is it derived from a different stem? Hatch thinks, "the term *υΠοCΤΑCΙC* is the conjugate of the verb *υΦιCΤΑΝΑΙ*, which had come into use as a more emphatic form than *εΙΝΑΙ*."¹ Hatch does not go into the question as to whether *υΠοCΤΑCΙC* is derived from the active form of the verb (*υΦιCΤΑΝΑΙ*) or the middle and passive form (*υΦιCΤΑCΘΑΙ*). Vaughan² derives it from *υΦιCΤΑCΘΑΙ*. One thing is certain, viz., that *υΠοCΤΑCΙC* was first used as a conjugate of *υΦιCΤΑCΘΑΙ* in the

¹ Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages on the Christian Church*, 275.

² Cf. Chas. Vaughan, *ΠροC ΕΒΡΑΙΟΥC*, The Epistle to the Hebrews, 6.

sense of "that which settles or stands" as opposed to "that which passes on or can be drained off." And if there is a probability that *υποστασις* in the sense of REALITY in contrast to MERE APPEARANCE is a development from this usage of the term, this derivation is to be preferred to one from a new verb-form. We have already pointed out that such a development is natural. For just as the original meaning of *υποστασις* was modified to signify "foundation," when used in a context concerned with "tomb construction," so also the fundamental sense of the term will take on a new shade of meaning, when brought into the field of Greek epistemology (that field in which it was first used to signify "REALITY"). The original sense, "that which stands or settles" as opposed to "that which passes on or can be drained off," becomes in epistemology "that which stands or settles" *for the perceptive faculties* (REALITY) in contrast to "that which flits away under the test of experience" (MERE APPEARANCE). Therefore, it may be regarded as certain that *the meaning of υποστασις as REALITY* is a development of the original sense of the term. If we can trust Plutarch and Stobaeus for preserving the *very words* of Antiphon, Democritus, and Epicurus, this development was achieved at a time almost contemporaneous with the extant instances of its usage in the original sense by Hippocrates and Aristotle. Be this as it may, we are sure that this development was actually reached in Polybius; after him it is common in the Stoic and *κωινη* writers, becoming ever clearer and more general in the literary milieu of Heb. xi, 1.

As we have already indicated, the usage of *υποστασις* to signify "TITLE-DEED" — "a document *deposited* in the archives, and *forming an evidence* of possession" — contains at least vaguely the two preceding senses of the term. "*Deposited*" is an element in *υποστασις* common to "sediment," and "*an evidence of possession*" is akin to the notion of the word in epistemology. Although Moulton¹ accepts this

¹ Cf. Moulton, *From Egyptian Rubbish Heaps*, 27.

meaning of *υποστασις* as the interpretation of the word in Heb. xi, 1, yet we do not go so far. For the document containing this meaning of the term is dated only in 186 A.D., and, even admitting that it very probably was current long before that date, still we are not hereby historically certain that this was a current meaning of the word at the time the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, especially since the Patristic literature shows another interpretation.

We come now to the important question: What is the value of this historico-literary investigation of the pivotal word in Heb. xi, 1 for the interpretation of that text? First, independently of the various extant interpretations of this verse, we may say that this investigation has established historically that certainly two senses of *υποστασις*, — "REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE" and "that which stands or settles" as opposed to "that which passes away or can be drained off," — and *probably* a third meaning (*υποστασις* = "title-deed") were current when Heb. xi, 1 was written. The nice literary usage in the Epistle to the Hebrews (acknowledged by all¹) demands that the author be acquainted with at least the first two senses of *υποστασις*, since they were already firmly anchored in the *κοινή* vocabulary. And the fact that the author has not indicated in the context of the Epistle some peculiar, new, and non-current usage of the term, makes it imperative that *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 be understood in one of the senses current at his time. Furthermore, without going into the details of the context of our verse, and with only the general context in mind (which undoubtedly is "the perception of the invisible world"), we must say that, of the two meanings of *υποστασις* certainly current and known to the author of the Epistle, that one was probably chosen which respects the history of the term, viz.,

¹ Cf. J. R. Willis, *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, 336: "The evidence of wide culture shows throughout the Epistle. This characteristic has been, and is, universally acknowledged."

"REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE." For in an epistemological context, *υποστασις* was long used in this sense.

Secondly, of the various interpretations of Heb. xi, 1 now extant, this investigation strongly approves the Patristic exegesis which understood *υποστασις* in the sense of "REALITY"; and it also shows the untenableness of the interpretation originated by Erasmus, popularized by Luther, and which has become to-day the more common interpretation, — *i.e.*, *υποστασις* = "CONFIDENCE." For the Greek Patristic interpretation, written by men whose mother-tongue was the *κοινή διαλεκτος*, understood *υποστασις* in a meaning that was current during that Greek period — a sense which finds a place in the history of the term as the most appropriate meaning for the context. On the other hand, the interpretation of *υποστασις* in our verse as "confidence" not only appeared in history, when the *κοινή διαλεκτος* was dead, thus finding no place whatever in the history of the word, but also the much repeated citation of Polybius (*Reliq. Histor.*, VI, 55, 2), purporting to be the convincing proof that *υποστασις* commonly meant "confidence" in the *κοινή διαλεκτος*, turns out to be any meaning of the term save "confidence." Schlatter also, we repeat, in spite of the fact that he interprets *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 as "Zuversicht," brands as erroneous the aforesaid contention which by mere force of constant repetition has become traditional: "Über diesen verbalen Gebrauch (*ανυποστατος* = 'lacking endurance') geht *υποστασις* in Stellen wie *Pol.* 6, 55, 2; 4, 50, 10; *Jos. Ant.* 18, 1, 6, nicht hinaus; *Zuversicht* heisst das Wort in keiner derselben, so traditionell ihre Citation in den Kommentaren als Beleg für den Begriff *Zuversicht* geworden ist."¹

II. IN BIBLICAL LITERATURE

After having found the meaning of *υποστασις* in profane Greek literature, it will be of some interest to ascertain its

¹ Cf. Schlatter, *Op. cit.*, 582.

sense in Biblical Greek writings generally, before applying the results of our historico-literary investigation to Heb. xi, 1. Of course, the meaning of *υποστασις* in Biblical literature cannot have a determining value (independent of Greek literature) for the interpretation of Heb. xi, 1, simply because the literary source for the Greek Biblical writers was the Hellenic world.

1. *Υποστασις* in the LXX

The term occurs twenty times in the LXX, "as the rendering of almost as many Hebrew words."¹ This fact alone should put us on our guard against too hurriedly concluding that the real sense of *υποστασις* in the LXX can be readily found by a mere mechanical process of equating the Hebrew equivalent. Of these twenty usages of the term, one is in Wisdom (xvi, 21), and the other nineteen have Hebrew equivalents which are reducible to thirteen roots. In these usages of the word Schlatter sees a common element: "Im Gebrauch der Septuaginta ist zunächst diess deutlich, dass ihr der Begriff Stehen im Wort die Hauptsache ist."² Yet in this we cannot agree with him.

To arrive at a clear understanding regarding the meaning of *υποστασις* in the LXX, it will be necessary to examine some examples of its usage. In those cases where *υποστασις* has been used to translate more than one form derived from the same Hebrew root, it will suffice to note only one instance of the same.

Following the order in the LXX Concordance of Hatch and Redpath, we shall first take up the meaning of *υποστασις* in Ps. lxxxviii, 48 (another form derived from the same Hebrew root is found in Ps. xxxviii, 5), where the Hebrew equivalent is חָלַךְ (r. חָלַךְ, to dig, to hide, etc.). In this Psalm the perpetuity of David's reign is set forth in the

¹ C. Vaughan, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, 7.

² *Op. cit.*, 582.

first 38 verses. Then with the 39th verse the evils that are to afflict him are described. The verse in which *υποστασις* occurs (vers. 48) is composed of the words that well up in David's heart, as he writhes under these afflictions: *Μνησθητι τις η υποστασις μου· μη γαρ ματαιως εκτισας παντας τους υιους των ανθρωπων*: Remember what my *υποστασις* is, for not without reason hast Thou made all the sons of man. The Hebrew equivalent *דָּוָר* demands the meaning "duration," "life," "age." If the LXX translator transformed it into *υποστασις*, which never in its whole history shows such a sense, it is evident that he had no discernment of the term.

In Deut. xi, 6, *υποστασις* equates *יָקִים* (r. *קָם* or *קָם*, to rise, exist, remain firm). In this passage the author warns the Jews that they ought to serve God better for having witnessed the punishments which He inflicted upon the Egyptians and the wicked Jews. *Υποστασις* occurs in the reference to the punishment of Dathan and Abiron: *Ους ανοιξασα η γη το στομα αυτης κατεπιεν αυτους και τους οικους αυτων και τας σκηνας αυτων και πασαν αυτων την υποστασιν την μετ' αυτων εν μεσω παντος Ισραηλ*: The earth opening her mouth swallowed Dathan and Abiron and their houses and tents and all their *υποστασις* in Israel. *Υποστασις* here is correctly rendered in correspondence with its Hebrew equivalent as that which "remains" or "exists," — it expresses "possession," in which sense it is familiar to us from both our Patristic study and the historico-literary investigation of *υποστασις* in the Greek world of thought.

In Jer. x, 17, we read: *Συνηγαγεν εξωθεν την υποστασιν σου κατοικουσαν εν εκλεκτοις*. This is indeed a rather curious translation of the Hebrew: *אָסַף מֵאֶרֶץ כְּנָעַן יֹשְׁבֶיהָ בְּמִצֹּר*. Gather from the earth thy belongings, thou that dwellest in a siege. *Υποστασις* translates the Hebrew *כְּנָעַן* which means "baggage," "belongings," "possessions." Accordingly, it is used in about the same sense as in the preceding verse.

The Hebrew *מַעֲמִיד* (r. *עָמַד*, to stand) in Ps. lxviii, 8, is

rendered in the LXX by *υποστασις*. In this Psalm the "just one" declares the greatness of his sufferings: "Save me, O God, for the waters have come even unto my soul" (vers. 2). Our verse follows immediately: *Ενεπαγγην εις ιλυν βυθου, και ουκ εστιν υποστασις*: I am sunk in the mud of the deep, and there is no *υποστασις* = לֹא מָצָא . מָצָא = "standing place" reminds us of the meaning of *υποστασις* = "firmness" of our philological examination.

In Deut. i, 12, *υποστασις* has been used to translate נָשָׂא (r. נָשָׂא , to bear, etc.). Here Moses reminds the Jews of the causes that led to his associating with himself some of their number in the government of the people. One reason was the increasing population (vers. 10) and the consequent multiplication of the duties of administration. Hence, Moses says: *Πως δυνησομαι μονος θερειν τον κοπον υμων και την υποστασιν υμων και τας αντιλογιας υμων*: How can I alone bear your trouble, your *υποστασις*, and your differences? *Υποστασις*, as the translation of נָשָׂא = "burden," has no parallel in the Hellenic use of the term.

Forms derived from נָצַח (to set, establish) are the most frequent equivalents for *υποστασις* in the LXX. It will suffice to cite but one instance, I Kings, xiii, 23. "The verse takes up the account of the Philistine position. In v. 17 ff., the plunderers are described. Here we are told that the garrison, or *permanent guard left in the camp*, pushed forward to the edge of the pass of Michmash."¹ The LXX reads: *Και εξηλθεν εξ υποστασεως των αλλοφυλων την εν τω περαν Μαχμας*. Instead of *εξ υποστασεως* the Hebrew reads simply מַחֲנֶה = "permanent camp." The well-established sense of the term in the Hellenic world as "that which settles down" in contrast to "that which is transient," is evident in the usage of *υποστασις* = נָצַח here. For in the words of Smith, נָצַח here, as in xiv, means "the soldiers who were

¹ Cf. Smith, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Samuel*, 102.

in occupation of the camp, in distinction from those who went out on the various expeditions."¹ It is the familiar contrast between "that which settles down" in opposition to "that which is transient." The other instances, where *υποστασις* translates Hebrew forms derived from the root **נָצַב**, are the following: (hi) I Kings, xiii, 21; (hoph.) (Na. ii, 7); **נָצַב** (I Kings, xiv, 4); and **נָצַבָה** (Ez. xxvi, 11).

In Jer. xxiii, 22, LXX renders **נָצַב** (r. **נָצַב**, to set down) by *υποστασις*, and in verse 18 by *υποστημα*. The Greek follows: *Και ει εστησαν εν τη υποστασει μου (בְּסֻדִּי), και ει ηκουσαν των λογων μου, και τον λαον μου αν απεστρεφον αυτους απο των πονηρων επιτηδευματων αυτων*: If they stood in my *υποστασις*, and had they heard my voice, they would have turned my people from their evil ways and wicked deeds. The Hebrew equivalent for *υποστασις* is **נָצַב** = familiar talk, consideration, consultation. This idea certainly has nothing to do with the *υποστασις* of the Greek world that we investigated.

Υποστασις μου has been used by the LXX interpreters in translating **רָקַמְתִּי** (Pu. from **רָקַם**, to build) in Ps. cxxxviii, 15. In this Psalm God's special providence over His servants is praised. We encounter God's Spirit everywhere (vers. 6), in heaven and in hell (vers. 7), in the sea (vers. 8), and even in darkness (vers. 11 and 12). "For Thou hast protected me from my mother's womb" (vers. 13). Then occurs our verse: *Ουκ εκρυβη το οστων μου απο σου ο εποιησας εν κρυψη, και η υποστασις μου εν τοις κατωτατω της γης*. The Hebrew of the latter sentence follows: **רָקַמְתִּי בְּתַחְתִּיּוֹת אֶרֶץ**. The Greek verse may be translated: Not hidden is my bone from Thee, which Thou madest in secret, and my *υποστασις* in the depths of the earth. The Hebrew reads quite differently. But there is no doubt that *εν τοις κατωτατω της γης* translates **בְּתַחְתִּיּוֹת אֶרֶץ**, and *υποστασις μου* equates the verb **רָקַמְתִּי** ("I was diligently fashioned in the

¹ Op. cit., 108.

womb of my mother"). This shows that the LXX interpreters did not translate the Hebrew literally at all. However, *υποστασις* in reference to *יְקִיָּהוּ* points to something that is made, which the LXX text translates freely "existence." It reminds one somewhat of the Greek use of the word *υποστασις* = existence, as a predicate of *reality*.

The meaning of *υποστασις* in Ps. xxxviii, 8 is of special interest, because it has so often been adduced as an example of "fiducia": *Και νυν τις η υπομονη μου; ουχι ο Κυριος; και η υποστασις μου παρα σοι εστιν.* From the Greek point of view we should translate this verse as follows: And now who is my endurance? Is it not the Lord? And my existence is with Thee. Also "firmness" would be possible. But the Hebrew original (of which the LXX gives a free translation) demands another interpretation. It reads: *וְעָתָה מִהֲקִיָּהוּ אֲדֹנָי תוֹחֶלְתִּי לָהּ הִיא.* The verbal expression *מִהֲקִיָּהוּ* is translated by the nominal phrase *τις η υπομονη μου*; *Υποστασις μου* obviously translates *תוֹחֶלְתִּי* (ר. תָּחַל, to wait, expect, hope), which is a synonym for *קָוָה*. It is evident that here *υποστασις* is used to render a Hebrew verb of hoping, expecting, confiding, — a fact that reflects again the lack of familiarity with the use of the term in the Greek world.

In Ez. xliii, 11 *υποστασις* is used in the LXX to translate *תְּכִינָה* (either from *בָּן*, to stand, or exist, or from *תָּכַן*, to set right, adjust). The "son of man" is here commanded by the Lord to show the Jews the dimensions of the temple: *Και διαγραφεις τον οικον και τας εξόδους αυτου και την υποστασιν αυτου (ותְּכִינָתוֹ).* The LXX translates *תְּכִינָתוֹ* by *υποστασις αυτου*. The Vulgate has "descriptio." In fact, *תְּכִינָה* means arrangement, equipment. The context would suggest "foundation."

Υποστασις has been used to render two forms derived from the root *קָוָה* (to twist, bind; and figuratively, to hope). These instances have also been frequently cited as examples

where *υποστασις* means "fiducia." It will suffice to investigate only one of the cases (Ez. xix, 5). Here Israel is compared to a lioness, bringing up her young in the company of elder lions. One such whelp thus trained became a lion, "and he learned to catch the prey, and to devour men" (vers. 3). This one the nations caught after a bloody struggle, and brought him in chains to Egypt. Hereupon follows the verse in which *υποστασις* occurs: *Και ειδεν οτι απωσται απ' αυτης, απωλετο η υποστασις αυτης*. This may be translated thus: And when she saw that he was dragged away from her, her *υποστασις* was destroyed. Because "he was dragged away from her," her *υποστασις* was destroyed. The Hebrew term *יִקְוָה* which is rendered in Greek by *υποστασις αυτης*, is derived from *קָוָה*, which is, as we saw above in connection with Ps. xxxviii, 8, a synonym for *לָחַץ*, and means "to expect, hope." Hence, we have another example, where the LXX renders "expectation" by *υποστασις*—a meaning that contradicts all we know of its use in the Greek world.

The use of *υποστασις ζωης* in Jud. vi, 4 to equate *מִקְוֵה* = "means of subsistence" reminds us somewhat of the Hellenic use of the term in the sense of "foundation," "support." The Madians and the Amalecites were sent to punish Israel. After Israel had sown the fields, these enemies with hordes of men and herds of cattle pitched their tents on the fields, and "like locusts" devoured everything: *Και ου κατελειποντο υποστασιν ζωης εν τη γη Ισραηλ*: *וְלֹא יִשְׁאַרִי מִקְוֵה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל*. They did not leave an *υποστασις* of life in the land of Israel.

In Job xxii, 20, "loss of *υποστασις*" is equated by *נִכְחַד* which expresses "destruction": *Ει μη ηφανισθη η υποστασις αυτων, και το καταλειμμα αυτων καταφαγεται πυρ*. The Hebrew follows: *אִם-לֹא נִכְחַד קִימִנִי יִתְרָם אֲכָלָה שָׂא*. The LXX translates again very freely, so much so that the Hebrew equivalents can hardly be recognized. It suffices for us to notice that the Hebrew word for "de-

struction" is expressed by the "disappearance of *υποστασις*" in the LXX, which suggests "essence" or "existence" as the meaning of *υποστασις*.

The only use of *υποστασις* in the LXX, not having a Hebrew equivalent, is Wis. xvi, 21. Here the author contrasts the "strange waters, hail, and rain" (vers. 16), which God let down upon Israel's enemies, with the "food of angels prepared without labor" (vers. 20), the manna which He rained upon the Jews. Speaking of this manna, the author goes on to say: *Η μὲν γὰρ υποστασις σου τὴν σὴν γλυκυτητα πρὸς τέκνα ἐνεφανίσε*. This may be translated thus: For Thy *υποστασις* shows Thy sweetness toward Thy children. *Υποστασις* is to be referred to the manna, since the manna is the *υποστασις* that God sent. It is difficult to decide the meaning of the term here. Perhaps "substance" expresses best what the author wishes to say.

To put in clear and striking relief the result of our Septuagintal investigation, we must restate the ideas which we found connected with *υποστασις*: life, duration of life, possession (or one's belongings), firmness, burden, camp, consultation, existence, confidence, arrangement, subsistence of life, essence, substance. Although a number of these renditions show more or less similarity with the use of *υποστασις* in the Greek literature (like possession, firmness, belongings, existence, essence, substance), yet we can safely say that the LXX writers are almost completely ignorant of the principal and primary meaning of the word *υποστασις*, as we found it in the Hellenic writers. Septuagintal usage of *υποστασις* is very loose, and most frequently it is employed as a kind of vox media, expressing various meanings. We may here quote Deissmann, who goes to the very heart of LXX usage when he says: "The meaning of a Septuagint word cannot be deduced from the original which it translates or replaces, but only from other remains of the Greek language, especially from those Egyptian sources that

have lately flowed so abundantly. Even Professor Blass, I am glad to say, took up this position at last—a position which, unfortunately, is not conceded at once, but has to be slowly won by combat with an unmethodical school. To give one example: Baljon in his *Lexicon* gives as meanings for the Septuagint word *αρκευθος* 'olive tree' and 'cypress tree.' The Hebrew words for these two trees are certainly sometimes rendered *αρκευθος* by the translators, and so Baljon concludes that in the language of the Septuagint, *αρκευθος* has these meanings. No, says Blass¹ very truly, *αρκευθος* means 'juniper,' and 'a wrong translation does not turn the juniper into an olive or a cypress.' There can be no doubt about that."² So also we can say: *Υποστασις* means "reality," and a wrong translation cannot turn "reality" into "life," "burden," or "fiducia."

It may be more interesting to learn the attitude of the New Testament writers toward *υποστασις*. Do they share the confusion of the LXX-writers, or have they a better knowledge of the Greek terminology?

2. *Υποστασις in the New Testament*

Υποστασις occurs only five times in the New Testament: twice in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, and thrice in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Hence, in the New Testament it is a Pauline word.

In the II Epistle to the Corinthians, both usages of the word are in connection with "boasting": (a) In ix, 4 with the idea of "boasting,"³ and (b) in xi, 17 with the term itself: *εν ταυτη τη υποστασει της καυχησης*.

In the first instance, Paul reminds the Corinthians about

¹ *Grammatik des Neutest., Griechisch*, col. 44.

² *The Philology of the Greek Bible*, 89, sq.

³ Although even here some MSS. add *της καυχησης*: $\aleph^o D^o E K L P$ al pler Syr^{tr} arm go Chr⁷⁵ Thdr^t Dam. Cf. Tischendorf, *Novum Testamentum Graec.*, etc., II, 605.

the collection for the Saints at Jerusalem (vers. 1) which they had apparently promised to have ready for a long time previously. For (in vers. 2), he tells them plainly that he had boasted (*καυχῶμαι*) to the Macedonians about the Corinthians' collection. Even in Achaia their emulation "hath provoked many" (vers. 2). The author continues: "Now I have sent the Brethren that the thing we boast of concerning you, be not made void in this behalf, that you may be ready" (vers. 3). Then follows a reference to the shame that would be not only his, but theirs also, if, accompanied by the Macedonians, he came to Corinth to find them unprepared in the matter of the collection: *Μηπως εαν ελθωσιν συν εμοι Μακεδονες και ευρωσιν υμας απαρασκευαστους, κατασχυνθωμεν ημεις (ινα μη λεγωμεν υμεις) εν τη υποστασει ταυτη*. What does *υποστασις* here mean? Any one of such current senses of the term as "reality," "pledge," "guarantee," or "anticipation of reality," would satisfy the context. The natural translation is "in this matter." Tangible material or matter is, as we know, the fundamental meaning of *υποστασις* in the naïve language. Since it corresponds most accurately with the context, we have no right nor reason to abandon this explanation demanded by the history of the term.

Furthermore, since "matter" in this Pauline context is not used as a materially tangible object, but in the higher sense of "affairs," we have in the English word "matter" the best translation. For it illustrates most aptly how the same word can signify *material* and *intellectual reality*. Any other meaning save *reality* (matter) for *υποστασις* in our passage may fit the context, but is no strict interpretation.

The second instance (II Cor. xi, 17) is even more interesting, since so many commentators insist on interpreting *υποστασις* in the sense of "confidence." Here Paul is forced to commend himself and "boast" of his Apostolic labors, lest the Corinthians should be imposed upon by "*false teachers*."

Though he repeatedly admits "boasting" to be "foolishness," yet he does not hesitate to "boast," when "false teachers" are winning over the Corinthians by "boasting," for he has more reason to "boast" than they. Hence, he says: *Ο λαλω, ου κατα Κυριον λαλω, αλλ' ως εν αφροσυνη, εν ταυτη τη υποστασει της καυχησης*: What I speak now I speak not according to the Lord, but as in foolishness, *in this υποστασις of boasting*. What does *υποστασις* here mean?

The original meaning of *υποστασις* (matter) again answers the demands of the context. Hence, "in this matter of boasting" must be regarded as the correct translation. In the light of the context and the history of *υποστασις*, the interpretation "fiducia," introduced by dogmatic tendency, cannot be sanctioned at all.

The remaining three usages of *υποστασις* in the New Testament occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews (i, 3; iii, 14; xi, 1). The meaning of *υποστασις* in the first instance (*Ος ων απαντασμα της δοξης και χαρακτηρ της υποστασεως αυτου*), as a synonym of *ουσια*, is so generally accepted by commentators that we shall not linger to give a special exegesis of the same. For, this interpretation agrees with the context and finds many parallels in contemporary Greek literature. As regards the latter consideration, we may note the excellent summary by Bigg, wherein he shows that *υποστασις* and *ουσια* were practically synonymous terms in contemporary usage: "The two expressions (*υποστασις* and *ουσια*) were current in the philosophy of the time, and mean precisely the same thing."¹ Hatch, also, says that "*υποστασις* is the conjugate of the verb *υφισταναι*, which had come into use as a more emphatic form than *ειναι*."² Even after the term was more clearly differentiated from *ουσια*, in the Trinitarian and Christological controversies,

¹ *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, 164.

² *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*, 275.

Athanasius still writes: "Ἡ δὲ ὑποστασις οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντον ἔχει ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ οὐ."¹ But, it must not be forgotten that St. Paul in his former usage of the term laid stress on the *very reality*, so that *ὑποστασις* here means the "*real essence*."

The sense of *ὑποστασις* in Heb. iii, 14 is the bone of much contention. First, let us give the text: *Μετοχοὶ γὰρ τοῦ Χριστοῦ γεγόναμεν, ἐὰν περ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ὑποστάσεως μεχοὶ τέλους βεβαίαν κατασχωμεν*. This text is supported by the overwhelming weight of critical evidence. The interesting variant is that of A, f, vg., and Jerome (Ep. Damas., 3, 517), which qualifies *ὑποστάσεως* by *αὐτοῦ*. That Heb. iii, 14 is a very important text for the understanding of *ὑποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1, is evident both from the fact that Heb. iii, 14 deals with *πίστις* (e.g., Chrysostom says: *τί ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑποστάσεως; τὴν πίστιν λέγει*²), and from the general context. Godet has clearly summarized the gist of this Epistle in three short sentences: "Break loose from Judaism. Be wholly his who is better to you than the angels (chaps. i-iii, 1),³ better than Moses (iii, 1-iii, 19)³ or Joshua (iv),³ better than Aaron and his priesthood (v-x).³ Be all to Jesus, in whom you possess the eternal reality of all the good things of which Judaism offers you only the shadow."⁴ The one clear burden of the author's message to the Jewish converts to Christianity is, "Do not apostatize." The reasons against this possible apostasy are given in the didactic part of the Epistle (i-x) so clearly summarized above by Godet. In concluding each reason, the author of the Epistle exhorts briefly and incidentally against apostasy, which exhortation is summarized and developed in the practical part of the letter (xi-xiii). Heb. iii, 14 occurs in the brief exhortation

¹ Migne, *P. G.*, 26, 1036 B.

² Cf. Tischendorf, *Novum Test., Graec.*, etc., II, 789.

³ The references in parentheses are mine.

⁴ *Studies on the Epistles*, 325.

"not to apostatize" drawn from the consideration "Jesus is greater than Moses." Accordingly, the importance of *υποστασις* in Heb. iii, 14 for the understanding of the same term in Heb. xi, 1 is derived from the fact that both verses have to do with *πιστις* by way of exhortation "not to apostatize."

The "superiority of Jesus over Moses" is the superiority of the Master-builder over the workman who builds the house, and of the Son over the servant in the house (vv. 2-6). The rather long application is then noted: "If the Jews in the wilderness were punished for their unbelief by not being allowed to enter Canaan, how much more certainly will those who let go their faith in Jesus be shut out from the rest of the Lord."¹ Heb. iii, 14 lies in the context of this practical exhortation. It is applied directly to the Jewish Christian readers (in verse 12): "Take heed, Brethren, lest perhaps there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief to depart from the living God." Then follows the reason in our verse: *Μετοχοι γαρ του Χριστου γεγοναμεν, εανπερ την αρχην της υποστασεως μεχρι τελους βεβαιαν κατασχωμεν*. In the light of the context it means, "For we have become sharers (partners) of Christ, if indeed we hold fast unto the end the sure beginning of the *reality* (in Christianity in contrast to the shadows of Judaism)." As regards the context, we might say that the reason given for not apostatizing is that we have become "sharers of Christ" (*μετοχοι του Χριστου*) as opposed to "sharers of Judaism," or, as it was expressed in verse 1: "sharers of the heavenly calling" (*μετοχοι επουρανιου μετοχοι*) in opposition to the "election of the Jews for the covenant of types and shadows," or, as in verse 6: "But Christ as the Son in His own house, *of which we are*" (*ου οικος εσμεν ημεις*) in contrast to "Moses and all his house." In a word, as Jewish Christians they have become "sharers of Christ" in His possessions (eternal realities) in

¹ Godet, *Op. cit.*, 319.

contrast to the Jews who by adhering to the Law remain the "sharers with Moses" in the types and shadows of the old dispensation. But this sharing or partnership with Christ in the heavenly realities of the new order in contrast to the sharing with Moses in the types and shadows of the old order is dependent on a condition: "if we indeed hold fast unto the end the sure beginning of the possession of true reality."

The only other instance in the New Testament, where *ὑποστασις* is used, is our famous passage in Heb. xi, 1. We shall take up this one in the next chapter. Our investigation of the other four instances in the New Testament where the term occurs has yielded the same results as did our study of *ὑποστασις* in the Greek world, only in a more striking way. The results show that St. Paul did not confine himself to the terminology of the LXX, but that he rather controls and marshals the popular-philosophical terminology of the Hellenic world to clothe his own ideas in the language of his day.

CHAPTER II

APPLICATION OF THE RESULTS TO HEB. XI, 1

BEFORE applying the results of this investigation to Heb. xi, 1, let us restate them in a summary way : The *Historical Part* yielded the original text and the various extant interpretations of the same. These latter differ according as *υποστασις* was understood to mean either "reality" or "confidence." The value of these historical interpretations, studied in such detail, consists not only in showing exactly what men have thought of this verse in the past and the problems mooted in the same, but also in furnishing an historico-literary argument of the highest importance for the understanding of *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1. For, as we have stated before, the language of the Greek Patristic writers was the *κοινή διαλεκτος* of Heb. xi, 1. Hence, the Patristic interpretation of our verse has a scientific probability not enjoyed by the other interpretation that originated in non-Greek writers many centuries after the *κοινή διαλεκτος* had ceased to be a spoken language.

However, the touchstone that decisively tests the merits of the two interpretations is the current Greek usage of *υποστασις*. This touchstone was found in the Exegetical Part of the investigation.

The *Exegetical Part* yielded the history of the pivotal term *υποστασις* in the Hellenic world, in both profane and Biblical literature. From its first appearance in extant literature to the Greek Patristic exegesis of Heb. xi, 1 *υποστασις* meant "reality," — first, in the terms of a naïve and primitive language, as the "tangible" in contrast to the "transient" matter, and later, in the popular philosophical

language, as "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance." This was the current meaning of the term when Heb. xi, 1 was penned. The only exception to this usage is that of the LXX, where the use of the term is so confused as to justify the conclusion that they had no knowledge of the really original sense of the term.

There can be no doubt about the meaning of Heb. xi, 1, if the sense of *υποστασις*, as furnished by the historico-literary investigation of the word, is applicable to our verse. And it is applicable, (1) if the general usage of the author approves it; (2) if the context confirms it; and (3) if there is no other literary source whence the author might have derived the term. Let us now examine these several hypotheses.

1. *Ἰποστασις* IN THE GENERAL USAGE OF THE AUTHOR

This usage has already been ascertained in the examination of *υποστασις* in the New Testament literature. As it was there stated, *υποστασις* in the New Testament is a Pauline term, since it occurs only five times, — twice in the II Epistle to the Corinthians and three times in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Without taking up the difficult problem of the authorship of the Epistle, which would bring us too far afield, I am assuming only what is generally granted, viz., that the Epistle to the Hebrews is Pauline. Hence, besides the evidence for the usage of *υποστασις* in Heb. i, 3 and iii, 14, we may add that of the two passages in II Corinthians (ix, 4 and xi, 17). In all these instances, it has been found that *υποστασις* was employed in the Greek usage of the term, viz., as "reality" or "something in connection with reality."

Among these instances of the usage of *υποστασις*, that in Heb. iii, 14 is of special importance for its use in Heb. xi, 1, because both verses deal with *πιστις* in the same way. For both are embedded in the context of the practical warning,

"Do not apostatize": Heb. iii, 14 in the casual warning, drawn from the consideration "Jesus is better than Moses," and Heb. xi, 1 in the solemn warning of the *whole practical part*, drawn from the arguments of the *whole didactic part*. And in Heb. iii, 14, *υποστασις* was certainly used to emphasize the sense "reality."

From these arguments it may be safely gathered that the *General Usage of υποστασις* by the Pauline author of the Epistle to the Hebrews favors the current Greek sense of the term throughout, but more especially in one passage (Heb. iii, 14) where the term is found in practically the same context as Heb. xi, 1.

2. THE CONTEXT OF HEB. XI, 1

Stevens has very adequately condensed all the "arguments" and "appeals" of this Epistle into three words: "Do not apostatize."¹ These "arguments" have been set forth in what has been called the "didactic part" of the Epistle (chaps. i-x); and the "appeals" are noted, first incidentally after each argument in the "didactic" portion, and then more fully in the "practical part" (chaps. xi-xiii).

The "arguments" for not apostatizing are three: (a) "Jesus is better than the angels" (chaps. i-ii); (b) "Jesus is better than Moses or Joshua" (chaps. iii-iv); and (c) "Jesus is better than Aaron and his priesthood" (chaps. v-x). But the reason underlying these "arguments" is the "*efficaciousness*" of Christ's superiority in our behalf (chaps. viii-x), which, as Godet says, is "the keynote of the whole didactic portion."²

On the other hand, the "appeals" grow out of these "arguments" and may be thus summarized with the same author: "Be all for Jesus, in whom you possess the eternal

¹ *The Theology of the New Testament*, 487.

² *Op. cit.*, 323.

reality of all the good things of which Judaism offers you only the shadow."¹ The appeals are first stated separately after each argument to which it forms a conclusion in the Didactic Part, and then summarily in the Practical Part (chaps. xi-xiii). Heb. xi, 1, dividing, as it does, the "didactic" from the "practical" part of the Epistle, and serving as the text for the whole latter part, holds the position of a fulcrum, upon which the "arguments" and the "appeals" of the whole Epistle balance. Let us now consider in more detail these "arguments" and "appeals" not to apostatize.

(a) "Jesus is better than the angels" (chaps. i-ii). "Therefore," the author would say, "Do not apostatize." For the fact that Jesus is superior to the angels is "proof of the superiority of the Gospel of Christ to the Law of Moses, in proportion as Christ, Who delivered it, is greater than the angels, who gave the Law."² After having established this superiority, the author pauses to draw the lesson: "For if the word spoken by angels became steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward: How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation, which began to be declared by the Lord?" (Heb. ii, 2, 3). In a word, "God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come (*οικουμένην την μελλουσαν*) whereof we speak" (Heb. ii, 5).

(b) "Jesus is better than Moses or Joshua" (chaps. iii-iv). I have already shown why Jewish Christians should not apostatize, for the reason that "Jesus is better than Moses,"³ viz., "because we are sharers of Christ, if indeed we hold fast unto the end the beginning of the *possession of true reality* (*της υποστασεως*) in contrast to shadows" (Heb. iii, 14). Side by side with this reason not to apostatize is a

¹ *Op. cit.*, 325.

² B. à Piconio, *An Exposition of the Epistles of St. Paul*, 282.

³ Cf. p. 136 sq.

warning about the incredulous Jews who did not enter the "promised land" because of unbelief (iii, 19). But this "rest of God" into which Joshua led the believers is only a *type* of the *real* "rest of God" into which Jesus leads believers. In a word, Jesus the founder of the New Economy is better than Moses and Joshua, the founders of the Old, precisely in just this that He is the reality which they *typify*.

(c) "Jesus is better than Aaron and his priesthood" (chaps. v-x). For Jesus brought the Aaronic priesthood to ideal perfection (chap. v, 1-10); His characteristics as absolute High-Priest were foreshadowed by Melchisedek (chap. vii); Christ's priestly sanctuary is heaven itself, not earth, and His covenant is one of grace, not external works (chap. viii); the old order with its man-made tabernacle and furnishings, its restricted priestly service, and the repeated sacrifices of oxen, heifers, and goats, is contrasted with the new, where the Eternal High-Priest Christ "in a tabernacle not made with hands," "entered once into the holies," "having obtained redemption for all" (chap. ix); and, finally, by one sacrifice Christ took away sin, whereas "the law (a shadow (*σκια*) of the good things to come, not the very essence (*εικονα των πραγματος*) of the realities) by the self-same sacrifices which are offered continually every year, *can never make the comers thereunto perfect*" (chap. x). The priesthood, sanctuary, services, sacrifices of the Old Covenant with their inability "to perfect" are only the *earthly types and shadows of the heavenly realities and life-giving efficacy* of Christ's eternal Priesthood in the New Covenant.

The "appeals" drawn from this argument are scattered over the whole section (chaps. v-x). The author complains of the lack of spiritual insight to see the difference between the two Covenants, and reminds them of the awful truth that if any one fall away after receiving the grace of regeneration and spiritual enlightenment, by which they "pierce

the veil," no further regeneration is possible (chaps. v, 10-vi, 20). Then the superiority of the Christian worship (in which the priesthood of Christ works out its life-giving effects) over the Temple service, is shown in a final warning not to apostatize: "Beware of forsaking the assembling of yourselves together, lest you forsake also your *faith* itself: For there would remain no more sacrifice for the expiation of such a sin" (chap. x, 16-20).

In a word, the author in this Epistle appeals to the Jewish converts to Christianity, warning them "not to apostatize," (a) because Jesus Who preached the *Gospel* is superior to the angels who delivered the *law*; (b) because Jesus, the Founder of the *New Economy*, is better than Moses and Joshua, the founders of the *Old*; (c) and finally, because the *nature and efficacy of Christ's priesthood* means more to us than *that of Aaron*. But the underlying reason for this superiority of the Gospel over the Law, of the New Economy over the Old, of Christ's Priesthood over Aaron's, is that in each case the latter is only a *sensuous and earthly type* of the former—a *supersensuous and heavenly reality*. We also observed that the author punctuates these arguments against apostasy with warnings and appeals for Faith, which grow in pointedness and boldness, until they reach their full stature in the "practical part" of the Epistle, of which Heb. xi, 1 is the keystone.

This brings us to Heb. xi, 1 in its immediate context. The last solemn warning growing out of the arguments of the "didactic part" is unmistakable: "But my just man liveth by Faith; yet if he withdraw (*υποστειλῃται*) himself, he shall not please my soul" (chap. x, 38); also the "appeal" for Faith is clear and emphatic: "But we are not the children of withdrawing unto perdition (*ημεεις δε ουκ εσμεν υποστολης εις απωλειαν*), but of Faith to the saving of the soul (*αλλα πιστεως εις περιποιησιν ψυχης*)" (chap. x, 39). The author having drawn this final contrast between "apos-

tasy" (*υποστολη*) and "faith" (*πιστις*), and having stated that, whereas "apostasy" leads to destruction, the soul of man is saved by "Faith," "proceeds to explain what that Faith is which saves the soul."¹ The explanation follows in the celebrated verse, Heb. xi, 1, concerning which Delitzsch has well said: "A more complete and accurate definition of Faith, and one more generally applicable, could not be devised than that one which is here given"²: *Εστιν δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποστασις, πραγματος ελεγχος ου βλεπομενων*: For Faith is the *υποστασις* of things hoped for, the incontestable proof of things unseen. The all-important question now arises: Is the current Hellenic meaning of *υποστασις* as "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance" applicable here? We answer in an emphatic affirmative.

For this final warning "not to apostatize" and the "appeal" for Faith are culminating exhortations drawn from the "arguments" of the whole Epistle, and are here solemnly restated and contrasted³ on the threshold of the "practical part" of the Epistle, of which Heb. xi, 1 is the topical verse. But the preceding "arguments" against apostasy and the "appeals" for Faith are based, as already noted, on the notion that Christianity is related to Judaism "as its complete fulfilment, the *substance answering* to the shadow."⁴ This reason underlying the "arguments" "not to apostatize," and animating the "appeals" for Faith, is now most

¹ Piconio, *Op. cit.*, 396.

² *Op. cit.*, II, 204. There is a division among the interpreters on the question as to whether this is a "definition" or a "description" of *πιστις*. Some of the most eminent authors, favoring the first, are: Augustine, Van Steenkiste, Godet, Feine, Beyschlag, Westcott, J. Weiss; those favoring the second, are: Olshausen, Milligan, MacEvilly, Cowles, Farrar, and John Owen.

³ Schlatter thinks that there is here even a verbal contrast: "Weichen und Glauben waren im Anschluss an das Wort Habakuks im vorangehenden einander entgegengestellt, dem Weichen tritt nun das "Stehen" gegenüber, der *υποστολη* die *υποστασις*." Cf. *Op. cit.*, 468.

⁴ Westcott, *Op. cit.*, 317.

strikingly, with complete fitness, and yet naturally, brought into the very definition of *πιστις*, by means of the term *υποστασις* in its current Hellenic sense of "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance": *Εστιν δε πιστις ελπιζομενων υποστασις, πραγματος ελεγχος ου βλεπτομενων*: For Faith is the PRESENTATION of the REALITY of things hoped for, the incontestable proof of things unseen. With this interpretation in mind, Dummelow has skillfully gathered up the main thread of the context in these words: "It has been shown that the earthly and visible things are but types, copies, and shadows of heavenly realities (Heb. viii, 5; ix, 22; x, 1). The underlying thought of the preceding chapters is that contrary to the ordinary way of thinking, it is the heavenly that is the real. But how are heavenly and invisible things to be realized with any assurance? It is by the operation of Faith. Faith is that by which the invisible becomes real, and the future becomes present. 'Faith gives reality to things hoped for, and puts to the test things for the present unseen.'" ¹

This interpretation of *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 as "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance" is confirmed by what follows in the context. For the "cloud of witnesses," arrayed by the author to illustrate his definition of Faith (xi, 2-xii, 3), is eminently fitted to do this. Godet says, "all these, each in his own manner, let go the Seen that they might grasp the Unseen."² Weinel analyzes the *πιστις* of the various heroes: "Glauben heisst: wie Abraham Gott gehorchen, ohne dass man weiss wohin er uns führt, und warten auf die Stadt, die die Fundamente hat, deren Architekt Gott ist, auch wenn man darum 'in Zelten' wohnen muss, u. s. w."³ In each case, it is the laying hold of the unseen and heavenly reality. After an appeal for patient endurance (c. xiii), the author finally asks for an absolute "break" from Judaism (c. xiii, 13).

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1026. ² *Op. cit.*, 324. ³ *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Test.*, 599.

This interpretation of Heb. xi, 1 would also be calculated to stir up anew Faith in the Jewish readers of this Epistle, who were apparently on the verge of abandoning the heavenly realities of Christianity for the earthly shadows of Judaism. For, if we but bear in mind the tenacity with which the early Jewish converts to Christianity clung to the Law that had degenerated into mere externalism, to the visible sanctuary at Jerusalem, and to the fleshly bond that bound them to the chosen people, we can appreciate more fully the scope, the probable efficacy, and the necessity of such "arguments" "not to apostatize," and of such "appeals" for Faith. For, the Law, the Jewish theocracy, and the Aaronic priesthood and its sacrifices, were earthly things, present among them, and easy to be grasped by bodily eyes; whereas the Gospel, the new economy of salvation, and the supersensuous and heavenly realities of Christianity were partly present and partly future, and could be grasped only by Faith and by Hope. Beyschlag has well expressed this thought in these words: "Above this sensuous world of growth and decay God has founded a supersensuous and eternal world, in which we believe, for which we hope, and after which we are to seek. The invisible world is characterized in this world of Faith and Hope in the well-known words of Heb. xi, 1."¹

Accordingly, we see that both the general context of the whole Epistle and the immediate context of Heb. xi, 1 demand the interpretation of *ὑποστάσις* of our verse in the current Greek sense of "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance."

3. THE ONLY LITERARY SOURCE FOR THE USAGE OF *ὑποστάσις* IS THE HELLENIC WORLD

Again it must be pointed out that the real home and birth-place of *ὑποστάσις* is the Hellenic world, and that the voice

¹ *New Testament Theology*, II, 296.

of this world of thought is decisive. Those commentators like Schlatter, Delitzsch, and the Moderns generally, who have gone to the LXX for the meaning of *ὑποστασις*, forget not only the basic fact, that the LXX cannot be a source for the sense of Greek words *independent* of good Greek usage, but also that the LXX in its actual usage of this term, as is the case with many others,¹ is altogether unreliable.

The meaning of the *ὑποστασις* in the Hellenistic world, as "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance," is not only a well-established sense of the term, but it has also been actually used for the very contrast employed in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Stevens has also noted this point: "The contrast between the lower world of shadows and semblances and the heavenly world of abiding realities, which is so prominent in this Epistle, reminds one of the distinction between the sensible and the intellectual world which Philo had derived from Plato."² And, I might add, what is most remarkable in this common usage of *ὑποστασις* by Philo and the author of our Epistle, is the fact that both use the term to express the "perception of the invisible world" which, in turn, was commonly expressed by the Greeks through the term *πιστις*.³

There cannot be the slightest doubt that St. Paul, putting aside the confused notions of *ὑποστασις* in the LXX, and adhering consistently to the definition of the term in the Hellenic World, under the striking identity of the famous contrast "reality" — "appearance," received his *ὑποστασις*-formula from no other source than this same Greek world of thought.

¹ Cf. p. 132 sq.; also cf. Deissmann, *The Philology of the Greek Bible*, 90.

² *Op. cit.*, 488 ff.

³ "Religious faith, even under the Polytheistic form it assumed in Greece, implies that what exists and happens in the world depends on certain causes concealed from sensuous perception." Cf. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, I, 52.

CONCLUSION

We hope that the *πιστις-υποστασις* problem can now be regarded as solved.

The Pauline *υποστασις*, as a qualification of *πιστις* in Heb. xi, 1, is the PRESENTATION OF "REALITY" in contrast to "MERE APPEARANCE." Scientifically, no other interpretation is possible. Such explanations as "fiducia," "expectation," etc., are perversions of the historical evidence.

In this age of the historico-critical method, these a priori interpretations ought to give place to an historically justified exegesis.



ABBREVIATIONS

- BSt** = **Biblische Studien.**
BW = **The Biblical World.**
BZ = **Biblische Zeitschrift.**
ExpT = **The Expository Times.**
HThSt = **Harvard Theological Studies.**
Philg = **Philologus.**
TR = **Textus Receptus.**
ZkTh = **Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie.**

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APPENDIX

THESES

I

Heb. xi, 1 is the standard definition of *πιστις* in the Patristic literature.

II

The Pauline *υποστασις*, as a qualification of *πιστις* in Heb. xi, 1, is the "presentation of reality" in contrast to "mere appearance." From an historico-literary point of view no other interpretation is possible.

III

Such interpretations of *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1, as "fiducia," "expectation" etc., are perversions of the historical evidence.

IV

The literary source for the Pauline usage of *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 is not the confused sense of the word in the LXX, but rather the current Greek understanding of the term, which had been prepared by a natural historical development in the Hellenic world.

V

An historico-literary investigation of the term *υποστασις* discloses the fact that it was first employed in the primitive and naïve usage, as the "tangible and stable matter" in contrast to the "transient," and later in the vocabulary of

popular philosophy, as "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance."

VI

The sense of *υποστασις*, as "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance," was current when the famous definition of the Pauline *πιστις* was penned.

VII

The current Greek usage of the Pauline *υποστασις* has not been sufficiently recognized by modern scholars in their interpretation of the five New Testament passages in which the term occurs.

VIII

Both the general usage of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the context demand that *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 be understood in the sense of "reality" in contrast to "mere appearance."

IX

The Greek Patristic exegesis of Heb. xi, 1 is in complete agreement with the Hellenistic notion of *υποστασις*.

X

It is a noteworthy fact that an historico-literary investigation of the terms, *ουσια* (by Hirzel), *απαργμος* and *μορφη θεου* (by Schumacher), and *υποστασις* has yielded the same general results: the terms were each found, first, in a naïve and primitive usage, and were adopted later, in a developed sense, into the popular philosophical vocabulary.

XI

The Peshitto-rendering of Heb. xi, 1 not only shows a perfect understanding of *υποστασις* in this context, as the

"presentation of reality," but it also constitutes an official confirmation of this interpretation by the early Syrian Church.

XII

The variant reading of Codex Alexandrinus (A) in the text of Heb. xi, 1 very probably is a transcriptional error.

XIII

ὑποστασις in Polybius, Histor. Reliq. VI, 55, 2, so often cited as the standard witness to the usage of that term in Heb. xi, 1 in the sense of "fiducia," positively cannot be so translated.

XIV

The meaning of ὑποστασις in the papyri, "property" and the "title-deed to property," confirms the results found in the Hellenic literature.

XV

An historico-literary investigation of the term μορφή θεου shows that it was a technical term in Greek philosophy, and the current formula for the metaphysical essence of God in the time of St. Paul.

XVI

The pre-existence of Christ in the Divine essence is clearly established in Phil. ii, 6.

XVII

The literary problem in the Synoptic Question cannot be solved by the so-called theory of Oral Tradition.

XVIII

The oriental conception of the mystery of numbers is the decisive key for the explanation of the Genealogies.

XIX

There is sufficient evidence to show that the Hebrew poetry of the Psalms is metrical, the essential element of the meter being the verse determined by the number of accented syllables.

XX

The inverted Nûn in the Massoretic text is used to mark critically doubtful passages.

XXI

The Nequdoth or Extraordinary Points of the Pentateuch were devised by their author or authors to condemn, as spurious, the words or letters over which they were placed.

XXII

The similarities in thought and expression between Wisdom (c. xiii) and St. Paul's speech at the Areopagus are such as to show some literary influence.

XXIII

The coincidences in the Magnificat (Luke i, 46-55) and in the Canticle of Anna (I Sam. ii, 1-10) show a literary dependence.

XXIV

The differences in the canon of the Old Testament, as formulated by the Council of Trent and that defended by Origen and St. Jerome, may be accounted for by the different tests of canonicity used.

XXV

The Pauline *πιστις*, characterized as *υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1, is fundamentally similar in meaning to *הַמַּשְׁכִּיחַ*, in that both terms mean "the tangible" in contrast to "the apparent."

XXVI

I. Non in unanimitate explicationum, sed potius in continua attestationum catena, consistit traditio catholica: ac proinde a veritate aberrant ii qui dogmata catholica ab explicationibus theologicis eorumdum non sedulo discreverint.

XXVII

II. Reiicienda est sententia iuxta quam "dogmata quae Ecclesia perhibet tanquam revelata, non sunt veritates a caelo delapsae, sed sunt interpretatio quaedam factorum religiosorum, quam humana mens laborioso conatu sibi comparavit." Ex decreto Lamentabili, No. 22.

XXVIII

III. Consideratis dogmatum catholicorum origine, natura atque profectu, ab iis omnino recedimus qui haec dogmata exhibere conantur ac si specimina praeberent quibus applicari possent leges generales evolutionis biologicae.

XXIX

IV. Doctrina catholica de morte piaculari Christi summe moralis atque spiritualis, simul ac realis et objectiva est dicenda.

XXX

V. Theologice, historice, et critice inspecta, falsa ostenditur distinctio illa nuperrime adinventata inter Christum quem exhibet historia, et Christum qui est obiectum fidei.

XXXI

As a term of distinction in the statement of the Trinitarian doctrine, *υποστασις* very probably came into use as a protest against Sabellius and other heretics, who, though admitting *τρεις προσωπα* in the Godhead, yet maintained that the *τρεις προσωπα* were *ανυποστατα*.

XXXII

Even in the process by which *υποστασις* became the technical term for person, the previous meaning of the word ("reality" in contrast to "mere appearance") controls the development.

XXXIII

The history of *υποστασις* not only throws a new light on the terminological confusion in the Trinitarian and Christological controversies, but it also dovetails into the results reached by Harnack, namely, that Tertullian and not the Greeks invented the technical terminology for the Trinitarian doctrine.

XXXIV

Πιστις in terms of *επιζομενων υποστασις* in Heb. xi, 1 shows in a striking manner how creed must influence action. For Faith gives "things hoped for" the force of "present realities" which must be reckoned with, just as the realities presented by the senses demand recognition.

XXXV

The contention of Harnack and Hatch that the eventual identification of *πιστις* with "creed" shows a development in the meaning of the term from simple trust to intellectual assent is unfounded. For there was always an intellectual element in the word.

XXXVI

The credibility of the miracles ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels, resting on the testimony of the Apostles themselves, cannot be impugned.

XXXVII

The limitations disclosed by a scientific study of the remedial power of psychotherapy and hypnotism clearly

show that the miracles of Jesus cannot be explained away, as instances of natural cures by suggestion.

XXXVIII

The claim of Jesus to be the Son of God is powerfully favored by the surpassing beauty and excellence of His moral character.

XXXIX

The transcendental excellence of Christ's moral teaching creates a strong presumption in favor of His claim to be the Son of God.

XL

Harnack's contention that Jesus never thought Himself to be the Son of God in the literal sense of truly Divine Sonship is shown to be false by a critico-historical analysis of Christ's consciousness as expressed in Matt. xi, 27 (Luke x, 22).

XLI

The employer's right to interest on his capital is morally inferior to the laborer's right to a living wage.

XLII

Under existing conditions, interest-taking does not violate justice.

XLIII

Natural justice demands that a laborer's remuneration should be such as to maintain himself and his family in reasonable and frugal comfort.

XLIV

The inherent right of every human being to subsist from the earth's bounty implies the right of access thereto on reasonable grounds.

XLV

In our present industrial civilization private landownership is indirectly necessary for the welfare of the individual.

XLVI

Etsi certum sit Christum immediate omnia sacramenta instituisse, probabile nihilominus videtur Illum quorundam sacramentorum materiam et formam in genere tantummodo determinasse.

XLVII

Sacramenta Novae Legis in non ponentibus obicem gratiam producunt ex opere operato.

XLVIII

Validus est Baptismus sive per immersionem, sive per infusionem, sive per aspersionem collatus.

XLIX

Auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae et perenni traditione constat solum gravi morbo laborantes et in periculo mortis versantes esse capaces sacramenti Extremae Unctionis.

L

“Unctiones verbis, ordine et modo in libris ritualibus praescripto, accurate peragantur; in casu autem necessitatis sufficit unica unctio in uno sensu seu rectius in fronte cum praescripta forma breviori, salva obligatione singulas unctiones supplendi, cessante periculo.” — Can. 947, 1.

LI

Can. 1017, 1.

LII

Can. 1070, 1.

